


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THESIS

POTENTIAL THREATS TO SPANISH SECURITY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

by

Tamara K. Adams

December 1990

Thesis Advisor:

Frank M. Teti

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POTENTIAL THREATS TO SPANISH SECURITY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

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B.S., Brigham Young University, 1982


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


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ABSTRACT

Thirteen years ago, Spain held its first democratic elections since 1936. Prior to those elections, held in June 1977, Spain spent almost forty years under the dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, who established an authoritarian regime in Spain following the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Upon Franco's death in November 1975, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon was crowned as King of Spain in accordance with Franco's 1957 announcement that the monarchy (abolished in 1931) would be restored after his death. Amidst problems ranging from inflation and unemployment to internal friction and, often, opposition from rightist elements, King Juan Carlos eased the Spanish nation-state through the transition into a democracy and, undaunted by an attempted coup by military rightists in 1981, supported what might then have been considered a fragile democracy.

Now, nine years later, the entire region of Eastern Europe is in a state of transition, not totally unlike the transition Spain undertook over a decade ago. Thus, it seems particularly appropriate to examine the Spanish experience.

The purpose of this study is to examine the security aspects of that experience. As such, it will address both internal security issues such as separatist movements, especially the Basque terrorist organization (ETA), and external security issues such as those posed by Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melilla, and, in spite of the tendency to dismiss it as irrelevant to Spanish security, the Soviet Union. In addition, as the title suggests, this study will address how Spain's security posture can be expected to affect the United States and NATO, particularly as Spain finds a place within the context of a rapidly changing New Europe.



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I. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this study is to examine Spanish security issues in an attempt to ascertain Spain's stability as a democracy and potential role within the New Europe.

Thirteen years ago, Spain held its first democratic elections since 1936. Prior to those elections, held in June 1977, Spain spent almost forty years under the dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco Franco, who established an authoritarian regime in Spain following the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939). Upon Franco's death in November 1975, Prince Juan Carlos de Borbon was crowned as King of Spain in accordance with Franco's 1957 announcement that the monarchy (abolished in 1931) would be restored after his death. Amidst problems ranging from inflation and unemployment to internal friction and, often, opposition from rightist elements, King Juan Carlos eased the Spanish nation-state through the transition into a democracy and, undaunted by an attempted coup by military rightists in 1981, supported what might then have been considered a fragile democracy.

Now, nine years later, the entire region of Eastern Europe is in a state of transition, not totally unlike the transition Spain undertook over a decade ago. Given the fact that Spain, as a nation, has had to deal with separatism that has threatened to tear it apart, it seems particularly fitting to review Spanish security issues in light of the ongoing transition in Europe, a continent whose nationalistic tendencies have, in the past, threatened to tear it apart.

In order to develop this hypothesis, this thesis will address both internal security issues such as separatist movements, especially the Basque terrorist organization (ETA), and external security issues such as those posed by Gibraltar, Ceuta, Melilla, and, in spite of the tendency to dismiss it as irrelevant to Spanish security, the Soviet Union. In

addition, the study will address the role Spain can be expected to play within the New Europe and discuss implications for the United States and NATO. Spain's manifest ability to maintain peace throughout its political transition may prove to be a valuable experience, from which the rest of Europe can learn. In addition, Spain may have an unexpectedly valuable role in the New Europe.

Historically, Spain has been isolated from Europe on many levels. Dominated by the Moors in the early Middle Ages, Spaniards developed a culture apart from the rest of Western Europe. Politically, Spain was under the dictatorship of Franco until his death in 1975, whereas virtually all other Western European nations were based on democracy. Economically, Spain was impoverished, while other Western European nations had industrialized and were thriving. Tallyrand asserted in the early nineteenth century that Spain, geographically separated by the Pyrenees mountains, should not even be considered as a part of Europe. His proclamation that "Europe stops at the Pyrenees"¹ seemed to be based not only on how the rest of Europe felt, but on how the Spaniards themselves felt. Wiarda notes "the notion has been widespread that Iberia is both 'different' and inferior."²

Early in its history, Spain looked outside of Europe towards the Americas for expansion and development. According to Wiarda, "Iberia's active participation in European affairs essentially ended with the termination of the Napoleonic wars." Wiarda explains Spain's isolation from Europe following the collapse of Napoleon's Empire as follows:

Both Spain and Portugal were subsequently torn by domestic upheaval, civil wars, and repeated military coups. They had lost most of their American colonies to independence by 1826, the rest to the United States in 1898. The

¹ Wiarda, Howard J., *The Transition to Democracy in Spain and Portugal*, p. 175, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1989.

² Ibid.

great economic expansion experienced by the central and northern European countries in the nineteenth century did not occur in Iberia. Hence when the economic drive to maturity did finally begin in Spain and Portugal in the twentieth century, it came in a different historical context and therefore not necessarily with all the same social and political concomitants of modernization that had accompanied the urban-industrialization process elsewhere in Europe.³

The Spanish Civil War was a watershed in Spanish history in that it marked the beginning of a dictatorship under Franco that lasted almost forty years. If the Civil War was a watershed in Spanish history, however, so was Franco's death, which marked the beginning of Spain's transition to democracy under King Juan Carlos.

Now, Spain's transition to democracy is complete. Democracy in Spain has survived elections that have resulted in rule by each of the two major opposing parties in the nation. It survived an attempted military coup in 1981 and has acquired membership in both NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC). It is indeed ironic for Spain that its transition to democracy and the subsequent strengthening of its European ties has been met with a Europe that is, in itself, in a state of transition with implications that are more far-reaching than anybody could have imagined a decade ago.

³ Ibid., p. 180.

II. SPAIN'S DOMESTIC SITUATION

As noted in the introduction, in the last two decades Spain has undergone impressive political and economic transitions. The first part of this section of the study, then, is devoted to describing Spain's evolution from an authoritarian regime to a democracy and includes a summary of how Spain's party system developed. Second, the section will address Spain's economic situation and third, it will discuss the existence of various separatist movements in Spain. These issues comprise the crux of Spanish internal stability in that political or economic failure would mean the collapse of democracy in Spain, as could an increase in the intensity of the demands for autonomy that characterize some of Spain's separatist groups. Further, Spain's ability to contribute stability to the New Europe is intimately connected to its own internal stability. Thus, any discussion of Spain within the context of the larger Europe must, of necessity, begin with an overview of its own internal situation.

A. SPAIN'S POLITICAL SETTING

Prior to the Spanish Civil War (1931-1937), the Spanish Left consisted of "neither socialists nor communists." One half of the Spanish working class (approximately 1.5 million people) belonged to the Confederacion Nacional del Trabajo (CNT). The CNT's ideology encompassed the "faith that anarchism can be achieved through a revolutionary trade union." and that "a new world can be built in which no human being will exploit another." The Socialists also played an important part in the Spanish Civil War but the Spanish Left of the 1930s consisted primarily of anarchists. Not surprisingly, the Spanish Left of the 1930s was "not a bloc, but a heterogeneous constellation of mutually competitive and normally mutually agnostic groups." Also, not surprisingly, such a political conglomeration was in no position to win a war.

Following the Spanish Civil War, Franco declared the CNT and related regional parties, the Socialists, and the Communist Party illegal. However, during the 1960s, Felipe Gonzales, presently Spain's Prime Minister, helped initiate the secret rejuvenation of the socialist PSOE⁴. After Franco's death in 1975, when King Juan Carlos began implementing his plans for the transition of Spain's government from an authoritarian to a democratic regime, the open resurrection of the PSOE represented, to the Right, the revival of the conflicts that led to the Spanish Civil War.

The new Spanish democracy seemed further impotent in light of violence perpetrated by the Basque separatist movement, ETA. A terrorist group that has received support and training from terrorist organizations such as the Irish Republican Army and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), the ETA claimed responsibility for almost 600 deaths in the 15 years between 1972 and 1987⁵. One of the three principal political forces in the Basque country, the ETA is composed of desperate militants who, "no longer the heroes of the resistance to the dictatorship and the vanguard of majority opinion,... have become the sectarian, embittered enemies of both Basque and Spanish democracy."⁶

On the other end of the political spectrum are the extreme rightist groups which have also posed a threat to Spain's democracy. A militant rightist group, under the leadership of Colonel Tejero, Lieutenant General Jaime Milans del Bosch, and General Alfonso Armado, "who served the King as tutor, intimate advisor, secretary, and confidant for over twenty years," attempted a coup d'etat in March of 1981. The promises behind the coup were, first that only the military could wipe out Basque separatist guerrillas and, second, that a military regime could best combat mounting crime in the streets,

⁴ Martin, Benjamin, "Identity Crisis," *The Nation*, pp. 485-486, Nov. 17, 1979.

⁵ Valls-Russell, Janice, "Offering Retirement to the ETA," *The New Leader*, pp. 9-10, Nov. 30, 1987.

⁶ Jackson, Gabriel, "Can the Basques Live with Spain?" *The Nation*, pp. 518-520, Nov. 15, 1986.

pornography, drug abuse, and a "general breakdown of traditional Spanish moral values." Furthermore, the generals who instigated the coup believed that the King had "robbed them of the victory Franco won in the 1936-1939 Civil War [and had] turned the fate of the country to democrats, liberals, socialists, and communists, the very same 'enemies of Spain' that Franco defeated to save the country from political chaos and dismemberment by ethnic separatists." The timing of the coup was perfect. Adolfo Suarez had resigned from the premiership and Parliament was voting on confirmation of Leopoldo Calvo Sotelo as his successor. The military conspiracy had hoped to fill the brief power vacuum with a government patterned after the Franco regime.⁷

At the time of the attempted coup, the UCD, a moderate political party slightly to the right of center, was in power. Largely due to Juan Carlos's stubborn determination to preserve democracy in Spain, the coup was unsuccessful. However, the UCD, as well as both right and left elements within the Spanish political spectrum, were painfully aware of the still-existing dangers. First, as illustrated by the attempted coup, the ultra rightists in the army were not enthusiastic about democracy. While the generals were deemed to be, for the most part, loyal (due to a new retirement law that allowed the government to fill vacancies with individuals more inclined to support democracy), many of the colonels, captains, and majors were children of victors of the Civil War and, as such, posed a danger to the fledgling democracy. Second, the civil service was dominated by the same franquistas who held power under the old regime. Third, the government was too weak to move decisively against the anti-democratic right or to combat Basque terrorism.

The socialists, viewing the potential dangers to the democracy, established their priorities as, first, to reform the civil service, second, to consolidate democracy, and third,

⁷ Komisar, Lucy, "Spain's Fragile Democracy," pp. 437-441, Oct. 31, 1981.

to halt terrorism. Felipe Gonzalez, the Socialists' prime candidate for the upcoming elections, viewed his job as "to insure that the executive power — is strong enough to defend itself from the attacks of democracy's enemies."⁸

Gonzalez's goals, given the difficulties inherent in Spain's transition, were not at all unreasonable or excessive. In fact, in order to understand the delicate balance King Juan Carlos attempted to achieve in order to maintain political stability in Spain, it may be useful to summarize the development of the party system in Spain. Without question, the most notable aspect of Spain's political development since Franco's death in 1975 has been its dual-transition, both from an authoritarian state to a democracy, and from "a unitary state into one based on 17 regional governments called Autonomous Communities." However, the most important aspects of this "dual-transition" period — a process that both influenced and came to be an intricate part of Spain's new political face — has undoubtedly been the evolution of the party system in Spain. As one might expect, given the multiple cultural, social, and regional facets to Spain, this evolution was accompanied by a myriad of complexities. As Crozier quoted in the *National Review*, "within six months of Franco's death, more than five hundred political groups or parties had registered, and that was just the national political spectrum; many of them had their Catalan or Basque counterparts, without counting the purely autonomous or separatist parties."⁹

Though hundreds of political parties emerged on the scene in post-Franco Spain, only a few came through the first elections with parliamentary representation. The two major parties that emerged in the 1977 election were the Union of the Democratic Center (UCD) and the Socialist Workers' Party (PSOE). In addition, the Spanish Communist

⁸ Gunther, R., Sani, G., and Shabad, G., *Spain After Franco*, pp. 181-182, University of California Press, 1986.

⁹ Crozier, Brian, "Invertebrate Spain," *National Review*, pp. 740-747, June 24, 1983.

Party (PCE) and the Popular Alliance (AP) "gained enough votes to insure for themselves a significant vote in the new parliament."¹⁰

Obtaining parliamentary representation was just the beginning of the struggle Spain's major political parties had to face, however. Whereas the PSOE and PCE had survived clandestinely throughout the Francoist regime and, thus, had organizational foundations in place, the AP and the UCD were newly created parties that had to establish not only their organizational structure but also their party platforms and public images. On the other hand, the PSOE and the PCE were sometimes limited by the images they had already created¹¹. Thus, whereas the PSOE's principal challenge was to consolidate numerous existing socialist movements¹², and to handle rapid growth¹³, the CDU's principal challenge was to develop an "organizational framework, a statement of ideological principles, or [and] a mass-membership base."¹⁴

On the periphery, the PCE and the AP had their own challenges to deal with. Not only did they face overcoming their own developmental challenges, but they had to deal with the challenges of their respective positions on the periphery. For example, the AP of the late 1970s has been described as the UCD's "lightning rod, deflecting accusations of *Franquismo* from vulnerable segments of the UCD."¹⁵

While the development of the party system in Spain was peaceful, the political situation in Spain was peaceful, the political situation in Spain in the 1970s was anything

¹⁰ Gunther, p. 38.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 42.

¹² Ibid., p. 158.

¹³ Ibid., p. 165

¹⁴ Ibid., p. 127.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 133.

but stable, as became apparent in 1982 when the new democracy's second general election was held. Prior to that election, the UCD collapsed and both the UCD and the PCE "were caught in the throes of divisive intraparty struggles on the eve of the 1982 election...." Thus, the AP took up some of the slack in the political void created by the UCD's collapse, and the PSOE, once outlawed, gained the popular vote. This created an extremely difficult situation for the PCE. As Mujal-Leon explains in the following excerpt:

Not only have PCE electoral fortunes come to depend more than ever on mistakes the PSOE commits, but the Communists are now competing with a Socialist party that, having proven itself capable of winning an absolute majority in the *Cortes*, can rightfully claim to be the best and, given the allergy many Spaniards feel toward a Popular Front, perhaps the only chance the Left has for exercising power. The Communist dilemma is that they can only gain at the expense of the Socialists. Yet by weakening the PSOE, the PCE would undermine the prospects for the Left. Under present circumstances, and in the absence of a viable Centrist party, those who voted Socialist in 1982 can hardly be expected to shift to the Communist standard. The Communists therefore face an uphill struggle in their quest for a more important position on the Left and in Spanish politics.¹⁶

Even given the difficulties inherent in creating and maintaining a party system in Spain, however, "the beliefs of the electorate, the strategies adopted by political elites [most notably the King], and the institutions established during the transition."¹⁷ all played a role in Spain's success. Whereas previous attempts at establishing a democracy based on a party system had failed in Spain, the democracy that has evolved after Franco's death has thus far been able to deal successfully with the same controversial issues that contributed to the downfall of previous democratic attempts, namely, such issues as "class conflicts, differences over the proper role of the church in social and political life, and struggles between some regional micronationalist movements and the

¹⁶ Mujal-Leon, Eusebio, *Communism and Political Change in Spain*, p. 227, Indiana University Press, 1983.

¹⁷ Gunther, p. 2.

centralist tendencies of Spanish nationalists... [in addition to] the general political orientations and ideological predilections of the Spanish populace."¹⁸

Among other developments to be discussed later, Gonzalez's reelection in 1986 and vote of confidence in 1990¹⁹ serve as clear indications that Spain's party system has stabilized. In accordance with his party's objective to consolidate democracy, Gonzalez has pursued middle-of-the-road, sometimes contradictory policies. In an attempt to meet a second party objective, that is, to halt terrorism, he began meeting with ETA members in April of 1986. Gonzalez, apparently, hopes these meetings will "drive a wedge between younger elements of the ETA bent on terrorism and older ones seeking a way back to normality."²⁰

Spain's chosen road of moderacy and compromise is further exemplified by King Juan Carlos's cautious treatment of the instigators of the attempted coup in 1981. The King wanted "no harsh punishment for military plotters." Given the possibility of more violent military reaction, this attitude was without doubt "a measure of the precariousness of his own position and of the country's democratic institutions."²¹

In addition to steps already taken to improve Spain's precarious situation regarding the ETA and the militant right, Gonzalez has taken some positive steps toward improving Spain's economy and international relations, as the following sections indicate.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 3.

¹⁹ *Reuters*, "Spain's Gonzalez Wins Parliamentary Vote of Confidence," 5 April 1990, Thurs., B C cycle.

²⁰ Russell, pp. 9-10.

²¹ Acoca.

B. SPAIN'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS

Traditionally, Spain has been plagued with high unemployment rates that, especially in the 1970s, threatened the new democracy's stability. While Spain's stability is no longer an issue in light of its proven ability to maintain a democratic system for over a decade (despite such threats as an attempted military coup in 1982 and continuing demands for regional autonomy), unemployment has continued to be a problem.

In addition, Spain has been plagued in the past with inflation and a lack of productive investments. In 1977, Spain's inflation rate was 26.4 percent: investment was negative, and both interest rates and unemployment rates were high. The prospects for a healthy economy were brighter in 1985. Although unemployment was still the highest of any industrialized country (22 percent), "economic growth in 1985 was the strongest since 1977 (at 2.1 percent); investment... grew by 5.5 percent; and inflation has [had] been gradually reduced... and is now [was] pegged at eight percent. Interest rates also decreased to ten percent in mid-1986 and real salaries, buying power and consumption in general" showed progress²².

Spain's economic problems have continued to decrease in the past few years. In early 1986, Spain's decision to join the European Economic Community (EEC) was fraught with the unknown, but the decision seems to have been profitable. In mid-1988, official reserves stood at \$38 billion, "nearly three times the level of 1985. In 1987, for the first time, these reserves exceeded the level of external debt, which has slowly been declining since 1983-1984. [Further,... inflation remains relatively low; the peseta is strong and is probably slated to become stronger; and integration in the EEC has led to substantial shift in the complexion of Spanish trade." Membership in the EEC along with the government's encouragement for the shrinking of "old-line industries, including steel and shipbuilding, as a way of shifting resources to businesses with brighter futures."²³

²² Serfary, Meir, "Political Pragmatism in Spain," *Current History*, pp. 379-380, Nov. 1986.

have seemed to boost Spain's economy in a positive direction. Even so, according to an article by David White, published in the *Financial Times* on January 18, 1988, "These are still early days to measure the results of [Spain's] EEC ascension, the transition period in industrial goods has five more years to run, and a large part of the farm sector has not yet really joined. But that is not to say that nothing has happened." Indeed, Spain's economic developments in recent years have been noteworthy. Since the nation joined the EEC in 1986, Spain's economy has been characterized by rapid expansion that may be, according to White, the most exciting period in Spain's economic history since economic reforms of 1959, when Spain was still under the dictatorship of Generalissimo Francisco Franco. Growth of real gross domestic product (GDP) in 1988 was five percent, which, though slightly less than growth in 1987 (largely due to a decrease in the growth rate of agricultural production) is still quite high.

As Table 1 indicates, Spain's overall economic performance in the labor market improved even more than projected. Of course, as an outgrowth of Spain's economic growth, however, Spanish consumer demands have increased, a situation that has forced Spain to rely more heavily on imports and which has "brought the process of disinflation to a halt and weakened the current balance of payments position more than had been projected."²⁴

²³ Time's U.S. Board of Economists, "New Members of the Club," *Time*, p. 37, 27 Jan, 1986.

²⁴ Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, *OECD Economic Surveys: Spain 1988/1989*, p. 12.

TABLE 1. 1987 AND 1988 DEVELOPMENTS IN RETROSPECT

Percentage change over previous year						
	1985	1986	1987		1988	
	Outcome		Preliminary estimates	Outcome	Projections	Outcome Provisional
Private consumption	2.4	3.6	4.5	5.5	3.25	4.5
Government consumption	4.6	5.7	6	8.7	4.5	5.0
Gross fixed investment	4.1	10.0	14	14.6	8	14.0
Total domestic demand	2.9	6.1	16.5	8.5	4.5	6.9
Exports of goods and services	2.8	1.3	7.5	5.9	4.25	6.3
Imports of goods and services	6.2	16.5	19	20.4	10	15.2
Foreign balance	-0.5	-2.6	-2.5	-2.8	-1.5	-2.1
GDP at constant prices	2.3	3.3	4.5	5.5	3.5	5.0
Memorandum items:						
Total employment	-0.9	2.2	3.5	3.1	2.25	2.9
Unemployment rate	21.5	21.0	20.25	20.5	20.25	19.5
GDP price deflator	8.5	10.9	5.5	5.9	4	5.7
Consumer price deflator	8.2	8.7	5.5	5.4	4.5	5.1
Current external balance						
(US\$ billion)	(2.5)	(3.9)	(1.5)	(0.0)	(-2)	(-3.6)
(Percent of GDP)	(1.3)	(1.7)	(0.5)	(0.0)	(-0.5)	(-1.1)

The principal source of Spain's demand growth has been fixed investment, which has grown rapidly since Spain's accession to the EEC. Foreign companies have gained a confidence in the Spanish economy that was non-existent in the new democracy of a decade ago. Hence, construction activity has boomed, with the need for office space, and rents and real estate prices, especially in the larger cities such as Madrid and Barcelona, have skyrocketed. The apparent confidence in Spain as a source of new investment possibilities has been stimulated by several factors. Ironically, the OECD identifies the first of these factors as increased prospects for demand, high and growing profits, foreign capital injections, and increased pressure on resources. Hence, Spain's growing demand both causes increased investments and is stimulated by the same. Whatever the reasons,

however, it seems apparent that membership in the EEC has provided Spanish citizens (based on demand growth) with a higher standard of living. In 1988, for example, private consumption grew by four-and-a-half percent, which, though less than the preceding few years, was still substantial. In addition, OECD estimates that the "total aggregate demand rose by about seven percent in volume terms."²⁵

At the beginning of 1988, Spain still had the community's worst unemployment record --- twenty percent of the active population²⁶. To make it worse, the government, led by Mr. Felipe Gonzales, had promised to create 800,000 jobs prior to the end of its first four-year term. The promise never materialized and, in fact, unemployment became more pronounced. However, as the OECD survey points out, Spain's agricultural labor force in 1988 continued to shrink, but almost 400,000 new jobs were created in other sectors, especially in the construction, industry, and service sectors²⁷. Employment Promotion Programmes have helped to create new jobs by, for example, "restrict[ing] the application of tax expenditure for new hirings to the net creation of permanent jobs, thus no longer favouring temporary and part-time contracts as was the case before." As a result of such measures, Spain's unemployment rate dropped to 18.5 percent in 1988. While still the highest in the OECD area,²⁸ it is certainly a marked improvement.

The role of the Spanish government in Spain's economic progress is indubitable. Under Franco, in the 1940s, Spain practiced "economic autarchy", which was

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ White.

²⁷ OECD, p. 15.

²⁸ The OECD is composed of the following nations: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, Finland, Australia, and New Zealand.

characterized by high import barriers, low growth, high (partly repressed) inflation, government control of the economy, and limited public spending. Even though public spending was limited, however, the 1950s were characterized by large deficits in the budget. In general, high inflation and excessive demand plagued the Spanish economy.

The liberalization of Spain's economy didn't begin until 1959, when Spain became a member of the OECD. Franco's goals at that time included reducing public deficits and deregulating the economy, and a "Stabilisation Programme" was initiated to support these goals.²⁹

After Franco's death, King Juan Carlos, in addition to establishing a democracy, expanded Spain's social welfare programs. However, oil shocks in the 1970s put Spain's economical aspirations on hold for a time, because of Spain's dependency on energy imports. Consequently, unemployment benefits, subsidies, and capital transfers all rose. In contrast, in the 1980s, the increase in public transfers has slowed and fixed investment is the "most dynamic component of expenditure."³⁰

In light of the "rapid expansion of government activities," however, setting priorities may be difficult for Spain. In an attempt to manage public expenditure, the Spanish government has established "Committees for Functional Outlays," which are responsible for coming up with and implementing four year plans. Typically, committee authorities have not, however, had the power to regulate the actions of governmental spending agencies. Consequently, "actual expenditure has always exceeded the initial budget estimate by a wide margin, while remaining well within total credit lines."³¹

Regardless of the difficulties of the challenges ahead of Spain, however, all available measurements indicate it is on the right track. Indeed, regardless of other aspects of the

²⁹ Ibid., p. 52.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid., p. 63.

economy in need of attention, Spain's willingness to reduce trade barriers in order to gain membership to the EEC has given its economy a strong boost that should not be overlooked. Spain's economic challenges do not seem to carry nearly the potential for destabilization as does the continued existence of various separatist groups within its borders.

C. SEPARATISM AND THE POSSIBILITY FOR RENEWED INSTABILITY

In assessing Spain's internal divisions, it seems only natural to first consider the differing regions in Spain since diverse peoples have occupied or influenced the Iberian Peninsula for literally thousands of years. The extent of this diversity is indicated by the following excerpt, taken from a study prepared by the Foreign Area Studies of the American University:

The ancient History of the peoples of the Iberian Peninsula is a hodge-podge of tribal movements, warfare, incursions, invasions, and intermixing of various tribes. That the peninsula was occupied in early prehistoric times is attested to by the Paleolithic cave paintings of Altamira near the Bay of Biscay. The Iberians probably came to peninsula about the third millennium B.C., most likely from the eastern Mediterranean, although some scholars believed they came from North Africa. In the first millennium B.C. waves of Celts arrived in the peninsula, some to displace Iberians, others to mix with them to form Celtiberian tribes. At the same time Greek and Phoenician colonies had been established along the coasts; and in the late first millennium B.C. Carthaginians had arrived from Africa, and Romans had crossed the Pyrenees to make the peninsula a battleground and eventually a part of the Roman Empire. Germanic tribes entered Spain--the Romans called it Hispania--during the declining years of the empire, and by the fifth century A.D. the Visigoths were displacing the Romans as rulers of Spain.³²

The same study recounts how the Muslims invaded the peninsula in A.D. 711 and occupied the territory for almost eight hundred years; and, of course, like most of the rest of the continent, Spain was controlled and influenced for a time by France under Napoleon. It would be absurd to assert that current regionalism in Spain could be

³² Keefe, Eugene K. and others, *Area Handbook for Spain*, p. 2. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976.

attributed totally to the historical influx of such diverse groups, but it would be equally absurd to assert that these groups had not influenced the complexities of regionalism in modern-day Spain.

Paradoxically, there is a tendency among Spanish "pueblos" to isolate themselves. As the authors of *Area Handbook for Spain* state, "[t]he Spaniard's sense of loyalty to and integration in a community or larger group diminishes from a strong institutionalized affiliation to his barrio (ward or suburb) or "pueblo" through progressively lesser attachments to "comarca" [a unity of "production, language and culture"³³] and region to a more idiosyncratic and abstract sentiment toward the nation state." Brian Crozier noted the same tendency among Spaniards in his *National Review* article: "The loyalty of many a Spaniard is, first, to his 'patria chica,' the little place he happens to have been born in; second to his native province; and third (if at all) to the centralized state of Spain."³⁴

The loyalty, sometimes extreme, that some "pueblanos" feel towards their village communities was manifested in the Catalan borderland struggles during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. In fact, as early as 1307, communities in France and Spain along the Pyrenees mountains were disputing over water rights. In the early nineteenth century, young, unmarried men often expressed "sociocentrismo," or "the sense of attachment to village or parish and a corresponding hostility toward neighboring settlements" by "initiat[ing] 'outsiders' who married into the community, punish[ing] agricultural abuses, enforc[ing] restrictions on common lands, or maintain[ing] road networks of the parish." Despite perceived cultural differences between neighboring villages, however, such differences seem to have been largely non-existent between

³³ Karmen, H., *Spain in the Later Seventeenth Century*, (No publisher given), 1981.

³⁴ Crozier, p. 741.

villagers in the nineteenth century. The elites of different villages were the first to use "language as a vehicle of political nationalism." However, "the French and Spanish identities of the communities in the borderland had their origins within a set of local conflicts."³⁵

Currently, regionalism in Spain is no less complex, and probably no more so, than it was in the nineteenth century. With history as a backdrop, the three principal actors of regionalism in Spain today are the Catalanian, Basque and Galician provinces. Catalonia has been autonomous in the past, with Catalan as its official language. Following the Civil War, however, Franco prohibited the region's schools from teaching Catalan and restricted its use. Catalans are proud of both their language and cultural identity. Although some separatist sympathies exist among Catalans, most "see their destiny as tied to Spain's."³⁶

The Basque country is second only to Catalonia in Spanish industrialization, but the Basques are "much more separatist in attitude than the Catalans." Even within the Basque country, however, regional differences are prominent. For example, during the Civil War, Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa, two of the Basque provinces, sided with the Republicans, who lost the war. Alava, on the other hand, supported Franco. During and subsequent to Franco's reign, Basques from Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa formed the underground terrorist group known as Basque Nation and Liberty (Euzkadi ta Azkatasuna — ETA). Many of the Basques, who, like the Catalans, have their own language (Euzkera), still seek separation from Spain under the auspices of the ETA.

³⁵ Sahlins, Peter, "The Nation in the Village: State-building and Communal Struggles in the Catalan Borderland During the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries," *Journal of Modern History*, pp. 234-263, June 1988.

³⁶ Keefe, 6.

The only other region of Spain that uses a separate language is Galicia, but "unlike Catalonia and the Basque country, the separatist movement in Galicia has been of minor consequence."³⁷

The remainder of Spain, however, is not "one great Castilian or Spanish entity; it is rather a conglomerate of regions divided by geography and historical tradition. Although Spanish is the common language, each of the regions has its distinct dialect and often several subdialects. The people declare themselves to be of a region before they are of the Spanish state. They are Castilian, Aragonese, Andalusian, or Valencian, among several others, and their language betrays their region and more often than not a specific area of that region." In addition, ethnic groups in Spain include several groups of gypsies, to include Beticos, Castellanos, and Cefeleles; jews; foreign minorities' and marginal Spanish minorities, to include vaqueros de Alzada (herdsmen of the heights), pasiegos (herdsmen from old Castile), agotes (Navarrese herdsmen), maragatos (natives of Astorga), morenos (Black people in the province of Huelva) and morcheros (also black)³⁸.

Spain has been referred to as an "ethnic mosaic" and, since the time of Franco, as the "Two Spains," one Roman Catholic, the other anticlerical; one traditionalist, the other progressive; one reactionary, the other revolutionary; one authoritarian, the other anarchical; one provincial, the other cosmopolitan; on Spain that "stresses the unique character of Hispanic culture and institutions and the other values it shares with the rest of Western Europe; there is the Spain of Castile (the Center) and the Spain of the regions (the periphery)." Throughout the history of Spain, or at least, since the reconquest when Spain overcame Moorish rule, "there have been recurrent periods of unity, but these

³⁷ Ibid., p. 7.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 117.

cycles have been achieved most often by the suppression of local rights." Both Spains, since 1977, have been united under democracy.

III. THE BASQUE TERRORIST ORGANIZATION

It is said that as of age 40 each person has the face that he has made for himself. Starting with the supple clay of the newborn infant, we gradually mold our own faces, as well or as poorly as we know how, amid joy and sorrow, flashes of brilliance and acts of stupidity. Our faces are our own. And so it is with the Basque Country. If the Basque Country has a tragic and at times anguished face now, occasionally wearing a brutal expression, it is because that is what all of us have made it.³⁹

The face of the Basque terrorist group ETA (Euskadi ta Askatasuna – Basque Country and Freedom), as the author of the above excerpt suggests, has undergone changes of facial expression since its conception. Rooted in Spain's regionalism, fueled by Franco's dictatorship, and challenged by modern democracy, the ETA has managed to survive. How the terrorist group has survived becomes an intriguing question. Whether or not it will survive in the future is still another question. This chapter will explore the ETA's historical roots, factors that have influenced its changing expressions, and its development into a modern terrorist organization. In addition, the chapter will include a discussion of the challenges the ETA must confront if it is to survive in the future as a viable movement capable of changing Spain's face as a unified nation.

A. SPAIN'S REGIONALISM: ROOT CAUSES

The struggle between centralism and regionalism in Spain is usually traced to 1812, when Spain adopted "a liberal centralizing Constitution⁴⁰." (Prior to that time — since the seventh century — the Basques had been politically autonomous.) The struggle evolved into armed conflict; from 1833 to 1840, and again from 1873 to 1876, the Carlist

³⁹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Terrorism - Spain: ETA (1974-1984)," p. 2, JPRS-TOT-86-010-L, 31 January 1986.

⁴⁰ Robert P. Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 14, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.

wars "pitted liberal Centralism against traditional regionalists not just in Spain but in the Basque provinces themselves⁴¹." After these wars, the regional privileges and autonomy that had characterized the Basque country gave way to more centralized control. Even so, the Basque people hoped to regain their autonomy and the Basque Nationalist Party was formed in the late nineteenth century for this end.

While, as previously indicated, regionalism is a factor in other parts of Spain, the Basques' more fervent tendency towards regional separatism has been reinforced by several factors. First, early industrialization stimulated a concentration of wealth in the Basque provinces. This prosperity led to a "superior, or patronizing attitude towards the inhabitants of other regions." Moreover, with prosperity, Basque resentment grew toward the rest of Spain as they began to feel that they were subsidizing "the more backward regions⁴²" of Spain. Thus, the Basques began to see themselves stereotypically as a "hardworking minority group" entitled to more compensation for their labor than they were getting.

A second factor that has contributed to Basque feelings of regionalism has to do with feelings that a central government is incapable of understanding local problems. This feeling is magnified because Basques have traditionally been "under-represented in many of Spain's major public institutions... disproportionately small numbers of judges, civil servants, policemen and military personnel have been recruited from these groups [the Basques and Catalans]⁴³." Thus, the Basques' feelings regarding their relationship to public officials have varied from that of "paying for the support of an army of parasitical bureaucrats" to that of living in an "occupied territory⁴⁴."

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Medhurst, Dr. Kenneth, *The Basques*, p. 5. The Minority Rights Group, 1972.

⁴³ Ibid.

In spite of, or perhaps because of minimal representation within the central government, the Basques tend to maintain a high level of political awareness — a tendency that only exacerbates existing schisms between the Basques and Madrid. This political consciousness, a third factor in Basque regionalism, is evidenced, for example, by the quality of services provided to the sick and aging and by a Basque propensity “for forming and joining special interest groups⁴⁵.”

Any discussion of the root causes of regionalism in the Euskadi would not be complete without mention of the Basque Church and immigration. Both have heavily influenced Basque society; the Church “because the Basque people... have been particularly loyal to it⁴⁶,” and immigration because of the industrialization that has characterized Euskadi.

Whereas in other areas of Spain, “the working classes... have tended to become indifferent or hostile to organized religion⁴⁷,” the Roman Catholic Church in Euskadi is a central aspect of life. The priests in Euskadi have considerable empathy toward the interests of the general population; by the same token, they exercise considerable influence. As a result, the Basque priests are not always in step with the mainstream Spanish clergy, as was illustrated in the Civil War — whereas “a large proportion of Spanish clergy were in General Franco’s camp, Basque priests, because of their sympathy with the local nationalist cause, were frequently found on the other side of the fence⁴⁸.”

⁴⁴ Ibid., 6.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

Immigration to Euskadi, like the Church, has tended to solidify regionalistic tendencies. Immigrants to Euskadi face several difficulties, as Dr. Kenneth Medhurst points out. The most obvious difficulty is perhaps the language, which is difficult and unrelated to any other language found in Spain. Secondly, many of the immigrants "have come from other fairly well developed regions and... have brought with them their own fairly fixed cultural and political values⁴⁹." Thirdly, the Basques tend to be exclusive.

B. GEOGRAPHICAL FACTORS IN THE BASQUE COUNTRY

If regionalism is a fact of life in Spain as a whole, it is even more a fact of life in Euskadi. The Spanish Basque country itself is divided into four distinct provinces: Vizcaya, Guipuzcoa, Alava, and Navarra. Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa are located to the North of the Cantabrian mountains; Alava and Navarra lie to the South (see Appendix A). Thus, the topography of Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa have historically "produced an adventurous and daring maritime culture that has given us some of the world's premier explorers;" while "the Southern plains, rolling gently Southward from the mountains toward the Ebro River, fostered... [a] farming culture, one that looked inward to itself and to Spain, rather than outward to a world of commerce and exploration⁵⁰." Such differences, fostered by the region's geography, persist today.

Navarra remains primarily an agricultural province, while Guipuzcoa, Vizcaya, and to some extent Alava have become heavily industrialized. Likewise, as Figure 1 indicates, use of the Basque language Euskera differs substantially from region to region.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 9.

	Percent of total population speaking Euskera	Percent of indigenous population speaking Euskera	
Guipuzcoa	68	44	92% of total Euskera speakers
Vizcaya	22	13	
Navarra	*	*	8% of total Euskera speakers
Alava	*	*	
Overall	30	20	

Figure 1: The use of Euskera in the Basque population

The data in Figure 1 were obtained in the early 1970s. Only nine percent of all Basque schoolchildren are instructed in Euskera. Figure 2 shows their location by province.⁵¹




Figure 2: The location of Euskera-speaking schoolchildren

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 11.

The demographics of the four provinces differ as well. As Clark notes, "In Navarra, where industrialization has proceeded most slowly, about 80 percent of the population is native-born. In Alava, Vizcaya, and Guipuzcoa, in contrast, the percentage of native-born actually drops to about 60 percent⁵²." Ironically, the Basque nationalist insurgency movement has been most successful in Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa.

C. HISTORICAL ROOTS OF THE ETA

It could be said that Euzkadi Ta Azkatasuna (ETA), a terrorist organization rooted in Basque regionalism, has its roots in ancient Basque history. At the same time, one could argue that its roots are somehow connected with Napoleon and the French Revolution, which gave birth to the idea of national identity. As previously mentioned, the ETA's roots could also be traced to the Carlist Wars which precipitated the Basque region's loss of autonomy. Gurutz Jauregui has traced the birth of the ETA to two factors: "traditional Basque nationalist ideology" and "Francoism⁵³." As suggested in the previous section, industrialization and the immigration that follows could also be given partial credit for the ETA's birth. In reality, it is likely that each of these factors has played a part in the birth and nature of the ETA.

If historical events such as industrialization and the birth of the nation-state can be considered ancestral to the ETA, it seems that events closer to the ETA's actual birth may have parental characteristics. Indeed, this seems to be the case.

In 1936, with the onset of the Spanish Civil War, the Basque provinces of Alava and Navarra supported Franco, while Guipuzcoa and Vizcaya supported the Republic. Less

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Jauregui, Gurutz, "National Identity and Political Violence in the Basque Country," *European Journal of Political Research*, v. 14, p. 587, 1986.

than nine months later, Franco and his forces had conquered the Basque region and forced its government to seek exile in France. Franco, in an effort to control any further resistance in Euskadi, took extreme measures to repress the language and culture⁵⁴.

The following statements made by ETA members serve to illustrate both the nature of these repressions and the feelings of the individuals who would later become terrorists:

Jose Maria Escubi Larraz (one of the chief ETA leaders in the 1960s):

I got to school, I realized that no one talked like me; I felt, then, a feeling of loneliness. I couldn't understand Spanish and the lectures of the teacher. They thought that I didn't want to study my lessons, and they punished me. This marked me deeply. And when I grew up I decided to do something for my Basque country.⁵⁵

Miguel Angel Apalategui:

Ten years ago [in about 1967 -RPC], in the festival in Aya, I was wearing a cap with four clusters of ribbons hanging from it. They [the police] grabbed me, they took off the ribbons and they took away my identity card, and they told me to come to Ataun the next day to get it. I went there, and they made me return home and come back with the cap that I had had on in Aya. I went back with the cap. They slapped me around a little and yelled at me. And I had to remain quiet. The ribbons were the [Basque] colors. They gave me a fine of 500 pesetas [about ten dollars] and they let me leave.⁵⁶

In addition to prohibiting the wearing of the colors of the Basque flag and the use of Euskera "in all public areas, and teaching or using the language in communications media⁵⁷," Franco forbid the Basques "to enjoy simple expressions of folklore, such as singing of nationalistic songs, [or] the playing of proscribed musical instruments⁵⁸." Further, officials assassinated Basque citizens randomly, "nationalist church officials...

⁵⁴ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, pp. 20-21.

⁵⁵ Clark, Robert P., "Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members," *Terrorism*, v. 6, p. 437, 1983.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 438.

⁵⁷ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 21.

⁵⁸ Clark, "Patterns in the Lives of ETA Members," p. 438.

were denounced and replaced with more reliable clergy" and "prisons bulged with political prisoners⁵⁹."

Ten years after the Basques had been defeated in the Civil War, "the basic elements of a resistance organization were in place⁶⁰." The Basques who had been exiled to Paris began an underground resistance movement; the Basques who had been imprisoned were able to establish "a network of contacts and shared experiences that facilitated the establishment of an underground political force in the late 1940s⁶¹."

If the Civil War served as a sort of paternal catalyst for the resistance movement, the economic crisis that followed it served as a kind of maternal catalyst. Clark reports that "by 1951, economic conditions had worsened to such an extent that serious strikes began to appear spontaneously throughout the country⁶²." In 1951, the Resistance Committee sponsored a general strike in Balboa (similar to a strike it had organized four years earlier). Franco crushed the strike, and the ensuing "repression imposed from Madrid was so intense that the network of clandestine cells within Spain was left in ruins⁶³."

Only months later, the U.S. government (which had supported the Basque government for at least five years, in an attempt to either destabilize or liberalize the Franco government) lost interest in fighting Franco and began "negotiations that would lead to the U.S. base agreement." Meanwhile, France, following the U.S. lead, "expelled the Basque government-in-exile... and turned the [its] building over to the Spanish Embassy for its use⁶⁴."

⁵⁹ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 21.

⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 20.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 21.

⁶² Ibid., p. 22.

⁶³ Ibid., p. 23.

The repressions brought on by the Civil War and Franco, poor economic conditions, and finally, what must have felt like a political betrayal to the Basques fostered the development of EKIN and EGI-EKIN (see Appendix B), the political forerunners of ETA.

In 1952, EKIN ("to do" or "to make") was formed from a group of students from Vizcaya and Guipuzcoa. This group began discussing politics and contemporary affairs; they also began publishing a newsletter, from whence they got their name. Later, in 1956, a group known as Euzko Gaztedi del Interior (EGI), or Basque Youth, established itself clandestinely in Spain. (The PNV had helped to establish the organization ten years earlier in Spain)⁶⁵.

EKIN and EGI served as political precursors of the ETA in more than one respect. First of all, they were the first Basque organizations to operate clandestinely in Spain since the beginning of Franco's regime. Second, they came to typify the changing masks that would characterize the ETA from its conception. The two organizations were short-lived. On July 31, 1959, the ETA was born.

D. ETA'S IDEOLOGICAL EVOLUTION

Clark has identified three ideologies that have dominated the ETA during different periods of its evolution. ETA members with nationalistic tendencies — those who believe that Euskadi should be autonomous — base their belief on Basque ethnicity, which they consider to be "a product of their language." Clark calls the people "ethnolinguists"⁶⁶. On the other hand, ETA members with a Marxist orientation,

⁶⁴ Ibid., p. 24.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 25.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 33.

concerned more with "liberation of the Basque workers" than with Basque ethnicity, have been called "trotskyites," (though, as Clark notes, "what they borrowed from Trotsky is not at all clear⁶⁷.") Finally, the third ideological belief common to the ETA is based on a combination of ethnolinguistic and trotskyite ideology. Those who espoused this ideology "believed Euskadi was suffering from a colonial relationship;" thus, advocates of the ideology were called "third-worldists."

Gurutx Jauregui provides an extended perspective regarding the ideological evolution of the ETA:

The doctrine of classic nationalism covered several important aspects: firstly, what may be called regionalism in the sense of what is essentially Basque (that is, the recovery of the Basque spirit) and in an inward-looking sense (that is, the rejection of all that is Spanish); secondly, the assumption of the Basque historical myths (the Basque people as a noble, just, democratic, freedom-loving people has reached this state of degradation as a consequence of the submission to and occupation by a reactionary, feudal country — Spain); thirdly, the consideration of the immigrants as foreigners; fourthly a visceral anti-communism in opposition to a doctrine that is radically incompatible with what is peculiarly Basque; and finally, various socio-economic concepts based on the social doctrine of the Catholic Church⁶⁸.

Jauregui further notes that the ETA's early ideology differed somewhat from "historic nationalism." He cites two peculiar contributions toward nationalism as "non-confessionalism — a particularly important aspect considering the omnipresence of the Catholic Church in the Basque country — and... the rejection of the race as a biological-genetic element;" instead, Jauregui observes that the Basques have substituted "the ethnos, a linguistic-cultural element, as a sign of identity⁶⁹."

In addition to his explanation of the elements of Basque nationalism, Jauregui proposes a plausible explanation of the ideological evolution in the ETA. He states that

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 34.

⁶⁸ Jauregui, p. 593.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

the ETA's challenge revolved around "the search for a theory capable of giving solid backing to the Basque people's national demands; the adaptation of Basque nationalism to the socio-economic realities of the country; [and] the putting into practice of a political strategy of national liberation⁷⁰."

E. THE EARLY YEARS (1959–1964)

During 1959, large-scale strikes and social conflicts characterized Spain. Due to the industry in Euskadi, the people there were hit particularly hard by the economic difficulties and ensuing conflicts. As a result, the ETA found it necessary to deal with the worker constituency rather than remaining true to the nationalism that was, initially, its entire reason for being.

ETA's general frustration with the Franco regime was manifest in 1961, when ETA challenged Spanish authority by derailing trains carrying Franco supporters to a celebration over his victory in the Civil War. ("Nineteen-sixty-one marked the twenty-fifth anniversary of the military rebellion that began the Civil War⁷¹") The action was followed by police arrests and deportations that temporarily stifled the ETA's development in Spain. Even so, it gave the organization's exiles time to establish themselves as the Executive Committee which, they hoped, would give the organization direction. In accordance with their new structural organization, the ETA exiles "issued the organization's declaration of purpose." The declaration identified ETA's purpose as "to obtain as rapidly as possible and using all the means possible – including violence– the independence of Euskadi⁷²."

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 584.

⁷¹ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 35.

⁷² Ibid., p. 37.

In spite of the ETA's "new direction," however, economic instability and the ensuing labor conflicts continued. According to Jauregui, "this labour conflict began to produce a change of attitude at its [the ETA's] base⁷³." Thus, it might be argued that the ETA was forced to broaden its ideological base in order to meet the political challenge of gaining a large enough constituency to be influential.

F. THE MIDDLE YEARS (1965-1967)

The Middle Years of the ETA's ideological struggle are characterized by the fourth and fifth assemblies. The Fourth Assembly was held in 1965 and "was the first assembly to meet in Spain under clandestine conditions." An important outcome of the assembly was approval of the "action-repression-action spiral theory". According to this theory, the ETA could, "by means of specific attacks... provoke Spanish authorities into an overreaction that would inflict heavy damage on the civilian Basque population⁷⁴." Thus, "with each action, there would come a counteraction of such a repressive nature that ETA would benefit with an increased flow of members to its ranks and increased support from the noncombatants⁷⁵." In this way, the ETA hoped to achieve its overall goal of Basque independence backed by popular support.

The Fourth Assembly was also characterized by "the establishment of the Activism Branch and the decision to launch an armed insurgency⁷⁶." The purpose of the Activism Branch was to assist in obtaining the financial resources necessary to further the purposes of the ETA. Thus, they were responsible for robberies and extortions.

⁷³ Jauregui, p. 594.

⁷⁴ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 40.

⁷⁵ Ibid., p. 41.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

The Fifth Assembly met initially in December 1966. The events of the meeting were dominated by a conflict between the Marxists and the other ETA constituencies (i.e. the ethno-linguists and the third-worldists). Apparently, during the Summer of that year, the Marxists attempted to take over the ETA by using the organization's newsletter to "call for all ETA militants to vote in the Spanish labor union elections scheduled for the autumn of 1966⁷⁷." The ETA's other factions, however, viewed participation in these elections as a means of legitimizing Franco.

A report was prepared to document the accusations against the Trotskyites. Following formal presentation of the report, members in attendance voted to expel the Trotskyites; thus the Fifth Assembly was characterized by the first schism within the ETA.

The second half of the Fifth Assembly met in March 1967 and "dealt with the split between the two [remaining] factions... in a struggle over ultimate control of the organization⁷⁸." The third-worldists dominated the Assembly, causing the ethno-linguists to resign and form the BRANKA group. The remaining members of the ETA (the third-worldists) also initiated "important structural changes⁷⁹" within the ETA. Francisco Javier Ortiz, the ETA's leader, oversaw the creation of "four fronts responsible for political action, cultural action, economic action, and activity amongst the industrial working class⁸⁰." The ETA hoped this organization would be more effective. Though it never really was, it serves as tangible evidence of the changes that characterized the ETA during the middle years of its ideological struggle.

⁷⁷ Ibid., p. 43.

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 44-45.

⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 46.

⁸⁰ Janke, Peter, *Spanish Separatism: ETA's Threat to Basque Democracy*, p. 7, The Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1980.

G. MORE RECENT YEARS (1968-1970)

The most significant event of the more recent years of the ETA's ideological struggle is without doubt the Manzanas murder. Throughout the 1960s, the ETA "had depended upon the enthusiasm of one man, Francisco Javier Echevarrieta Ortiz⁸¹." The Guardia Civil killed Ortiz on 7 June 1968 when "he failed to stop for speeding... and was killed in an exchange of shots." The event precipitated the first murder that can be attributed to the ETA; Janke reports that "to avenge his death ETA killed the San Sebastian police chief, Meliton Manzanas, outside his home in Irun in August 1968⁸²."

Sixteen individuals connected with the event were arrested and "put on military trial at Burgos in 1970." As a result of the Manzanas murder, Franco suspended the constitutional guarantees of Guipuzcoa; then early in 1969, Franco revoked the constitutional guarantees of the entire Spanish nation for three months. Reportedly, "in August alone,... more than six hundred arrests were made in the Basque provinces and police maltreatment of prisoners rose dramatically⁸³." As a result of the massive police actions, the ETA was almost destroyed.

Probably due in part to the devastation of the police reactions in 1968 and 1969, the ETA began to question several aspects of its ideology. First, it began to appear that "the action-repression-action spiral theory... [was] too costly a tactic⁸⁴." Second, the ETA (ironically) began to question "its relationship with workers, both Basque and non-Basque." In an attempt to assimilate non-Basque workers into the organization, the ETA

⁸¹ Ibid., p. 15.

⁸² Ibid., p. 8.

⁸³ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 49.

⁸⁴ Ibid., p. 51.

"created the Workers' Front, charged with the responsibility of maintaining the organization's ties with the labor unions that were active in the Basque region.

Meanwhile, ETA members in exile comprised various factions with differing ideologies. The Red Cells resembled the Executive Committee, and their ideology was as follows:

- They didn't believe the ETA met "the needs of the working class in the Basque region⁸⁵."
- "liberation of the Basque region could not be undertaken while Spain remained under the control of a dictatorship;" therefore, the struggle would "have to be extended to the rest of Spain⁸⁶."
- The Basques had to look for alliances.

In contrast, the exiles emphasized Basque ethnicity; the milis were radically anti-communist, and insisted on an armed struggle; and the revolutionary war group of Krutwig advocated armed struggle, although subordinating violence to the needs of a political-military structure and refusing to reject Marxism out of hand.

The Sixth Assembly, like the Fifth Assembly, was dominated by the ideological turmoil characterized by the differing factions. Also, as with the Fifth Assembly, the Sixth Assembly was characterized by fragmentation. The milis were expelled, the Red Cells and Ezkubi (the leader of the Krutwig group) resigned, and the Executive Committee remained to direct the affairs of the ETA.

H. THE LAST YEARS OF THE FRANCO REGIME (1971-1975)

According to Gurutz Jauregui, the ETA has been "ideologically dead since 1970⁸⁷." In spite of this so-called philosophical demise, however, the ETA has managed to survive (in function, at the very least), and to change its facial expression from time to time. In

⁸⁵ Ibid., p. 53.

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Jauregui, p. 598.

the early 1970s, as Janke notes, the ETA's factions "eventually formed into ETA-V and ETA-VI⁸⁸." Jauregui notes that "the worker sectors and the military sectors coexisted with great difficulty⁸⁹" from 1970 to 1974.

ETA-VI, as Clark notes, was composed of the direct heirs of the organization that remained after the Sixth Assembly⁹⁰. Shortly after the Sixth Assembly the ETA-VI received a letter, allegedly from the Burgos 16, "the most famous ETA members," who because of their involvement in the Manzananas murder, were imprisoned. The letter accused members of the ETA-VI of "handing out folklore calendars or writing novels while Txabi Etxebarriete [the first ETA member to be killed] lay dying on a road in Euskadi⁹¹." This letter seemed to influence ETA-VI into adopting a "belief that Basque workers, forced to choose between class and ethnicity, would support a class-based struggle⁹² rather than a national one. This belief, in addition to "a series of mistaken policy choices," spelled the end of the ETA-VI by the end of 1972.

ETA-V, ETA-VI's chief competitor, took its social base from the followers of the authors of the Burgos 16 letter (which, not surprisingly, had actually been perpetrated by the former leaders of the ETA, the war group of Krutwig, in an attempt to regain control of the ETA). With the decline of ETA-VI, ETA-V became known simply as ETA, indicating a high level of acceptance.

In early 1972, the ETA began changing its mask once again. In January of that year, they kidnapped Lorenzo Zabala to demonstrate their support of the Basque workers. The

⁸⁸ Janke, p. 8.

⁸⁹ Jauregui, p. 603.

⁹⁰ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, pp. 57, 58.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 58.

⁹² Ibid., p. 59.

kidnapping was particularly important because Zabala himself was a Basque, and it therefore came to represent the ETA's willingness to defend the class interests of the workers, even at the expense of the Basque nationalist movement. ETA's new mask became further apparent when, on Easter 1972, the ETA merged with the EGI, the Basque Youth Organization, thereby gaining additional popular support⁹³.

The willingness of the new ETA to extend beyond nationalist interests became further apparent when "the organization began to reach out beyond the frontiers of the Basque country to establish links with other insurgent organizations." These other groups included Fatah, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Breton Liberation Front, and the Irish Republican Army⁹⁴. Even as the popular base of the ETA was expanding, however, internal fissures threatened to change its appearance again.

The conflict that would develop into a schism in the ETA's structure focused on differences between the Frente Obrero, "the principal advocate of a political approach to struggle," and the "Frente Militar, which continued to stress a military approach⁹⁵." The catalyst that caused the split was an attack on Carrero Blanco, "one of Franco's most trusted advisors⁹⁶" in 1972. Blanco's assassination surpassed the Frente Obrero's tolerance level. Thus, when "the advocates of a unified political and military strategy found themselves in the majority" at a meeting in October 1974, not content to forsake "the clandestine struggle of a tiny armed group⁹⁷," the Frente Militar split off to become

⁹³ Ibid., p. 66-67.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 69.

⁹⁵ Ibid., p. 70.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 79.

ETA(M). Despite appearances, however, the ETA(P-M) was the most radical faction since it advocated a struggle based on Marxist sympathies *and* Basque ethnicity.

I. POST-FRANCO SPAIN

At first blush, it might seem that, since the Civil War and Franco's repression contributed to the ETA's birth, Franco's death, followed by the emergence of a democracy in Spain would contribute to the ETA's demise. However, in spite of the fact that Spanish democracy has meant increased autonomy⁹⁸ for the Basques, ETA militancy has not subsided. On the contrary, the violence has increased. As Gabriel Jackson notes, this occurrence "defies full explanation. However the main factor is surely the isolation of its [ETA's] members⁹⁹."

Edward Moxon-Browne elaborates on the survival of ETA militancy. According to his research, "the basic aims of ETA have remained very much the same as they were 10 or 20 years ago: to achieve the independence, and reunification of Euskadi. The right of the Basque people to determine their own country, lies at the heart of *ETA ideology*. The democratisation of the Spanish state since the death of Franco is acknowledged by ETA as changing the political context in which the struggle must be fought, but it does not alter the necessity for the struggle itself¹⁰⁰." Further, as Moxon-Browne notes, "the Spanish Constitution was rejected by 63 percent of the voters in the Basque country, and consequently has dubious legitimacy, to say the least, in the region¹⁰¹." In addition to the

⁹⁸ Foreign Broadcast Information Service. "Terrorism - Spain: ETA (1974-1984)." JPRS-TOT-86-010-L, 31 January 1986.

⁹⁹ Jackson, "Can the Basques Live with Spain?" p. 519.

¹⁰⁰ Moxon-Browne, Edward, *Spain and the ETA: The Bid for Basque Autonomy*, The Centre for Security and Conflict Studies, p. 5, 1987.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

ETA's determination to continue its militant strategy in spite of democracy, "the reform of the police under democratic institutions made it all the harder to control terrorism¹⁰²."

The ETA's strong stance against the Spanish Government, even after it adopted democracy, may have been different had Eduardo Moreno Bergareche "Pertur" lived to assist the ETA in adapting to the new government. However, "Pertur," the leader of ETA(P-M) did not even live long enough to see democracy in Spain¹⁰³. Instead, Miguel Angel Apalategui "Apala" became ETA(P-M)'s leader, and the ETA "splintered into three divergent forces":

- The Berezi Commandos under Apala
- The Political Faction of ETA (P-M)
- ETA (militar)¹⁰⁴

The Seventh Assembly, directed by ETA (P-M), was held in October 1976. As might well have been expected, further splintering occurred. Most of those in attendance broke away from ETA(M), and each of the different factions proposed a structure based on various combinations of political and/or military strategy¹⁰⁵ which was intended to support some combination of Marxist-Basque nationalist interests.

With the political changes in Spain wrought by Franco's death, the ETA itself did not change; politically, however, more legal options were opened up to the Basques. Specifically, aside from the PSOE and the PCE on the left and the UCD on the right, several Basque parties came on the political scene. On the right, the Basque National

¹⁰² Payne, Stanley G., "Terrorism and Democratic Stability in Spain," *Current History*, p. 169, November 1979.

¹⁰³ Alonso, Alejandro Munoz, *El Terrorismo en Espana*, pp. 66-69, Talleres Graficos, 1982.

¹⁰⁴ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 93.

¹⁰⁵ Alonso, p. 70.

Party (PNV) was legitimized and accounted for approximately twenty-five percent of the votes in the 1976 election in Euskadi¹⁰⁶. On the left, emerging parties included the Patriotic Socialist Coordinating Council (KAS), the Basque Revolutionary Party (EIA), and the Basque Left (EE). These parties and their coalitions were supported, at one time or another, by ETA(M)¹⁰⁷.

On 28 April 1978, however, ETA(M), which is the ETA which has survived to the present day, organized Herri Batasuna, an electoral coalition that, while it refuses to occupy the seats it gains, has become a strong political party in the Basque provinces by "synthesize[ing] the two explosive interpretations of the Basque Country's history¹⁰⁸." Thus, HB "combined radical Basque ethnicity with revolutionary socialism in a parliamentary electoral setting."¹⁰⁹

The creation of HB was a smart political decision on the part of ETA. As noted by FBIS, "leftwing extremist groups and cliques have been crushed by HB and swept away by ETA's offer, which none of them can outdo, because what is more violent than death and what is more nationalistic than advocating independence?"¹¹⁰

J. CHALLENGES TO AND SURVIVABILITY OF THE ETA

In spite of the ETA demonstrated inability to muster continued support for violence, it should be noted that the organization faces new challenges, now that democracy has taken root in Spain. In the first place, it faces increased legal opposition.

¹⁰⁶ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 95.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp. 97-99.

¹⁰⁸ FBIS, "Terrorism - Spain: ETA (1974-1984)."

¹⁰⁹ Clark, *The Basque Insurgents*, pp. 97-99.

¹¹⁰ FBIS, "Terrorism - Spain: ETA (1974-1984)."

Members of the Guardia Civil who traditionally persecuted Basques¹¹¹ have now been largely replaced by Basque policemen¹¹². Further, police successes against terrorist actions have been on the increase, which, given the ETA's small numbers (currently around 200 members), has certainly taken its toll on the ETA's abilities. Further, Spain recently allotted the equivalent of approximately \$10,000 towards improving the GAR, "one of the principal elite forces of the country's Guardia Civil."¹¹³

Spanish police actions against ETA terrorist attacks have been assisted by French cooperation as well. Traditionally, the Spanish government has complained that, without the formerly traditional French sanctuary, the fight against the ETA would be easier¹¹⁴. But while France gave ETA members refugee status in the past, more recently status has been denied¹¹⁵.

Probably the greatest challenge the ETA has to face is that of legitimacy. Ideologically, the ETA has no more legs left to stand on. The problem with ethno-linguist ideology is, as Figure 2 illustrated, that less than 20% of the region's population can speak Euskera. The Trotskyites, on the other hand, *never* supported the Basque movement for the movement itself, but as part of a larger movement. Also, communism is now recognized globally as ineffective. ETA members who espouse third-worldist ideology face similar problems. First, nationalism and communism are, in many ways, conflicting doctrines. Second, the Basque region, due to current industrialization, is wealthier than most of the rest of Spain. Thus, the colonialist argument does not work.

¹¹¹ Alonso, pp. 66-69.

¹¹² Ridíng, p. 6.

¹¹³ Joint Staff, "1989 Annual Terrorism Report," Washington, D.C.

¹¹⁴ Alonso, p. 234.

¹¹⁵ Janke, p. 18.

That the Basques themselves recognize the futility of legitimization based on their traditional ideologies is apparent in an article by Alan Riding, in which he reports that "nationalist groups in the Basque country are using events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to justify calls for regional self-determination in Spain¹¹⁶. As previously noted, unlike the Poles or the Lithuanians, or any of the nations which in recent times have demanded independence from the Soviet Union, the Basques have only limited claim to national identity. Perhaps the only pervasive similarities among the Basque people are distinct noses, an increased occurrences of Rh-negative blood factor, and a language that seems to be uttering its last words. Whether or not these factors are enough on which to base a national identity is dubious at best.

In spite of the fact that the ETA has lost a large base of its support, due largely to the region's increased autonomy, the ETA has managed to survive. There may be several reasons for this seeming paradox. Peter Waldmann, a German author, suggests that the insurgency movement can be compared to a religion, wherein members demonstrate "a fanatical devotion to a common cause,... faith in the miracles wrought by force, combined with the not-too-hidden desire to become martyrs themselves¹¹⁷." He illustrates this euphoric picture with a fairy tale-like story which illustrates the "religious myth" taught within the Basque movement:

Once, the Basques lived happily in a paradisiacal Euskadi, which was protected from the misfortunes of history, and successfully defended their thousand-year independence from all who conquered the peninsula. Neither the Celts nor the Phoenicians, nor the Greeks, Romans, Visigoths, Arabs, or Spaniards were able to put an end to the Basque golden age. They knew neither slavery nor feudalism, but were all knights. Their harmony and the democracy they established remained until they were conquered by the Spaniards in the Carlist Wars. With that, a great evil came upon Euskadi in the form of exploitive, corrupt, Spanish capitalism. The Basque revolution, led by the ETA,

¹¹⁶ Riding, p. 6.

¹¹⁷ Waldmann, Peter, "Gewaltsamer Separatismus," *Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, p. 222, Juni 1985.

will restore the earthly paradise in the form of an independent, socialist Euskadi, where only Euskera shall be spoken.¹¹⁸

It has also been argued convincingly that terrorism, *any* terrorism, is a result of psychopathic factors, the "desire to belong." In the case of the Basques, Jerrold M. Post has set forth an intriguing argument regarding this possibility:

Even though the decision to join a "nationalist separatist terrorist group" is less profound and does not represent a total break with society, here, too, the desire to join well spring from a feeling of alienation. The Basque region of Spain is remarkable homogeneous. Only eight percent of the families are of mixed Spanish-Basque heritage, and the children of these families are scorned and rejected. Yet fully 40 percent of the members of ETA, the terrorists whose espoused cause is establishing a separate Basque nation, come from such mixed-parent families. Not belonging, on the margins of society, they try to "out-Basque" the Basques¹¹⁹.

Santiago de Genoves brings to light still another reason for the survival of the ETA, which may be related to the idea of abnormal, psychological factors. He proposes that Euskadi is living in a state of moral shock brought about by the industrial revolution – a revolution that purports to employ the unemployed, but in reality places them along an assembly line. According to Genoves, the problem the ETA terrorists are trying to solve is not political but cultural. "In a world that doesn't yet know how to orient the plethora of information that it receives day by day — in a world that is unequal, materialistic, without adventure — in a world with broken ideals that we cling to only because we have no others¹²⁰."

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ Post, Jerrold M., M.D. "Rewarding Fire with Fire: Effects of Relations on Terrorist Group Dynamics." *Terrorism*, v. 10, p. 145-163, 1987.

¹²⁰ Genoves, Santiago, *La Violencia en el Pais Vasco y en sus Relaciones Con Espanola*, p. 139, Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, 1980.

Perhaps each of the above reasons has contributed to the survival of the ETA. One thing is for certain, however, in spite of animosity towards the terrorists among the Basques themselves, in spite of decreased legitimacy, and in spite of the fact that its popular base has shrunk in recent years, the ETA will survive¹²¹.

Ironically, the ETA been successfully compared to Franco's movement. As stated in the FBIS Worldwide Report on Terrorism, "ETA has not undergone a political evolution, and this has been one of its constraints. ETA does not evolve, although it is affected by the evolution around it. Indeed, amid all vicissitudes it remains a hard-core group that persists in maintaining the legitimacy of an immobile movement¹²²." Indeed, the ETA can be expected to remain a principal threat to Spanish internal security for an indefinite time period. While the terrorist organization has experienced difficult challenges and setbacks, largely due to the successes of the Spanish Guardia Civil, the conflict between Basque separatists who foster terrorism and the Spanish nation is far from over. In fact, *Tiempo*, a Spanish newspaper, recently reported that "security officials are predicting a future full of package bombs, culminating in 1992¹²³." (That year marks several important events for the Spanish people to include the World's Fair, the Olympics, the 500th anniversary of Columbus's discovery of the New World, and the greater integration of the European community.)

The ETA has manifest a remarkable propensity for revitalizing itself when faced with setbacks both from within and from without. (See Appendix C for a list of selected ETA actions since 1980.) For example, while the terrorists used to obtain funding by means of a so-called "revolutionary tax," when the tax became increasingly difficult to collect

¹²¹ FBIS, "Terrorism - Spain: ETA (1974-1984)." JPRS-TOT-86-010-L, p. 5, 31 January 1986.

¹²² Ibid., p. 4.

¹²³ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, JPRS-TOT-90-025-L, 16 July 90, p. 58.

(around 1987), they resorted to increased kidnappings. While it is true, then, that the ETA movement has made many superficial changes in organizational structure and even in tactical approaches, the movement's face is a permanent and unchanging granite that only changes masks periodically. As such, it seems clear that the ETA is determined to pursue national autonomy at any cost.

IV. SPAIN'S EXTERNAL INTERESTS AND POTENTIALS FOR CONFLICT

Spain's external interests are many and varied. Not surprisingly, Spain's primary interest in recent years has been to secure a place for herself in the context of the new Europe, a process that will be addressed in Chapter V. Other Spanish interests that may well affect Spain's European role, however, include its relation with Great Britain, especially regarding Gibraltar; its relations with Morocco, particularly concerning the issues of Ceuta and Melilla; its perennial fear of the Arab nations combined with its natural affinity for the same; and its bilateral agreements with Portugal, the United States, and France. In addition, though the East-West confrontation has been almost totally dismantled, Spain is a fairly new member of NATO. Thus, any discussion of Spain's external interests would be incomplete without sections devoted to its relations with NATO and the Soviet Union, respectively. Like the points on a graph, these issues all serve as points of reference that have both influenced and are influenced by Spain's current position and direction. Hence, this chapter will discuss Spain's external interests and the potentials for conflict that exist in conjunction with some of these interests.

A. GIBRALTAR

Without doubt, Spain's interest in Gibraltar is high on its list of external interests. An area that "has been occupied by human beings since prehistoric times,"¹²⁴ Gibraltar first came to be a Spanish possession in 1309 when Ferdinand IV, the son of the King of Castile, "ordered several of his nobles to attack Gibraltar." While the Spanish had attacked the Moslems (who had possessed Gibraltar since 711), with some frequency

¹²⁴ Levie, Howard S., *The Status of Gibraltar*, p. 3, Westview Press, 1983.

during the previous century, Ferdinand IV was the first Spaniard to stage a successful siege. Even so, "twenty-four years later the third siege, in 1333, resulted in her [Gibraltar's] return to the control of the Moslems." Not until 1462, with the eighth siege, did Gibraltar return to Spanish possession. Gibraltar was then under Spanish control from 1462 until 1704 when British Admiral Sir George Rooke seized the territory with the help of the Dutch. The dispute between Spain and Great Britain over the rightful ownership of Gibraltar, then, dates back to 1704¹²⁵.

Though the British did not seize Gibraltar until 1704, British interest in the territory was documented as early as 1625, and in 1655 Oliver Cromwell noted both the economic and strategic value of attacking Gibraltar. Later, "in the negotiations between William III and Louis XIV which followed the Peace of Rijswijk [20 Sep 1697], William several times included Gibraltar in the list of naval bases which would be required by Great Britain in order to ensure that she would be able to protect her trade and other commercial interests against interference by a combination of France and a French-dominated Spain."¹²⁶

Upon the death of Spanish King Charles II in 1699, both the Archduke Charles of Austria and Philip of Anjou, grandson of French King Louis XIV, were potential heirs to the Spanish throne because both had ancestors who had married into the Spanish royal family. However, most of continental Europe feared a strong alliance between Spain and France; thus, prior to Charles II's death, William III of Great Britain and Louis XIV reached an agreement (the Second Partition Agreement) to name the Archduke Charles of Austria as Charles II's successor. However, distraught at the proposed division of Spain's possessions, Charles II drew up a will which superceded the Second Partition Agreement,

¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 9.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 10.

naming Philip as his successor. The seeds of the War of Spanish Succession (1701–1714) and of the British siege of Gibraltar had been planted.¹²⁷

When the English occupied Gibraltar in 1704, the Gibraltarian citizens were given the choice of staying or fleeing. About 4000 fled to the Spanish coastal city of San Roque, while only about 70 stayed on Gibraltar¹²⁸. Philip V subsequently tried to reconquer the area, but was unsuccessful. Finally, on 13 Jul 1713, Great Britain and Spain signed the Treaty of Utrecht, which obliged Spain, “against her will, to cede Gibraltar to the English in addition to having to constantly vigil the territory of the isthmus that the English also tried to annex using the most diverse pretexts imaginable.”¹²⁹

Several aspects of Article X of the Treaty of Utrecht remain points of contention between Spain and Great Britain to this day. For example, some Spaniards argue that the treaty is invalid, given the fact that Philip V, Spain’s ruler at the time of the signing, was the grandson of Louis XIV (a French King), and therefore that “Spain had neither voice nor vote” in the matter¹³⁰.

The opening paragraph, which reads as follows, has also proven to be a matter of contention:

The Catholic King does hereby, for himself, his heirs and successors, yield to the Crown of Great Britain, the full and entire propriety of the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, fortifications and forts thereunto belonging; and he gives up the said propriety to be held and enjoyed absolutely with all manner of right forever, without any exception or impediment whatsoever.¹³¹

¹²⁷ Ibid., p. 8.

¹²⁸ Ibid., p. 12.

¹²⁹ Tornay, Francisco, *La Linea de Gibraltar, 1730–1810*, p. 30, La Linea De La Concepcion (Cadiz), 1981.

¹³⁰ Casaldueiro, General Francisco, *Europa, Gibraltar y la O.T.A.N.*, p. 29, Ediciones Dyrsa, 1985.

According to the Spanish, "one must distinguish between the *right of jurisdiction* and the *right of propriety*... sovereignty, that is, jurisdiction, belongs in its entirety to Spain." Thus, according to Spain, "the most Britain can have in Gibraltar are the same *rights of propriety*, not of *jurisdiction* and *sovereignty*, that it has over its Embassy in Madrid."¹³²

Levie, on the other hand, argues that the Spanish arguments regarding propriety have little validity. He argues that "there was nothing whatsoever mentioned at any time by any person to indicate that the cession of Gibraltar was to differ in any manner from the then quite commonplace procedure by which one sovereign transferred the title to territory to another." He further argues that such an interpretation would render "the final clauses of the first paragraph of Article X... meaningless,"¹³³ and that had Article X meant in 1713 what some Spanish authorities now claim it means, a "completely anomalous situation... would have been created" since territorial jurisdiction "certainly [did] not [belong] with Philip from whom it had been wrested by force of Allied arms and from whom it was being detached by force of British diplomacy."¹³⁴

If Spain has stretched the interpretation of Article X to some degree, Great Britain is no less guilty of the same. Throughout the period of negotiations, Spain made it clear that Great Britain's claim on Gibraltar ended at the castle wall, whereas Great Britain attempted to obtain territory on the isthmus to include the range of two cannon shots. Spain's determination not to cede any territory around Gibraltar is evidenced in the Spanish Red Book on Gibraltar¹³⁵. Further, that the English were aware of these limits is

¹³¹ Levie, p. 42.

¹³² Ibid., 36.

¹³³ Levie, pp. 30-31.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p. 33.

apparent in a letter Lord Lexington, English minister in Madrid, wrote to Brigadier Stanwix, the first English governor of Gibraltar. He said, in reply to concerns Stanwix had over Spain's vigilance of the territory just outside the walls of Gibraltar, "I don't see how we can aspire to impede the Spanish from quartering troops wherever it seems best to them within their own territory as long as they don't, as a result, direct any hostile acts against the town of Gibraltar."¹³⁶

In spite of the limitations placed on the British by Utrecht, however, Colonel Ralph Congreve, Gibraltar's second English governor, occupied Torre del Diablo and Molino shortly after the treaty had been signed. Meanwhile, Philip V had had ample opportunity to regain Gibraltar¹³⁷, but "an Italian-oriented Queen (and Minister) had misled Philip and had prevented him from... the return of Gibraltar to Spanish sovereignty." War ensued, but not before Spain's Ambassador in London declared the cession of Gibraltar invalid because of the "numerous violations of the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht by Great Britain." According to the Ambassador's letter, the British "not only extended their fortifications by exceeding the limits prescribed and stipulated, but what is more, contrary to the express and liberal tenour of the Treaties, they receive and admit the Jews and Moors, in the same manner as the Spaniards, and other nations confounded and mixed, contrary to our holy religion; not to mention the frauds and continual contrabands which are carried on there to the prejudice of his Majesty's revenues."¹³⁸

¹³⁵ Tornay, p. 30.

¹³⁶ Tornay, p. 31.

¹³⁷ Not only was the Great Britain Whig party, which had replaced the Tories, willing to give Gibraltar back to Spain, but twice Spain declined to accept Gibraltar in return for peace. In addition, rather than attacking Sardina in 1717, Spain "could easily have taken a totally unprepared Gibraltar instead." (Levie, p. 44).

¹³⁸ Ibid.

The war between Spain and Great Britain, which constituted the thirteenth siege of Gibraltar, was of short duration, but the peace treaty was ambiguous in that it did not mention either Gibraltar or the Treaty of Utrecht. Four years later, Spain entered its first agreement with France aimed at regaining possession of Gibraltar. France did not support Spain as Spain would have liked; nevertheless, within ten years, Spain was again at war with Great Britain. Again, Gibraltar was at stake, though not the central issue of the conflict^{139,140}. As part of the hostilities, Philip V attempted to elicit France's help in securing Gibraltar; when he realized the futility of his efforts, he began preparations for another siege, but died before the siege was carried out. His son, Ferdinand VI, attempted to procure peace by convincing Great Britain to return Gibraltar, but such attempts were useless. He did procure peace, but only by agreeing to accept the ambiguous conditions of the Treaty of Utrecht¹⁴¹.

Only six years later, in 1754, Britain offered to return Gibraltar to Spain in exchange for her help in recovering Minorca from France. France, on the other hand, offered Minorca to Spain in exchange for help against Britain. Ferdinand VI opted for a neutral position, but upon his death in 1759, his half-brother Charles III succeeded him and agreed to support France, "which by that date had actually already lost the war."¹⁴²

During the reign of Charles III, Great Britain went to war with its American colonies; because Charles III harbored a hatred for Great Britain, he supported the American colonists and planned the fourteenth siege of Gibraltar, known as the Great Siege, which lasted three years. Again, the British won and in 1783, a Treaty of Peace was signed¹⁴³.

¹³⁹ Relations between the two nations deteriorated over commercial issues.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p. 49.

¹⁴¹ Ibid., p. 50.

¹⁴² Ibid.

Ironically enough, given the long-term conflicting nature of relations between Spain and Great Britain, they fought as allies against Revolutionary France from 1793 to 1795. As Levie notes, "Great Britain and Spain had fought their last war. Henceforth Spanish efforts to recover Gibraltar, when they occurred, would be limited to the diplomatic arena." Even so, diplomatic relations between the two countries remain somewhat strained. Britain continued to demand that Spain evacuate all territory within cannon shot distance of Gibraltar; Spain continued to assert that Britain had no jurisdiction beyond Gibraltar's castle walls. In an attempt to satisfy Britain's demands, in 1930 Spain proclaimed a "neutral ground" on the isthmus, a concession that the British took to mean that they had been granted legitimate access to the isthmus. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Spanish permitted them "to garden and to graze cattle on the isthmus... [but] when they established a more permanent installation there, a cemetery, the Spanish pretested." Other British infringements on the "neutral" territory included building a quarantine village for yellow fever victims in 1810 (a village that, by 1828, "had taken on an air of permanence with a population of 1000."), the construction of a slaughterhouse in 1815 in addition to enlargement of the cemetery, the building of a drillground in 1817, and, in 1825-26, the digging of a new well. Thus, it became apparent "that the southern half of this 'Neutral Ground,' this 'no-man's land,' was British territory, to do with as the British desired, while the northern half was a true 'no-man's land' which must remain devoid of all Spanish military installations¹⁴⁴.

The one-sidedness of Anglo-Spanish relations again became apparent when, in 1898, Spain started building fortifications around the Bay of Algereciras against a possible American attack during the Spanish-American War. Britain responded by demanding

¹⁴³ Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., pp. 66, 67.

that Spain not construct such fortifications within seven miles of Gibraltar's castle walls¹⁴⁵. Once again, Britain took advantage of Spain's weakness to gain control over additional territory.

British provocations had not stopped by the early twentieth century. In 1908, Britain informed Spain in "an act of courtesy" of its "intention to erect a fence [nine feet high] along the British edge of the neutral territory at Gibraltar." In 1938, Britain built an airfield in the middle of "its side" of the neutral territory. British claims regarding criminal jurisdiction and water territorial rights have posed no less of a challenge to Spanish diplomats.

Since 1963, the United Nations has become involved in the issues surrounding Gibraltar, which continue to serve as a point of friction between Spain and Great Britain. One of the primary issues at stake revolves around whether the laws of territorial integrity or self-determination should apply to Gibraltar. According to the Spanish position, the true Gibraltarians are those whose ancestors were forced out in 1704 and who took up residence in San Roque. Thus, according to that position, Gibraltar was no claim to the right of self-determination¹⁴⁶.

Because of tensions, the border between Spain and Gibraltar was closed in June of 1969, which only served to mandate the replacement of Spanish labor with Moroccan labor. Even so, the tables had turned somewhat; whereas in former days Great Britain had induced friction with its expansionist policies, during the UN-mandated attempts at negotiation between Spain and Great Britain regarding Gibraltar, Spain provoked Great Britain such that bilateral negotiations never occurred. Spanish border guards made crossings time-consuming and burdensome, "the export of almost all goods from Spain to Gibraltar was embargoed, expiring licenses for trucks and passenger cars to cross the

¹⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 75.

¹⁴⁶ Casaldueiro, p. 43

border were not renewed by the Spanish authorities, the frontier gates were closed an hour earlier than had been customary, etc. When the British refused to negotiate under such circumstances, the General Assembly of the UN "declared the continuation of 'the colonial situation in Gibraltar' incompatible with the Charter and with its Resolution 1514 (XV); it 'requested' Great Britain 'to terminate the colonial situation in Gibraltar no later than 1 October 1969'; and it called upon Great Britain 'to begin without delay negotiations with the Government of Spain.'"147

It looked like Spain had finally regained its long-lost claim to Gibraltar. However, in 1970, the deed to Gibraltar still belonged to Great Britain, if largely due to sentiment on Gibraltar itself.¹⁴⁸

Spain's change to a democratic form of government has in no way limited its interest in Gibraltar. In October 1977, Spanish Prime Minister Suarez said in London that "the Gibraltarians would be welcome to join 'the new democratic Spain' with regional autonomy similar to that being offered to other ethnic groups¹⁴⁹." In December of 1982, Spain's Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez "decided to open the border to pedestrians... as a goodwill gesture designed to spur negotiations."¹⁵⁰

When Spain was debating whether or not to join NATO, the Gibraltar issue surfaced again. Proponents of joining NATO supported the view that belonging to the Alliance would increase the prospect of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar, while opponents argued that "since Britain is more powerful than Spain, NATO would always support the United Kingdom on the issue of Gibraltar."¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 115.

¹⁴⁸ According to a referendum held on Gibraltar in 1967, 12,138 individuals out of the 12,762 who qualified to vote voted to "retain the link with Britain." (Levie, p. 112)

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 116.

¹⁵⁰ Edlund, Bjorn, "Spain may stay in NATO if it gets Gibraltar back," UPI, 13 Dec 1982, AM cycle.

When Spain joined NATO, the move was not initially supported by the Socialist government, headed by Felipe Gonzalez, that came into power shortly after the decision had been made. According to Gonzalez, "[i]t is impossible to accept that Spain's armed forces depend for the defense of this territory on a force that is, in our opinion and according to the United Nations, occupying part of our territory." Along the same lines, Jaime de Ojeda, Spain's Ambassador to NATO in 1985, stated that Spain would accept full military integration "if it were to gain satisfaction from Britain in the Gibraltar dispute."¹⁵²

To be certain, the Gibraltar issue is neither simple nor easily solvable. According to Mr. Frank Folger, Spanish Desk Officer at the U.S. State Department, "the Spanish understand the status quo. They have the issue in perspective and are becoming more politically mature." Even so, he noted that "if circumstances arise, they [the Spanish] will reiterate interests." According to historical perspective, Mr. Folger's observations are correct since, according to Spain, Gibraltar still belongs to them.

B. CEUTA & MELILLA

Closely related to the Gibraltar issue is the issue of Ceuta and Melilla, which mirrors the Gibraltar issue in nearly every respect. Like the Gibraltar issue, the Ceuta and Melilla issue is rooted in history. As early as A.D. 700, "Northern Morocco and Southern Spain were faced with the cruel choice of having to throw themselves into the arms of one or the other of the two powerful masters who were face to face: Visigoths or the Arabs." At this point in history, Melilla was inhabited by the Arabs and Ceuta was inhabited by the

¹⁵¹ Alba, Victor, "Spain's Entry Into NATO," in *NATO and the Mediterranean*. Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimundo Luraghi, eds., p. 103, Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1985.

¹⁵² Allin, Major George R., "Spain's NATO Dilemma," *Military Review*, p. 68, (January 1985).

Visigoths. As history has it, however, by 713 the Arabs had conquered the entire Iberian peninsula.¹⁵³

Ceuta played an important role during the ensuing centuries, both as a cultural center and as a port¹⁵⁴. It was not until 1415 that it was conquered by Portuguese King Juan I, whose son convinced him to attack the city. In an attempt to regain possession of Ceuta, the Moors attacked it in 1418, but Portugal retained it¹⁵⁵. In 1492, Isabel and Ferdinand conquered Granada, which signified the end of Muslim domination of Spain¹⁵⁶.

While both Spain and Portugal were primarily concerned with the exciting prospects offered by the newly discovered America, their attention was diverted in some small measure to Northern Africa for various reasons. First, they perceived a necessity to defend commercial routes and "guarantee the security of their coastal population." Later, confronted with the expansion of the Ottoman Empire, the Iberian nations decided that it was in their best interest to "conquer the ports and isles of the North African Coast." In 1497, the House of Medina Sidonia, which was later ceded to Spain, conquered Melilla¹⁵⁷.

Following the death of the Portuguese King Sebastian in December 1578, the Spanish and Portuguese crowns were combined (in 1580). As a result, in addition to Melilla, Ceuta "was to become Spanish and to remain so until modern times." The two enclaves were "frequently attacked by neighboring tribes;"¹⁵⁸ nevertheless, Spain

¹⁵³ Ibid.

¹⁵⁴ Ibid., pp. 24, 26.

¹⁵⁵ Ibid., pp. 32, 33.

¹⁵⁶ Del Pino, Domingo, *La ultima guerra con Marruecos: Ceuta y Melilla*, p. 9, Editorial Argos Vergara, S. A., 1983.

¹⁵⁷ *Revue*, p. 35.

retained control over them in fulfillment of Isabel's testament of 1504 in support of the spread of Catholicism. She stated that her successors "'were responsible for' and should not cease 'conquering Africa and fighting for the faith against the infidel.'"¹⁵⁹

In 1640, Lisbon rose against the reign of Philippe IV, bringing "the unison of the two kingdoms to an end." Portugal regained most of the Moroccan territory it had previously held, "but the nobles of Ceuta gathered before the Governor's Palace and proclaimed their loyalty to the Spanish monarch." By 1668, the Treaty of Lisbon acknowledged Ceuta's right to self-determination and the city was formally recognized as a Spanish possession¹⁶⁰.

While Portugal had ceded Ceuta to Spain peacefully, Morocco had not yet resigned itself to the city's loss. Thus, throughout the latter seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Ceuta was subject to sieges from its Moroccan neighbors. Likewise, the Moroccans laid siege to Melilla from 1694 to 1696¹⁶¹. By the mid-eighteenth century, both Spain and Morocco were interested in establishing and maintaining peaceful relations, and both had much to gain from making this desire a reality. For Morocco, peace would have meant total security since Spain was the only nation that posed any threat to it; for Spain, peace would have meant freedom to pursue its interests in the New World¹⁶². By 1774, however, relations had deteriorated and the Moroccan sultan again attempted to siege Melilla. He held the city for fourteen months¹⁶³, but Morocco's

¹⁵⁸ Del Pino, p. 10.

¹⁵⁹ Rezette, p. 37.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid.

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p. 41.

¹⁶² Del Pino, p. 35.

¹⁶³ Ibid. p. 40.

attention was diverted to other problems posed by Turkish invasions of Moroccan territory¹⁶⁴. When the Sultan left Melilla in 1775, Spain interpreted it as acknowledgement of Spanish sovereignty. Six years later, a treaty established the borders of Ceuta, but by 1790, Ceuta was suffering its fourth siege by Morocco.

In the early nineteenth century, Melilla, upset with Spanish rule, insisted on self-government. This lasted for three months until another Moroccan siege threatened. Rezette notes that "following attacks by the tribes there was a succession of treaties: Larache on May 6, 1845 dealing with the boundaries of Ceuta and that of August 24, 1859 with those of Melilla." As seems to have been a common practice in the nineteenth century, the boundaries of Melilla were determined by the distance of a cannon shot¹⁶⁵.

As the agreement was being negotiated, a Moroccan tribe "laid siege to Ceuta" and the Sultan died¹⁶⁶; consequently, war broke out in October of 1859 and lasted until April of the following year, when Great Britain "imposed peace that ended with the Treaty of Tetouan." In spite of the treaty, however, Riff tribes continued to attack the enclaves and new treaties concerning boundaries continued to end hostilities for brief periods of time. Between 1860 and 1894, this pattern occurred twice.

The situation was exacerbated in 1908 when Spain requested authorization to expand their territory near Melilla. When Morocco did not agree to Spain's proposal, Spain took the land by force and "pretended that it was a temporary occupation the purpose of which was to prevent contraband in arms." Local tribes began attacking Spanish workers. The conflicts that had surfaced periodically for centuries came to a head in the Riff War, which lasted from 1906 to 1926.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁴ Rezette, p. 42.

¹⁶⁵ Del Pino, p. 41.

¹⁶⁶ Del Pino, p. 41.

While Spain and Morocco have not been at war since 1926, relations between the two countries are still characterized by tension and "as recently as 1975 the Spanish enclaves in North Africa caused significant tension between Spain and Morocco as a sidelight to the major issue of confrontation in the Spanish Sahara." In February of that year, bombs placed in the enclaves were responsible for "killing one person and wounding two."¹⁶⁸

The ongoing tension between Spain and Morocco over the North African enclaves is ironic for several reasons, not the least of which is its similarity to the Gibraltar issue. However, in this instance, Spain, not Great Britain, plays the part of the colonial power that refuses to give up its possessions. Further, while Spain has adamantly refused to cede additional territory in Gibraltar to Britain for protection, it felt no shame in expanding its territory in the North African enclaves for the same reason. If this were not irony enough, Spain even suggested the amount of territory be determined with a cannon shot.

As with Great Britain in the Gibraltar issue, Spain also uses the demographic argument to support its position in Ceuta and Melilla. According to this line of reasoning, "the population of these territories is more than 90% Spanish, the original Moroccan population either having been exterminated or driven out." Not surprisingly, given the parallel situation in Gibraltar, the fact that the Spaniards were not the original population "is not emphasized in the official Spanish argument."¹⁶⁹

Also parallel to Britain's position on the Gibraltar issue, Spain bases its North African claims to a large degree on treaties signed between the Bourbons and the Sultans.

¹⁶⁷ Porritt, Richard H., Jr., *Spain and Morocco: The Spanish Enclaves in North Africa, Potential Mediterranean Security Dilemma*, p. 72, Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1982.

¹⁶⁸ Rezette, p. 160.

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

While Spain insists on the validity of these treaties, "the very fact that the treaties were signed by the Sultans, in many cases after wars, allows the Moroccans to argue with some legitimacy that these treaties constitute the recognition of the sovereignty of the Sultans over these cities."¹⁷⁰

As in Gibraltar, "the Moroccan population of Ceuta, an indeed of Melilla as well, is one of the major areas of contention between Spain and Morocco... Specific issues usually have to do with discrimination, control of the number of legal and illegal Moroccans that work, live, or own property in the enclaves, and smuggling." Fishing rights have also been a matter of contention¹⁷¹.

Just as Spain took the Gibraltar issue before the U.N., Morocco took the Ceuta and Melilla issue before the U.N. in 1961. In reply to Morocco's request for support in the Ceuta/Melilla issue, Spain claimed that "the steps taken by the Moroccan Government constituted 'an attempt to disrupt Spain's national unity and territorial integrity,'" and that such an attempt was "incompatible with the goals and principles of the United Nations Charter." Further, from the Spanish point of view, its claim to the territories goes back further than the Moroccan claim since Morocco did not even achieve independence until 1956. As Rezette notes, however, what Spain tends to forget is "the f a dozen dynasties that had existed and governed since the eighth century." The situation is complicated since, as Spain is quick to point out, Spain did not obtain the enclaves by conquest but from Portugal, and according to the will of its citizens¹⁷².

If Spain's position on the issue of Ceuta and Melilla is ironic, it is just as ironic that the issue has come to be linked with the Gibraltar issue. Though King Hassan has ruled

¹⁷⁰ Del Pino, p. 14.

¹⁷¹ Del Pino, pp. 185-198.

¹⁷² Del Pino, p. 34.

out "using force to recover them [the Spanish enclaves] or sending a 'Green March' like the 1975 assemblage when 350,000 Moroccan civilians walked into Western Sahara when it was still a Spanish colony,"¹⁷³ he is determined not to allow Spain "to dominate both sides of the entry to the Mediterranean." The king has, in fact, "declared that the return of Ceuta and Melilla would not become a major issue until Gibraltar was returned to Spain."¹⁷⁴

The instability of the situation, then, remains and, if such a thing is possible, has stabilized somewhat. In reality, the issue has become a political one since Morocco gained its independence in 1957. Since that time, Ceuta and Melilla have served little purpose for Spain; their defense value is non-existent¹⁷⁵. Whereas initially, Spain conquered North Africa to prevent the French from gaining control over the area, the French no longer pose such a threat¹⁷⁶. Further, Spain has no need for the enclaves to serve as points of departure for the conquest of Morocco, since such a policy would no longer be compatible with international interests or law¹⁷⁷. Economically, the enclaves have become more of a liability than an asset¹⁷⁸. Spain's only real concern is that dialogue with Morocco over Ceuta and Melilla would encourage the Canary Islands, "which they consider vital not only to Spanish security but to the security of the European and Atlantic Community,"¹⁷⁹ to seek to lessen Spanish control.

¹⁷³ "Moroccans to March to Spanish Enclave of Ceuta to Press Claim," The Reuter Library Report, July 1990.

¹⁷⁴ Porritt, p. 16.

¹⁷⁵ Del Pino, p. 24.

¹⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 13.

¹⁷⁷ Ibid.

¹⁷⁸ Rezette, p. 168.

Geographically, Ceuta and Melilla appear to fall more naturally within Morocco's territory than within Spain's. The Spaniards would argue that, first, the enclaves are culturally and socially Spanish¹⁸⁰, and second, that natural boundaries between nations are not a valid means for determining actual borders — if they were, France would have been allowed to extend to the Rhein long ago¹⁸¹.

In short, the issue of Ceuta and Melilla is no less complicated than the issue of Gibraltar. While it is unlikely that Spain and Morocco will resolve the issue militarily, the two nations will no doubt act in their own best interest. Thus, for example, if it were impatient, Morocco could help a Spanish blockade on Gibraltar succeed by not allowing Arab workers to go there, thereby pressuring England into giving up Gibraltar and, in turn, pressuring Spain into giving up Ceuta and Melilla¹⁸². According to Del Pino, "[p]reventive military action on Spain's part is possible, but such an attack 'would have to be totally motivated by politics,' because Spain's prestige would be irreparably affected and pressures from the West, the Arabs, the Africans, and the U.N. would have such grave consequences that Spain and its general interests would be in a terrible state."¹⁸³

Because of the negative repercussion any military action on Spain's part would have, it seems more likely that Spain will eventually either cede Ceuta and Melilla to Morocco on the condition that Britain return Gibraltar or, on a more pessimistic note, that other Spanish internal issues high on the priority list will "unduly shift Spanish national

¹⁷⁹ Del Pino, p. 18.

¹⁸⁰ Rezette, p. 158.

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p. 131.

¹⁸² Ibid., p. 172.

¹⁸³ Del Pino, p. 262.

attention to that crisis issue. This potentially would put Spain in a vulnerable situation in regard to the enclaves. Any corresponding challenges by Morocco to the status of the enclaves, either militarily, economically, or socially, could then send shock waves through Spain, because of the military's close association with the enclave." To date, however, both Morocco and Spain are holding their own: Morocco is living with a situation it cannot accept and Spain is living with a situation it refuses to change.

C. THE ARAB NATIONS

In July of 711, an event was to occur which would affect Spain's foreign relations, customs, and outlook to and beyond the present day. Spain was invaded "by a mixed force of Arabs and Berbers," who "slashed through Spain in nine years, conquering all but a few Christian strongholds in the north mountains." Not until 1492, with the fall of Granada, could Spain say she had totally regained the territory that was hers¹⁸⁴. Even so, during the seven hundred years of Moorish rule, Spain could not help but sustain some permanent changes. (A chronology of Spain's reconquest comprises Appendix E.)

One effect of the conquest was that Spain learned to fear the Moor, and this fear has been repeatedly reinforced. In this century for example, the Moors helped General Franco during the Spanish Civil War. Franco won the war, but in the meantime, "the atrocities that these troops carried out in Republican villages re-dressed the old nightmare of the Moorish bogymen in twentieth-century battle-camouflage." Just prior to Franco, Spain had to face the Moors in the Riff War over the Spanish enclaves and, in more recent years Spain had to face Morocco in the conflict over Western Sahara¹⁸⁵.

Most of Spain's encounters with the Arabs, then, have not been happy ones and, in fact, in Spain, if you "call someone a Moro,... you're calling him a dangerous, conniving

¹⁸⁴ Langer, p. 304.

¹⁸⁵ McGirk, p. 17.

savage." The fact that Spain still perceives its primary security threat to be the Arab nations is evidenced "in the Spanish military academies [where] teachers unscroll plans of possible Moroccan attack routes for the new cadets."¹⁸⁶

In spite of Spain's fear of its neighbors to the south, however, most Spaniards are also somewhat "proud of the Moorish fire in their souls. It sets them apart from other Western Europeans who were never under Arab dominion."¹⁸⁷

Ironically, Spain hoped to play the role of arbiter between the United States, Europe, and third world nations, to include Arab nations. An example of Spain's strange affinity for its long-time enemies is evidenced in a statement by Foreign Minister Oliart in 1982. In the debate regarding Spain's membership in NATO, he "stressed the necessity for 'playing roles in Latin America, North Africa, and the Arab world - with the countries to which it [Spain] is linked by a common history, such as Morocco.' Foreign Minister Perez-Llorca expounded on this thought and predicted that NATO entry would give Spain

...greater weight as an interlocutor... I have found in the Arab countries, with which we maintain manifold relations, an interest in knowing that they have a friend in NATO and a country which has traditionally listened to them sensitively and which maintains good relations with them. Of course, the same applies to the Latin American countries."¹⁸⁸

The extent to which the United States and European nations are willing to allow Spain to serve as an arbiter in dealing with third world nations is uncertain. Nevertheless, the fact that Spain sees its own role as such may serve as an indicator of Spain's external interests and foreign policy goals. In addition, Spain's role in European affairs will most certainly be affected by her own self image. With the prospect of military conflict in the Middle East lurking in the near future, the fact that Spain's self image encompasses a

¹⁸⁶ Ibid.

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Heiberg, William L., *The Sixteenth Nation: Spain's Role in NATO*, National Security Affairs Monograph Series 83-1, p. 34, Washington, D.C., 1983.

unique understanding of the Arab nations may well serve to its advantage as events in Europe and the Middle East unfold.

D. BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WITH PORTUGAL, THE U.S., AND FRANCE

During the Franco regime and prior to its joining the North Atlantic Alliance, Spain's general defense situation can be described by two phenomena: isolation and internal crisis. Traditionally, Spain was a dominant power, both in Europe and in the Americas. However, by the early 1800s, Spain "had lost almost all the possessions owned by the Spanish Crown both in Europe and America." Thus, it "turned on itself and withdrew from the European stage." Spain's isolation can be largely attributed to its loss of influence, a phenomenon that "distanced Spain from all the current thinking and progress that had come to the fore in the countries that make up what is known today as the Western world." Simultaneously, internal crises "culminated in a Civil War (1936-9)"¹⁸⁹ which led to Franco's regime.

Following the Civil War, the only bilateral defense agreement Spain had until 1953 was with Portugal. Generally known as the "Iberian Pact," this agreement was signed in March 1939 and served as a treaty of friendship between the two Iberian nations. It was "successively ratified in three Additional Protocols signed in 1940, 1948, and 1970, respectively."¹⁹⁰

The beginning of Franco's regime coincided with the beginning of World War II. Spain remained neutral and, to a large degree, isolated from European affairs throughout the war; nevertheless, the war complicated the European situation and, as such, of necessity affected Spain. Specifically, since the Soviet Union had supported the Spanish

¹⁸⁹ Ibid.

¹⁹⁰ Salas Lopez, Fernando de, *¿Nos Interesa La OTAN?*, p. 5, Madrid, 1981, translated from Spanish by the author.

Republic, which had lost to Franco, during the Spanish Civil War, the Soviet Union was obviously not a friend to Franco. In fact, the two nations did not resume diplomatic relations (though they did maintain considerable contact) until 1977¹⁹¹. By the same token, following World War II, Franco found few friends in the European sphere because his government was seen as a fascist regime that was supported by the axis. As such, it was a natural enemy to democracy.

While the onset of the Cold War did not ease Spanish/European tensions sufficiently in European eyes to merit the acceptance of Spain as an ally in the Atlantic Alliance, it did provide an opportunity for Spain to establish links with the Western world. Thus, as Wayne C. Thompson notes, "Spain's strategic location brought it into an indirect relationship with NATO through a series of bilateral defense agreements with the U.S. beginning in 1953." In September 1953, Spain and the United States signed a defense agreement that, although less than ideal for both nations, was pragmatic for both. From Spain's perspective, the agreement signaled "the end to isolation" and the beginning of what Franco perceived as "substantial help for the survival of his regime." It "provided Spain with enough economic help to avoid national bankruptcy" and "involved the provision of a substantial amount of U.S. military equipment and assistance." From the U.S. perspective, the agreement bolstered Western defense by allowing the U.S. "to establish military bases in Spain, among them Rota in southwest Spain, Torrejon near Madrid, Zaragoza, Moron, and some other minor installations." Furthermore, a secret clause in the 1953 agreement gave the U.S. the right to use the bases in Spanish Territory to "attack the Soviet Union without previous consultation with the Spanish government." Angel Vinas, in his article "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges," makes further reference to the secret clause in the 1953 agreement. According to Vinas, the clause stipulated "the possible activation of U.S. military bases in time of war or

¹⁹¹ Adams, Tamara K., "Soviet Relations with and Influence on Spain," (unpublished)

emergency" and "gave the United States *carte blanche* but left the Spanish government little scope for action."¹⁹²

Subsequent agreements between Spain and the United States which led, ultimately, to Spain's unique, if limited, role in the North Atlantic Alliance were signed on 6 August 1970, 19 July 1974, and 21 September 1976. The Spanish-American Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, signed in 1976, was of particular importance. The following characteristics of the treaty are especially pertinent:

- The treaty promised to contribute to the solution of the colonial act of Gibraltar.
- The treaty did not pertain to a military alliance and specified that Spain was not obligated to take part, either directly or indirectly, in situations of conflict in the Mediterranean that did not affect her national interests. In relation to NATO, it hoped to bring a higher level of security, both for Spain and for the nations that form the Atlantic bloc. Even though Spain had not established a defensive alliance, it pledged a defensive relationship to NATO.
- The Agreement of 1970 was converted to this treaty following parliamentary approbation by both nations.
- The Spanish-North American Council was responsible for supervising the application of the treaty.
- In addition, the ad hoc commission existed for coordination with NATO.
- When the treaty was signed, the Spanish Ministry of Defense had not yet been created.
- The treaty provided for the lessening of risks to include nuclear weapons and airplanes.
- Military help consisted of 600 million dollars credit over a period of five years and a donation of 75 million dollars. A contribution of 50 million dollars for Red Alert and Control and 10 million dollars for training was also specified.
- The U.S. promised to give Spain the technical data necessary for production of defensive material in Spain.
- The U.S. and Spain committed to negotiate the establishment of a Spanish-North American Center for Solar Energy.
- The treaty specified that Spanish bases were not to be employed in localized conflicts as, for example, in the Middle East.
- The Rota-Zaragoza oil duct was authorized for U.S. use and the U.S. agreed to deliver three generous petroleum deposits to the Spanish government by 19 December, 1978.¹⁹³

¹⁹² Vinas, Angel, "Spain and NATO: Internal Debate and External Challenges," in *NATO's Southern Allies: Internal and External Challenges*, John Chipman, ed., p. 147, Routledge, 1988.

¹⁹³ Salas Lopez, p. 152-54.

Franco's tenure as dictator was also characterized by an Agreement of Military Cooperation Between the Government of the Spanish State and the Government of the French Republic, signed on 22 June 1970. The roots of this agreement lie, according to the preamble, in the geographical relationship the two nations share, since both have access to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic. Hence, the purpose of the agreement was to ensure friendly relations through cooperation and exchanges between the Armed Forces. For example, they agreed jointly to produce military materials, organize joint maneuvers, promote both personnel and unit exchanges, and arrange industrial cooperation and technical assistance¹⁹⁴.

E. SPAIN AND NATO

1. The NATO Debate

a. *Benefits of NATO Membership*

According to Gary Prevost, "the Spanish NATO debate began on June 15, 1980, when Foreign Minister Marcelino Oreja, in a major policy speech, declared 'the necessity of Spanish membership in NATO before 1983.'" Those in favor of NATO membership at the beginning of the debate naturally focussed on what they perceived as the benefits such membership would have. For example, Oreja linked "NATO memberships and integration into the European Economic Community and the regaining of sovereignty over Gibraltar from the British." Domestic concerns also, no doubt, motivated NATO accession. As Vinas notes in the following excerpt:

First, it is probable that the government felt that participation in the Alliance would take the armed forces out of their ideological and emotional ghetto, by offering them many attractive professional opportunities and providing a special reason for the continuance of necessary technical and organizational reforms. However, this argument was never made explicit. Second, given the growing disintegration of the UCD, the NATO issue might

¹⁹⁴ Salas Lopez, p. 152-54.

have served for some time as an element of self-identification and unity within certain sectors of the party. Third, it was believed that if Spain under the UCD government did not accede to NATO, a Socialist or Socialist-supported government would be very unwilling to countenance such a move... Forecasts of forthcoming regional elections did show that the UCD would not fare well.¹⁹⁵

NATO membership was seen by some, then, as a means of preventing military coups such as the attempted coup in 1981.

Salas Lopez further notes possible advantages NATO membership may have meant for proponents. Politically, NATO membership meant greater identification with the West and the possibility of "having a voice in the decision-making organs of Europe."¹⁹⁶

Militarily, NATO membership signified "better actualization of doctrinal concepts, methods of combat, unit organization, and logistic development." Furthermore, Spaniards in favor of NATO membership saw it as a possibility to "augment infrastructure in our territory" and to modernize Spanish Armed Forces¹⁹⁷. Defense of the Canary Islands and better protection of Spanish air space were also seen as advantages.

Economically, advocates of Spain joining NATO hoped for more opportunities for technological advancement; "a better yield from expenses dedicated to defense; development of military industries and defense relations; and increased coproduction, etc."¹⁹⁸.

¹⁹⁵ Vinas, "Spain and NATO," p. 161.

¹⁹⁶ Salas Lopez, p. 219.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 221.

b. The Anti-NATO Movement

For every argument in favor of joining NATO, however, the opposition had an argument for staying out. In the eyes of many Spaniards, NATO and the U.S. were inseparable, and anti-American sentiments in Spain date back at least to the Spanish-American war of 1898. Such sentiments have been periodically exacerbated by events such as "the accidental fall of a nuclear bomb from an airplane off the Spanish Mediterranean coast on 7 January 1966,"¹⁹⁹ and Kissinger's pragmatic renewal of the bilateral treaty immediately following "a series of political executions" by Franco, an event that some European leaders condemned by recalling ambassadors and appealing "for 'clemency' on behalf of those executed."²⁰⁰

In addition to their anti-American sentiments, opponents of NATO membership felt that "Spain's membership would disrupt the East-West balance of power and increase the chances of new conflicts." They questioned whether Spain could afford the expense of membership and whether it would be "better to wait to join until the defense of Europe is completely in the hands of the Europeans, free of all dependence on the United States."²⁰¹

While proponents of joining NATO supported the view that belonging to the Alliance would reduce the prospect of military coups and increase the prospect of Spanish sovereignty over Gibraltar, opponents argued that "NATO is not a 'vaccination' that would render a country immune to military coups" as evidenced in Greece and Turkey and that "since Britain is more powerful than Spain, NATO would always support the United Kingdom on the issue of Gibraltar."²⁰²

¹⁹⁹ Alba, p. 100.

²⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 100-101.

²⁰¹ Ibid.

Some opponents cited that "the expansion of NATO would not accord with the spirit of the Helsinki Final Act; others argued that the nuclear umbrella would not extend to Ceuta and Melilla, that Spain could become "a nuclear target in time of war," and that nothing would "be gained from NATO membership that was not already provided by the bilateral agreement with the United States." The possibility of "militarization" was seen by some as a negative effect of joining the Alliance. Others felt NATO membership should be used as a bargaining chip to secure Gibraltar and entry into the European Community.²⁰³

Of course, the Soviet Union attempted to pressure the Spanish government into staying out of NATO. The first Soviet Foreign Minister to visit Spain after a thirty-eight-year break in diplomatic relations (Gromyko) chose Spanish membership in NATO as one of the principal topics for discussion²⁰⁴. Further, "according to a Spanish weekly, a Soviet leader proposed aid, in the fight against the ETA and its terrorism... if Spain would stay out of NATO."²⁰⁵

Based on the anti-NATO arguments discussed above, leaders of the PCE and other organizations to the left of the PSOE organized an anti-NATO movement. The movement mobilized for the first time in January of 1981 when "20,000 persons marched 12 kilometers from Madrid to the American military base at Torrejon." The demonstration has become an annual event and has continued to grow in size (within four years the size of the crowd had multiplied by a factor of five).

²⁰² Ibid.

²⁰³ Vinas, "Spain and NATO," p. 159.

²⁰⁴ *Christian Science Monitor*, "Gromyko in Spain to Talk Against Ties With NATO," 20 November 1979, p. 2.

²⁰⁵ Alba, p. 105.

With the anti-NATO movement, the Spanish debate was well underway and was, it seems, characterized by the same kind of ambivalence that characterized Spain's transition to democracy. As Treverton notes, "on the one hand there is the yearning for Spain to be a full member of Europe and of the club of industrial democracies. On the other, however, there is the feeling that Spain, still removed from the clash of forces in Central Europe, has little to fear from the East and little to gain by more direct participation in 'Europe's' quarrels."²⁰⁶

c. The Decision to Join

In spite of growing opposition to Spanish accession to NATO, and the UCP government's "weak parliamentary base," Parliament approved the decision to join NATO in October 1981²⁰⁷, and the government under Sotelo accelerated "the process of accession to the Atlantic Alliance." The explanation for what appeared to some as a rash decision has never been fully revealed. Only five days after Spain had officially joined the Alliance, questions such as the following ran rampant:

Was the government rushing into NATO because its election defeat in Andalusia meant it was in danger of collapse? Was it expecting trouble because of the sentences about to be imposed on the officers who organized last year's abortive coup? Or was it simply cashing in on the military spirit generated by a week of propaganda in praise of the armed forces, which had saturated the media and added shellshock to the hazards of watching Spanish television?²⁰⁸

²⁰⁶ Treverton, Gregory F. *Spain: Domestic Politics and Security Policy*, p. 5, Adelphi Paper 204, International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1986.

²⁰⁷ Serra, p. 6.

²⁰⁸ *Economist*, "Ask Not Only What Spain Can Do For NATO...", pp. 47-48, June 5, 1982.

According to *The Economist*, Spain's primary reason for joining NATO was Sotelo's genuine support for the Alliance. Joining it was, in his opinion, "his greatest political achievement."²⁰⁹

Regardless of why Spain joined NATO, the decision, as Treverton notes, probably "owed as much to reasons of tactics and domestic politics as it did to calculations of foreign-policy interest." The decision had been made and Spain was left with the challenge of dealing with the decision. Alba lists four circumstances that "made Spain's entry into NATO... a special case:"

- It is the first country to join NATO since 1955. It therefore is in the position of dealing with a working institution without having the advantage, as did the founding members, of being able to influence its structure.
- Its joining did not take place either during a Cold War Period, as was the case when the alliance was founded, or during an age of detente, as was the case during the following years, but rather during a time of hesitation, disorientation, and absence of specific international policies and clearly defined objectives.
- Spain joined NATO after many years of dictatorship, during which it was somewhat shunned by the organization. Therefore, the Spanish expect more from the alliance than it probably can offer, such as protection against right-wing coups, in spite of the examples to the contrary in the instances of Greece and Turkey.
- Outside of the context of NATO, the United States maintained special relations with the Spanish dictatorship. The anti-Americanism in democratic Spain that resulted from those relations has extended to the alliance.²¹⁰

While the Socialists opposed NATO membership based at least partly on its lack of public appeal in addition to other perceived problems, they "were unwilling, for domestic political reasons, to bring down the government." Hence, they proceeded to oppose NATO membership through legal means.

In particular, the Socialists capitalized on the volatile nature of the NATO debate in the 1982 election campaign. Thus, two major points characterized the PSOE's

²⁰⁹ Ibid.

²¹⁰ Alba, p. 97.

election platform. First, the PSOE promised to "suspend integration into NATO's military structure." Second, they promised that, if they won the upcoming election, they "would call for a referendum on Spanish membership in NATO."²¹¹

d. The Referendum

In October 1982, just five months after Spain's entry into the Atlantic Alliance, Felipe Gonzalez, representing the PSOE, won the general elections. The new Socialist Government faced several challenges regarding the direction Spanish security would take. Sr. Don Narcis Serra has identified three key objectives the new government hoped to meet. First, Gonzalez was faced with "giving a new structure to the Ministry of Defence, reorganizing the air force, providing it with improved equipment and making it fully operative within an overall project of defence policy"; second, he was challenged with "working out a security policy;" and third, he hoped to resolve the issue of "how to structure Spain's defences in relation to Western Security." How to handle Spain's new membership in NATO would certainly determine how each of these objectives would be met.

While some members of the PSOE were in favor of leaving the Alliance, others recognized that "choosing not to enter and deciding to leave NATO" were based on two different frames of reference²¹². By 1984 some members of the PSOE Executive Committee even supported NATO membership²¹³. Even Felipe Gonzalez's perspective changed once he saw "the realities of power." Whereas he had stated in 1976 that "NATO is nothing but a military superstructure implanted by the Americans in order to guarantee the survival of the capitalist system,"²¹⁴ he came to support Spain's "continued

²¹¹ Ibid.

²¹² Vinas, "Spain and NATO," p. 162.

²¹³ Sanchez-Gijon, p. 111.

membership in NATO." Furthermore, he communicated the following reasons for his new perspective to the voting populace:

- Spain could not live isolated. In particular, PSOE members "defend their change of heart by arguing that since Spain is [became] a member of the Common Market, it has [incurred] a moral obligation to contribute to the defense of its partners."²¹⁵
- The Alliance strengthens Spain's economic and technological relations. According to Gabriel Jackson, "party technocrats believe modernization of the Spanish economy depends on increased investment in high technology, and that requires access to military technology and capital which only NATO countries can offer."²¹⁶
- Neutrality is impossible for Spain.²¹⁷

Nevertheless, in spite of Gonzalez's and the PSOE's new perspective, they could not forget their promise to the voters in 1982 to hold a referendum regarding Spain's NATO membership. Thus, "during 1984 the Spanish government gradually developed the policy of linking the EEC question with the NATO issue" and in October 1984, Gonzalez "announced a ten-point defence programme which included, among other things, continuation of Spanish NATO membership without participation in the integrated military structures, the opening of talks with the USA for the reduction of their military presence in Spain, the non-nuclearisation of the Spanish territory, and consideration of the possibility of Spain's joining the Western European Union."²¹⁸

Based on Gonzalez's apparent turnaround, some doubted whether he would honor his promise to hold a referendum and, again, the referendum issue fostered ambivalence in Spain. According to D. Eduardo Serra Rexach, the referendum was

²¹⁴ Ibid.

²¹⁵ Jackson, Gabriel, "Spain's NATO Vote," *Nation*, p. 293, 15 March 1986.

²¹⁶ Ibid.

²¹⁷ Ibid.

²¹⁸ Sanchez-Gijon, p. 113.

necessary for three reasons. First, "while the average Spaniard has for years identified Europe with democracy and political pluralism, it has not been the same with NATO or even with Spain's bilateral agreements with the United States." This is due, in many cases, to what Spaniards perceived as U.S. support to the Franco regime. Second, Rexach asserts that many in Spain remember "the advantages of neutrality." "Finally," as Rexach points out, "one must remember that Spain was not liberated by the Allied Forces, as were the other European Countries at the end of World War II. Unlike these countries, Spain did not receive all of the benefits of the Marshall Plan, nor did it sign the Washington Treaty in 1949, which crystallized a defense policy closely pursued by Europeans in order to face the Soviet advances of 1945-1948."²¹⁹

Serra was not alone in arguing for a referendum regarding the NATO issue in Spain. In fact arguments both for and against the referendum were prevalent. Vinas listed several arguments for both positions. According to him, the arguments supporting a referendum included the following:

- Failure to hold the referendum would damage the PSOE's prestige and, consequently, that of any party aspiring to hold office. In a country that had only recently become a parliamentary democracy, non-adherence to a solemn commitment might considerably harm the credibility of the incipient democratic political class.
- Any damage done to the PSOE's prestige would be detrimental to the nation (not just the party) given the PSOE's pledge to undertake a thorough modernization of Spain.
- If the Spanish people, under the proper guidance of the government, were to support the government in the referendum, this would make it possible to develop security policy in the future on a much firmer basis. It would also help to get rid of the NATO issue, thus ending all the strife that it had caused.

"

Weighty arguments against holding the referendum included:

- *No other country had ever had a referendum on NATO membership.* (Against this position, it was argued that the referendum was part of the process of Spanish accession, and that in other countries NATO had not been so consistently questioned as in Spain.)

²¹⁹ Ibid.

- The government might not be able to carry the majority of the nation with it, which would give rise to a politically delicate situation.
- A problematic situation would be even more likely if the right-wing opposition voted 'no' in the referendum, or abstained.
- The referendum campaign and the referendum itself would cause considerable turmoil in Spanish society if the majority parties failed to reestablish a minimal consensus on the basic principles of security policy.²²⁰

Other arguments against the referendum included the following:

- Spanish withdrawal from NATO due to the negative outcome of a referendum "might strain Western unity and encourage similar action by others."²²¹
- As Gonzalez warned, withdrawal "would embarrass Spain with its new Common Market trading partners, cause a breach in relations with Washington and even lead to 'instability'"²²²

Fears regarding the outcome of the referendum were compounded by Spain's internal political situation. Specifically, even though the Popular Alliance party supported continued membership in NATO, its leaders did not want to support the PSOE decision to hold a referendum. Thus, its leaders advised constituents to refrain from voting in the referendum. In spite of fears regarding the outcome of a referendum due to both those opposed to Spain's membership in NATO and those who were either indifferent or could be expected consciously to refrain from voting, the Spanish government opted to hold a referendum. Thus, on 12 March 1986, it became a reality. Fortunately, "against the forecasts of nearly all public-opinion polls taken days earlier, at the polling booths, Spaniards who favored remaining in NATO outnumbered those who advocated taking Spain out of the Atlantic Alliance."²²³

²²⁰ Vinas, "Spain and NATO," p. 169.

²²¹ Chesnoff, Richard Z., "Spain Gives Nod to NATO, Europe," *U.S. News & World Report* 100, p. 30, 24 March 1986.

²²² Ibid.

²²³ Piquer, p. 325.

2. Implications of NATO Membership

a. The Spanish Perspective

The 1986 referendum served to strengthen the Spanish decision to join NATO and thus dispelled, at least to some degree, the intense debate that had surrounded the issue for so long. Even so, the Spanish perspective towards membership is unique and merits attention. Since Spain is far from being a homogeneous nation, this section will describe five aspects of Spain's perspective: political, territorial, economic, internal, and defense-related.

Politically, as previously mentioned, the PSOE has adopted a pro-NATO stance that is only moderated by "the deep-seated opposition of the Spanish people to military alliances and the relatively low salience of harsh anti-Soviet themes in Spanish politics." As Prevost notes, "by just about any standard, the Spanish populace turns up as more pacifist, less anti-Soviet, and more anti-American than any other European country." The political difficulties that have surrounded Spanish accession to the Alliance are particularly significant since Spain's decision to join seems to have been based more on political issues than on military concerns.

Prior to the referendum, advocates of Spain's membership suggested that continued affiliation with the Alliance would "strengthen the democratic system in Spain." From a political perspective, such would seem to be the case since "not only would Spanish defense be boosted, but its officers would be brought into closer contact with foreign officers who are committed to democracy and civilian rule." In addition, William Heiberg lists three other political objectives that characterize Spain's perspective on NATO membership:

- Increasing influence in Europe according to Spanish tradition,
- Gaining independence from the United States, and
- Promoting interests outside of NATO.

For example, Spain has traditionally perceived itself as the mediator between Latin America, the Arab nations, and Europe. From a political perspective, Spain would claim to have gained greater influence in this realm.²²⁴

Spain's territorial objectives that it hopes to meet through the Atlantic Alliance include regaining sovereignty over Gibraltar²²⁵, guaranteeing protection of Ceuta and Melilla, its African enclaves, and insuring "Spanish command over maritime areas," an objective that, given Portugal's interests in the area, is quite sensitive²²⁶.

Just as Spain hopes to promote Latin American and Middle Eastern interests within the North Atlantic Alliance, it has made it clear that it will not "allow its bases to be used for operations" against those states "it considers friendly."²²⁷

If Spain's territorial interests differ from those of other Alliance members, so does its economic position. According to Heiberg, Spain's economic objectives which it hopes to fulfill through its membership in NATO initially included improving its prospects for entering the EEC and strengthening the general economy. Spain's acceptance into the EEC may or may not have been influenced by its decision to remain in NATO; its concern with economic crisis remains a primary aspect of the nation's perspective. Whether or not NATO has helped or hindered the Spanish economy is debatable. On the one hand the Spanish economy's technological and productive dependence on more developed Western nation "tends to increase Spain's vulnerability vis-a-vis external pressures." On the other hand, the referendum tended to push the NATO debate into the background of political awareness, thus freeing Gonzalez "to tend

²²⁴ Heiberg, pp. 32-34.

²²⁵ Thompson, p. 457.

²²⁶ Heiberg, pp. 34, 35.

²²⁷ *Economist*, "Ask Not Only What Spain Can Do For NATO...", pp. 47-48.

to the country's ailing economy." Whether or not NATO has helped Spain handle its economic problems, cooperation with the West is generally perceived as an economic priority in Spain.

Spain's internal objectives relative to its NATO membership include stabilizing its democracy and avoiding deployment of nuclear weapons. These objectives concur with Spain's traditional concerns. As previously noted, Spain is traditionally more concerned with internal violence than that from any external threat. Furthermore, "when Spaniards do talk of external threats, the discussion is usually vague but the assumption is always that it will come from the South."²²⁸

One persisting internal threat in Spain is that of terrorism. Mikhlin suggests that Spain's NATO affiliation has assisted in the war against terrorism. He points out that, whereas the PSOE was unsuccessful in its attempts to induce France's cooperation in "tackling the problem of terrorism,... Paris suddenly changed its position" in 1983. According to *El Pais*, cooperation between the two nations may have had some basis in Spain's membership in the Alliance, since other NATO countries could, conceivably, have pressured France into cooperating²²⁹.

Spain's internal character is different from most other NATO members in yet another aspect that rises from its traditional emphasis on internal violence over any external threats. Spanish citizens, by and large, fear the army. Paradoxically, "the media feel obliged to flatter the generals frequently and tell them how much everyone loves them." It stands to reason that Spain's perspective of defense, then, also differs from that of most other Alliance members.

As stated previously, Spain's reasons for joining NATO did not revolve around any perception of a threat from the Warsaw Pact. In short, while Spain's defense

²²⁸ Treverton, p. 16.

²²⁹ Mikhlin, I., "Under Pro-Atlantic Pressure," *New Times* 35, p. 9, 1984.

objective is "to enhance Spain's defensive posture, Spanish objectives appear to be virtually unrelated to the defensive purposes of the Alliance." Nevertheless, since joining NATO, Spain has encouraged its military officers to "acquire modern military skills"²³⁰ and has attempted "to bring the Spanish defense structure into line with patterns already tested in neighboring Western countries, [and] to make the armed forces more professional, effective, and streamlined."²³¹

That Spain is concerned with defense is evidenced by its interest in purchasing military equipment such as the SORAS 6, an instrument used to locate enemy artillery systems²³². Even so, to date, Spain has shown no interest in becoming a part of NATO's integrated military structure²³³. While the Right postulates that the Spanish government is "depriving the country of the NATO 'security umbrella' by keeping Spain out of the bloc's military organization,"²³⁴ it seems unlikely that Spain will change its posture in the near future. North Africa remains, in Spanish eyes, a more viable threat than does the Soviet Union²³⁵.

b. The Alliance Perspective

Thus far, this section has focused primarily on the Spanish perspective of NATO membership. What about the Alliance perspective? According to Salas Lopez, a

²³⁰ Thompson, p. 456.

²³¹ Heiberg, pp. 40-41.

²³² Foss, Christopher F., "Spain Orders SORAS 6 Plus Simulator," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, p. 690, 9 April 1988.

²³³ Piquer, p. 328.

²³⁴ Mikhlin, p. 8.

²³⁵ Palmer, Diego A. Ruiz, "Spanish Security Policy in an Era of Internationalization: Implications for Long-term Defense Planning," draft of a panel discussion "Implications for Spain" held at the *International Conference of the Asociacion de Periodistas Europeos*, p. 7, Toledo, Spain, December 1989.

possible concern within the Alliance is that, due to Spain's unique perception regarding defense, it would not be willing to defend central Europe in the event of an East-West conflict²³⁶. Further, Spain's determination "to reduce American military forces in the country" and to keep nuclear weapons off of Spanish soil²³⁷ cannot help but be of some concern to NATO.

Other issues and concerns within NATO are not peculiar to the Spanish situation. Burdensharing, strategic deterrence, and host nation support rank high on the list of general concerns. Though some concerns are inevitable, however, Treverton suggests that "the NATO perspective on Spanish membership, like Spain's own, is dominated by politics." He further asserts that "the Alliance sought Spanish accession more in order to symbolize Spain's joining the West than for any military advantage that it might bring."²³⁸

Since Spain has joined NATO, the challenge has been more one of how to accommodate both Spanish and NATO political concerns than anything else. NATO, as Treverton suggests, is primarily concerned with maintaining its own integrity and Spain is only of concern in light of its potential, given its rejection of full integration, to "encourage centrifugal tendencies within the Alliance." Generally, however, Victor Alba's percept. of NATO's position on Spanish membership seems to be the most accurate. According to Alba, "NATO's position... has been one of essential indifference."²³⁹

²³⁶ Salas Lopez, p. 214.

²³⁷ Thompson, pp. 456-457.

²³⁸ Treverton, p. 35.

²³⁹ Alba, p. 109.

Whether or not Spain has been of concern to NATO, it would be a mistake to overlook Spain's potential as an alliance member. Vinas argues that the most valuable contribution Spain could make in the event of a conflict may be to secure "its own national interest," since Spain shares NATO's concern for "ensuing the defence of the destination points of the sea lines of communication (SLOC) from the United States to central and southern Europe as well as of the oil route and the sea routes that go through the Straits of Gibraltar." However, Spain could also be useful in performing "logistical and reinforcement functions within NATO's overall strategy of European defence," as well as in "providing access to aeronaval bases and infrastructure and logistical systems." Should Spain decide to become part of NATO's integrated military structure, then, both its strategic position and its manpower and material resources could contribute to NATO's ability to defend itself against potential aggressors. Even more importantly, Spain's membership has the potential of increasing "NATO's dissuasive value."²⁴⁰

If Spain is to reach any or all of her potentials as a member of the North Atlantic Alliance, it stands to reason that her objectives must coincide with the objectives of the Alliance as a whole. In some, though not all, cases, a definite correlation exists between NATO's objectives and Spain's contributions or potential. For example, one of NATO's primary objectives is "to demonstrate the solidarity and health of the Alliance." It seems fair to assert that Spain has, at least initially, assisted NATO in meeting this objective. Other NATO objectives include enhancing "deterrence through a more credible combat posture," maintaining "current NATO boundaries," respecting the "sensitivities of all member nations," encouraging "the development of members' democratic institutions," preserving "the integrity of NATO," limiting "costs to the Alliance," and developing "the capability to combat terrorism." Sensitivities that must be addressed with regard to these objectives include Britain's claim to Gibraltar and

²⁴⁰ Alba, p. 110.

Portugal's command jurisdiction. In light of Spain's thriving democracy and greater cooperation with France regarding terrorism, however, it seems that Spain has contributed enough to NATO's objectives to be considered a valuable member of the Alliance.

As with Spain, U.S. objectives should both enhance NATO's objectives as a whole and contribute to the objectives of other member countries, including Spain. Because of the U.S. role in the Alliance, it seems beneficial to review some of the U.S.'s major objectives to enhance understanding of the Alliance perspective regarding Spain. Heiberg lists U.S. objectives as follows:

- To enhance the capability of the Alliance...
- To prepare for contingencies outside of NATO...
- To coordinate the Allied response to armed conflicts outside of NATO...
- To increase the European share of the NATO burden...
- To avoid massive increases in U.S. military assistance...
- To better integrate U.S. and NATO war planning...
- To protect bilateral relationships with other nations.²⁴¹

Given these objectives and the various perspectives this paper has attempted to bring to light regarding the implications of Spain's membership in the Atlantic Alliance, Spain's actual role in the Alliance becomes an important consideration. Following, then, is a discussion of Spanish contributions to NATO.

3. Spanish Role in the Alliance

a. Spanish Contributions

Clearly, Spain could contribute more to NATO if it were integrated into the military command. Initially, NATO hoped to incorporate Spain into contingency plans, even though, as reported in the *Economist* in 1982, "its 225,000-man army is [was] oriented more toward parades, the imposition of martial law and skirmishes with Moroccans than towards defence against the Warsaw Pact."²⁴²

²⁴¹ Ibid., pp. 26-30.

²⁴² *Economist*, "Ask Not Only What Spain Can Do For NATO...", pp. 47-48.

In spite of Spain's refusal to join NATO's integrated military structure, "Spain's willingness to act as a staging and transit area in support of the SACEUR Rapid Reinforcement Plan... adds a new, still undefined dimension to AFSOUTH's rapid reinforcement planning." In addition, according to a Eurogroup publication, Spain has agreed to contribute "to the common defense" by assuming the following roles outside the integrated military structure:

- Prevention of occupation of the Spanish territory;
- Naval and air operations in the Eastern Atlantic;
- Control of the Straits of Gibraltar and its approaches;
- Naval and air operations in the Western Mediterranean;
- Air space control and air defense in the Spanish area of responsibility and cooperation with the adjacent areas. This will include air surveillance and all kinds of air defense operations;
- Utilization of the Spanish territory as a transit, support, and rear logistic area.²⁴³

As the following chart (also taken from the Eurogroup publication²⁴⁴) indicates, Spanish military contributions, though generally downplayed because of Spain's special role in the Alliance, are worthy of note.

NAVY	
Conventional submarines:	8
Major surface combatants:	22
Mine counter-measure vessels:	12
Other naval vessels:	22
Support vessel:	1
Fixed wing aircraft:	1 squadron
Helicopters:	5 squadrons
Amphibious brigades:	1
Amphibious battalions:	5

²⁴³ NATO: Eurogroup, *Western Defense: The European Role in NATO*, p. 30, Brussels, 1988.

²⁴⁴ Ibid.

ARMY

Armored divisions:	1
Motorized divisions:	1
Mechanized divisions:	1
High mountain divisions:	2
Cavalry brigades:	2
Paratroop brigades:	1
Airmobile brigades:	1

AIR FORCE

Fighter bomber/ground attack:	12 squadrons
Maritime patrol:	2 squadrons
Refuelling tankers:	1 squadron
Transport:	9 squadrons
Search and rescue:	3 squadrons
Reconnaissance:	1 squadron

While it is obvious, given Spain's troop positioning, that Spain perceives Morocco as its primary threat, it is also true that "continental contingencies are not being ignored." Provisions for such contingencies include "the establishment of a new armored cavalry brigade and a new fighter-wing — equipped with the latest F-18 fighters." Further, Spain seems gradually to be cooperating more with NATO's military forces in other areas. For example, the Spanish Navy is concentrating on updating its frigate fleet²⁴⁵ and has participated in joint maritime operations with Britain, thus "assuming a wider naval role within NATO."²⁴⁶

Spain's geostrategic position can also be considered a contribution to the Alliance. It "constitutes a rear guard position of support for the Rhine, the Po, and the Loire. It is also a forward American port in Europe and the European antechamber of the South Atlantic routes. Finally, it occupies a very special position in the Mediterranean."²⁴⁷

²⁴⁵ Gallego, Fermin, "Spanish Update Plans Detailed," *Jane's Defense Weekly*, p. 418, 10 March 1990.

²⁴⁶ *Jane's Defense Weekly*, "Spain, UK Team Up For NATO's 'Sharp Spear 89'," p. 563, 23 September 1989.

²⁴⁷ Alba, p. 107.

b. Problems

Although Spain has definitely made progress in the political, economic, and security arenas since its transition to democracy and subsequent decision to join NATO, its role in the Alliance is certainly not without problems. Some of these problems, such as Spain's conflict with Britain over Gibraltar, anti-U.S. sentiment, the amount of economic commitment NATO membership requires, "the resolution of competing Spanish and Portuguese interests in the Atlantic,"²⁴⁸ and Spain's concern that its enclaves in Morocco be protected have already been discussed. However, several other problems characterize Spain's role in the Atlantic Alliance. For example, as Vinas points out, Spain is geographically vulnerable. He adds that "many of these vulnerabilities do not directly affect the purely military aspect of security, but they do have a bearing upon its political, economic, and social dimensions. These are very important since they shape people's perceptions of governmental efficiency and ability."²⁴⁹

Another problem Spain has had to confront deals with defense information proliferation. The publicity which Spain's accession to NATO naturally attracted fostered the "trivialization" of Spanish defense issues. Hence, whereas Spanish citizens had little opportunity to shape their nation's defense policies prior to the referendum, the right to participate in defense decisions has come to be expected. As a result, public debate and ambivalence can be expected to continue.²⁵⁰

Regardless of the existence of problems and challenges for Spain regarding its role in the Alliance, how it handles those problems is more important and can be expected to influence Spain's future security situation.

²⁴⁸ Heiberg, p. 36.

²⁴⁹ Vinas, "Spain and NATO," p. 173.

²⁵⁰ Palmer, "Spanish Security Policy....," p. 2.

F. SOVIET RELATIONS WITH AND INFLUENCE ON SPAIN

1. Historical Perspective: Soviet Relations with Spain During the Spanish Civil War

Prior to the Spanish Civil War and the events immediately preceding it, Russian and, later, Soviet interaction with Spain was primarily limited to mutual colonial interests²⁵¹ or other less direct contact. Just prior to the Spanish Civil War, however, the Soviet Union became directly involved in Spanish affairs. The complexity of peripheral events in the same time period make it difficult to interpret Soviet motivations and influence on Spain. That the Soviet Union influenced events in Spain in some manner is hardly disputable.

Rubinstein, in *The Foreign Policy of the Soviet Union* enumerated three possible motivations for Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War. According to Rubinstein, the USSR may have hoped to establish a Soviet Republic, a view which Germany, Italy, and "many conservative and reactionary European circles"²⁵² supported. On the other hand, Moscow may have hoped to postpone Nazi expansion into the Soviet Union by involving "Western democracies in a war with the fascist states." A third possibility, espoused by the pro-Communists, is that the Soviet Union supported the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War because of "a desire to strengthen the principle of collective security and thereby halt the spread of fascism."²⁵³

There is, doubtless, some truth to all of the possible motives that have been attributed to the Soviet Union; all have been argued convincingly. The events

²⁵¹ For a more detailed discussion of this, see Perkins, Dexter, "Russia and the Spanish Colonies, 1817-1818," pp. 656-72, *The American Historical Review* 28 (October 1922 - July 1923).

²⁵² Rubinstein, Alvin Z., *Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II*, p. 20, Little, Brown and Company, 1985.

²⁵³ Ibid.

immediately preceding the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, however, indicate that Soviet involvement was probably not as defensive as some might suspect. In 1931, Manuel Azana was the leader of the pro-Marxian Republic Action party. With the birth of the Spanish Republic, Azana, the Marxian Socialists, the Anarcho-Syndicalists and other important unions, and some of the Progressive Republicans gained strength and "dominated the drafting of the 1931 constitution."²⁵⁴

From 1932 through 1933, the Spanish government was pro-Soviet and was itself "oriented along Marxist lines," as exemplified by a Socialist Manifesto dated 17 July 1932. The document made it clear that, according to its authors, "the revolutionary movement is not yet over." (The document's accuracy was strangely ironic, as October 1933 marked the date of the last free election Spain was to have until its attempt to support democracy again over forty years later.) In 1933, the anti-Marxist coalition won the elections, a victory that incensed the leader of Spain's Socialist party, Largo Caballero. Caballero, along with the Communists and the Anarcho-Syndicalists, "led riots and strikes which helped prevent the appointment of the anti-Communist Gil Robles as Premier, with the result that the milder Lerroux was made head of the cabinet." Leftist groups, including youth groups and Marxist militias formed to "defend the republic" and were opposed by the newly-formed Spanish Fascist group. In 1934, Caballero and his followers on the left revolted when three individuals who represented contrary interests joined the cabinet. According to Bouscaren, the new cabinet members made "a perfectly normal and parliamentary move"²⁵⁵ by joining the cabinet, but it went beyond the tolerance level of the left.

²⁵⁴ Bouscaren, Anthony T., *Imperial Communism*, p. 189, Public Affairs Press, 1953.

²⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

In support of the revolt, "French and Russian ships landed ammunition and the First Soviet Republic of Spain was proclaimed, with its seat in Oviedo, Asturias. Currency and stamps were issued bearing the hammer and sickle insignia" and, according to Bouscaren, "the left lost every shred of moral authority to condemn the rebellion of 1936" with this rebellion. The *Communist International*, basking in the fruits of the 1934 rebellion, noted that "the workers of Asturias fought for Soviet power under the leadership of the Communist Party."²⁵⁶

Though the Communists and their supporters failed in their attempt to establish a Soviet state, they were not beaten. Instead, they helped form the Popular Front, which insisted on new elections. Spain's president, Zamora, bowed to the Popular Front's demands and scheduled elections for 15 February 1936. The outcome of the elections is not clear — the anti-Marxist coalition won the overall election, but the Popular Front could not agree with the anti-Marxists over how many seats each would get in the cabinet. In the midst of the disagreement, "President Zamora asked Azana to take over the premiership," but Azana protested and "proceeded to appoint a commission to 'verify' the election, with the result that forty more anti-Marxists were deprived of their seats and replaced by members of the Popular Front, some of whom had not even run for office in first place."²⁵⁷

As the following quotation indicates, after the Popular Front gained control, any hope for democracy in Spain was gone:

The "election" of 1936 was the death blow struck at the Spanish Republic not by Fascism, as some have held, but by the partisans of Soviet power. Constitutional government and parliamentarism was dying, and the left admitted as much. Following the seizure of power by the Popular Front, the Marxist daily *Claridad* commented: "We are approaching the ultimate implications of our electoral triumph. Shall we return to legality as the Rightists demand? To what legality? We know no law but that of revolution."²⁵⁸

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 191.

The 1936 election and the events that followed can be seen as the watershed from which the Civil War was to spring. In March 1936, "Soviet and other agents began arriving in Spain. ...On April 20th a party of Russian Communists passed through Paris on their way to Spain, and were granted every courtesy by the Popular Front ambassador there." On 16 May, the Soviet Ambassador, the Comintern representative, Caballero, and the Stalinist Socialist Alvarez del Vayo held a meeting in which they "planned to transform the Popular Front into a Communist-dominated regime capable of holding the Iberian peninsula in the interests of Soviet power." In accordance with this plan, a coup was planned for 25 July.

In the meantime, the Popular Front successfully replaced Zamora with Azana. Violence between the right and the left ran rampant in Madrid.

In spite of the violence, a few members of Spain's political right groups stayed in the parliament and tried to help restore order and constitutionalism. One such individual was Calvin Sotelo, who "made speech after speech demanding restoration of public order, and listing the number of people killed, buildings and churches fired, and other terrorist activities." Following such a speech on 7 July, the Communist parliamentary leader threatened Sotelo by telling him that he had just spoken his last speech. It was no surprise, then, when on 2 July, Sotelo was taken by government police, who "worked him over and dumped his body at one of Madrid's outlying cemeteries early the next morning." Sparked by Sotelo's assassination, the Nationalist revolution started on 17 July. As Bouscaren notes, "[h]is murder, threatened by a government deputy and carried out by the government police, was a signal that there was no longer room for an opposition party, and that only force could assert the will of the majority as expressed on February 15th."²⁵⁹

²⁵⁸ Ibid.

While Bouscaren's explanation of what provoked the Spanish Civil War sounds plausible enough, it is by no means the only explanation. As Hugh Seton-Watson points out, "[t]he Spanish war was represented as a new version of religious war. European civilization was being defended against Red bestiality, or democracy was being defended against Fascist terror, depending on your point of view."²⁶⁰

Vinas, on the other hand, is content to explain the beginnings and direction of the Spanish Civil War as follows:

The February 1936 general election was won by centre-left and left-wing parties grouped in a 'Popular Front' coalition. The new government... was formed by republicans and attempted once again, to pass reforms that previously had been blocked. This was enough for some powerful groups in the army and the civilian right to intensify their activities leading to a coup d'etat on 17 July 1936. A new Popular Front government then armed the masses, although it could not prevent large areas of the country from falling to the insurgents. Nazi Germany and fascist Italy provided immediate help for the Spanish rebels out of fear that the republican government might change the balance of power in Western Europe by allying itself with France.²⁶¹

With the commencement of the Spanish Civil War, it did not take long for foreign aid to arrive. The situation, however, got more and more complex. In the first place, the fascist threat of Nazi Germany loomed nearby. In the second place, both Germany and Italy supported the Nationalists (the right wing) during the war. Thirdly, Stalin was concerned with maintaining "good relations with France, which had [along with Britain, Germany, Italy, and the USSR] previously signed a nonaggression pact and a mutual assistance treaty with the USSR." In short, while Stalin likely wanted to maximize the Soviet Union's potential for power in Spain, the situation was too complex to treat lightly. The Communist Party in Spain was certainly not weak; but by the same

²⁵⁹ Ibid.

²⁶⁰ Seton-Watson, Hugh, *The Soviet Impact on World Politics*, p. 53, ed. Kurt London, Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1974.

²⁶¹ Vinas, "Spain and NATO," p. 145.

token, the Soviet Union did not want to risk involvement in a general war, especially in light of the purges that Stalin had initiated within the Soviet Union. Hence, Stalin's goals were, of necessity, limited and, Kaplan argues, "operationally did not include the takeover of Spain by Communists loyal to Moscow."²⁶²

Nevertheless, it seems that the thought of Soviet control did not escape the minds of all Soviets involved. Kennan notes that "Soviet agents were in complete charge of military operations on the Madrid front." Salvador de Madariaga states that Soviet advisors and military personnel in Spain were adamant about maintaining "a unified army under a unified command,"²⁶³ but in actuality, refused to submit their own army to Spanish control. Thus, Madariaga argues, "the true aim of this campaign... was not merely technical but political as well. The Communists felt that if the Army could be unified, it could be put more efficiently under their complete control, owing to their hold on supplies, and once in possession of the Army, they would be in possession of Spain."²⁶⁴

The role of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE) in the Spanish Civil War is far from clear cut. Even today, that role is a "highly disputed and controversial subject." An example of this controversy is apparent in an article by Angel Vinas in which he notes, first, that the Popular Front coalition won the general election held in February 1936 and second, that Socialists and Communists were excluded from the new government²⁶⁵; however, as previously noted, Bouscaren and also Bolloten, author of *The Grand Camouflage*, virtually equate the Popular Front with communism throughout the Spanish

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ de Madariaga, Salvador, *Spain: A Modern History*, p. 511, Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965.

²⁶⁴ Ibid., pp. 511-512.

²⁶⁵ Vinas, "Spain and NATO," p. 145.

struggle²⁶⁶. Gary Prevost concurs with Vinas and argues that Stalin was primarily concerned with forming a military alliance with France and Britain that would stay Nazi Germany. Prevost argues that "Stalin withheld massive aid to prove to his prospective allies that he was not interested in promoting the spread of revolution" and that it is thus apparent that "the PCE played a conservative non-revolutionary role during the Civil War."²⁶⁷

Still another explanation for Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War has been offered by Hugh Thomas. Thomas argues that the Soviets hoped to push France into a war with Germany and Italy by supporting the Republic (Popular Front) in Spain (Germany and Italy supported the opposition group led by Franco). Thus, Stalin hoped to avoid the collapse of the Republic while mounting an extensive propaganda campaign against Germany and Italy in Western Europe. Had the campaign worked, Thomas argues that the Soviets would have been free to "remain on the sidelines."²⁶⁸

Rubinstein amplified the difficult dilemma Stalin was faced with by pointing out that, while "a victory for the fascist Franco might push Paris into more intimate ties with Moscow,... a Loyalist victory achieved with open Communist support, though it would undoubtedly raise Soviet prestige, might paradoxically frighten France and lead her to view Hitler less belligerently."²⁶⁹

It is certain that Stalin saw the advantages of non-aggression. In the following statement Stalin was purportedly commenting on his view of why the western powers did

²⁶⁶ Bolloren, Burnett, *The Grand Camouflage: The Communist Conspiracy in the Spanish Civil War*, p. 88, Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1961.

²⁶⁷ Prevost, p. 21.

²⁶⁸ Johnston, Verle B., *Legions of Babel: The International Brigades in the Spanish Civil War*, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1967.

²⁶⁹ Rubinstein, p. 20.

not intervene in Spain. Paradoxically, however, his comments are probably an accurate mirror of his own political aspirations:

The Policy of non-intervention means the abetting of aggression, of unleashing war — consequently the transformation of war into world war. There shines through the policy of non-intervention the desire not to hinder the aggressors in the performance of their dirty work,... not to hinder Germany, let us say, from getting bogged down in European matters or becoming entangled in a war with the Soviet Union, to permit all the participants in a war to become deeply bogged down in the mire of the war, to encourage them surreptitiously in this direction, to let them weaken and exhaust each other, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, to come onto the scene with fresh forces, to come one, of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate one's terms to the weakened participants in the war ...²⁷⁰

If, as the above excerpts indicate, the purposes for Soviet aid to the Spanish Republic are clouded with controversy, the amount and nature of that aid is no less controversial. On 23 August, 1936, the Soviet Union agreed to the Non-Intervention Agreement, even though they had already contributed 12,145,000 rubles to the Spanish Republic. The Soviets had alluded to the apparent contradiction as early as 6 August, when they, "like the Italian[s], agreed to the French non-intervention plan 'in principle.'"²⁷¹

In fact, there are indications that the Soviet Union attempted to abide by the agreement, at least until it noted non-compliance, particularly on the part of Italy. Kennan argues as follows:

Stalin, with his characteristic caution and timidity, would have preferred to remain aloof. But this was not feasible. The immediate and energetic intervention of the Germans and Italians meant that if Russia failed to intervene, an early and dramatic victory of the insurgents could hardly have been avoided. Such a victory would have meant the encirclement of France by fascists, the probable triumph of fascist tendencies within France herself, and the further weakening of western resistance to Hitler. The way would then be clear for a German aggression toward the East.²⁷²

²⁷⁰ Stalin, Josef, "Voprosy Leninizma," taken from *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1941*, George F. Kennan, pp. 172-73, Greenwood Press Publishers, 1960.

²⁷¹ Thomas, Hugh, *The Spanish Civil War*, pp. 388, 392, Harper & Rowe, 1961.

Just as there are differing accounts regarding the extent and nature of Stalin's political interests in Spain, there are controversial accounts regarding the Soviet Union's willingness to assist Spain's Popular Front. Those who support the notion that the Soviet Union was interested in Soviet control of Spain tend to interpret Stalin's agreement to support the Non-Intervention Agreement as a necessary step toward avoiding French embarrassment, but difficult to support in actuality²⁷³. Those who see the Soviet Union's role in the Spanish Civil War as primarily defensive in nature tend to support the view that Stalin signed the Non-Intervention Agreement with the intention of abiding by it, but that Italian and German intervention necessitated his own involvement²⁷⁴. Those who believe that the Soviets wanted the Spanish conflict to last as long as possible, thereby drawing interest away from German and Italian fascism, downplay the amount of assistance the Soviets provided²⁷⁵. Still others assert that Soviet aid to the Republican cause in the Spanish Civil War was a natural expression of what was "probably the most popular political feeling ever permitted by Josef Stalin."²⁷⁶

The *amount* of Soviet aid the Spanish Popular Front received also remains a matter of controversy, as was mentioned above. Kaplan refers to the Soviet contribution of military personnel as "relatively small."²⁷⁷ and Kennan asserts that the Soviets "came out squarely for the Spanish Republic and, for a short time, gave military aid on a major

²⁷² Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, pp. 86-87.

²⁷³ Bolloten, p. 97.

²⁷⁴ Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power*, pp. 150-51.

²⁷⁵ Kennan, *Soviet Foreign Policy*, p. 88.

²⁷⁶ Jackson, *A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War*, p. 60, Thames and Hudson, 1974.

²⁷⁷ Kaplan, *Diplomacy of Power*, p. 151.

scale to the Republican cause." Hugh Thomas, however, gives what seems to be the most detailed account regarding exactly how the Soviets backed the Popular Front. According to Thomas, "the republic bought about 1,000 aircraft from Russia;" in addition, Russia supported Spain with approximately 900 tanks, 1,550 pieces of artillery, 300 armoured cars, 15,000 machine guns, 30,000 automatic rifles, 15,000 mortars, 500,000 rifles, 8,000 trucks, 4 million artillery projectiles, 1 billion cartridges, and 1,500 tons of gunpowder.²⁷⁸

In analyzing Soviet aid to the Spanish Republicans, it is easy to overlook the fact that Soviet Russia's decision to provide assistance required some amount of organization to implement. As Angel Vinas notes, the USSR had to establish mechanisms to distribute the weapons. In addition, the Soviet Union agreed to send specialists and technicians who were not supposed to participate in any actual combat and to monitor an organization established to acquire foreign material and services that Spain might otherwise have had difficulty acquiring.²⁷⁹

Hugh Thomas substantiates Vinas's record, noting that Soviets involved in arms shipments were ordered to "stay out of range of artillery fire." Later, however, Thomas supports the fact that the Soviets, like other members of the International Brigade, actually fought in the war. While the number of Russian volunteers was minimal compared to other foreigners who fought in the war, Soviet "volunteers" included tank operators and pilots²⁸⁰. According to Thomas, "the maximum Russians in Spain at any one time was 700, the total number being probably between 2,000 and 3,000. Perhaps 1,000 Russian pilots flew in Spain."²⁸¹

²⁷⁸ Thomas, pp. 981-82.

²⁷⁹ Vinas, Angel, *El Oro de Moscu*, pp. 151-52, Ediciones Grijalbo, S.A., 1979.

²⁸⁰ Bolloten, p. 99.

Another aspect of the Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War that merits attention is the transfer of over half of the Spanish treasury (approximately \$578 million in gold, at \$35.00 per ounce) at the war's onset. One explanation for the transfer is that it was to serve as advance payment for arms. Gabriel Jackson claims that "since 1939 the Soviets have claimed that their deliveries to Republican Spain more than exhausted the value of the gold."²⁸²

That the event may not have been so clear cut is evidenced by Soviet hesitation, at the conclusion of the war, to recognize any Spanish government at all, in spite of the fact that all her satellites recognized the government-in-exile (i.e. the Popular Front). Salvador de Madariaga asserts that this oddity "proves that Moscow's reluctance is due to the fact that once a Spanish government were recognized by Moscow a *prima facie* obligation would arise to return the gold to it."²⁸³

If the Spanish Civil War can teach us anything about Soviet/Spanish relations historically, it is probably that they were extremely complex and unclear. As this paper has attempted to illustrate thus far, Soviet motives throughout the Civil War were unclear. One thing is certain, however. The Soviet Union acted according to its perceived national interest. In light of this observation, whether or not Soviet Russia, in essence, robbed Spain or just provided a few expensive weapons does not seem as important as why the Soviet Union (or any other nation) became involved in what some have argued began as a purely internal Spanish affair — a conflict not between the Fascists and the Communists, but between Spain's own political parties.

²⁸¹ Thomas, p. 984.

²⁸² Jackson, *A Concise History of the Spanish Civil War*, p. 152.

²⁸³ Madariaga, p. 617.

That Moscow, initially at least, had no apparent malevolent intent to overtake Spain is evidenced by the following statement by W.O. Krivitsky, the Chief of the Soviet Military Intelligence in Western Europe, who defected from the Russian Service:

At the first thunder of guns beyond the Pyrenees, I [Krivitsky was at his headquarters in The Hague.] dispatched an agent to Hendaye on the French-Spanish border, and another to Lisbon, to organize a secret information service in the Franco Territory.

These were merely routine measures. I had received no instructions from Moscow in regard to Spain, and at the time there was no contact between my agents and the Madrid government. As the responsible head of the European Intelligence Service, I was simply securing general information for relaying to the Kremlin.

Our agents in Berlin and Rome, Hamburg and Genoa, Bremen and Naples duly reported to us the powerful aid that Franco was receiving from Italy and Germany. This information I dispatched to Moscow, where it was received in silence. I still got no secret instructions regarding Spain. Publicly also the Soviet government had nothing to say.

The Comintern, of course, made a great deal of noise, but none of us practiced men took that seriously...²⁸⁴

As suggested earlier, it seems reasonable to view Soviet involvement as due to a variety of factors. More than likely, there were those who were interested in the possibility of Soviet control of Spain; others no doubt saw involvement as a way to deflect potential German or Italian aggression from itself, as a way to weaken surrounding powers (thereby strengthening the USSR's own position on the European continent), or simply as a spontaneous expression of political empathy towards the Spanish Republic. Each of these explanations likely pertains to at least some portion of Soviet relations with Spain during the Spanish Civil War.

Whether or not his policies, and the official Soviet policies, were laden with aggressive intent, Stalin did not want to *appear* aggressive. He apparently took care to instruct specialists involved with supplying Spain with weapons not to participate in

²⁸⁴ Puzzo, Pante A., *Spain and the Great Powers 1936-1941*, p. 39, Columbia University Press, 1962.

combat. He did not act decisively, in spite of the belief, as evidenced by the British ambassador's dispatch dated 14 August 1936, that Spain would adopt a communist form of government. He did not even supply Spain with an over-abundance of supplies. It seems safe to conclude, then, that any thoughts of pursuing an overtly aggressive policy towards Spain were necessarily overridden by larger security concerns.

2. Soviet Influence on Spain During the Franco Regime

A natural outgrowth of national victory in the Spanish Civil War was the severance of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Spain. Since Soviet Russia had assisted the Republicans, who opposed Franco during the war, Franco's gain meant Soviet defeat. Consequently, the two nations were cautious in their dealings with one another throughout Franco's dictatorship. Paradoxically, in spite of the lack of formal diplomatic relations between the two nations, Soviet influence on Spain for the forty years following the Spanish Civil War was far from minimal. As Madariaga notes, "From the point of view of ideology, it may be said that the regimes of Moscow and Madrid are allies, as close allies as the two blades of a pair of scissors. Franco finds [found] the existence of the Soviet system an excellent pretext for justifying his own existence (though the idea that the July 1936 uprising was prompted by the need to put down Communist menace in Spain is arrant nonsense); and the Soviet Union finds Franco invaluable as a blatant proof of the "fascist" nature of the West which relies on him as an ally."²⁸⁵

In addition to this "scissor-like" relationship with Spain during the Franco period, the Soviet Union influenced Spain internally more than might be expected given the lack of diplomatic relations. Constantine Christopher Menges points out that "the Communist party generally survives better than democratic opposition groups during periods of dictatorship." Menges reasons that such is the case because Communist parties

²⁸⁵ Madariaga, p. 637.

have "long experience in clandestine operations, internal screening, selectivity, discipline, and international Communist support," experience that "more open groups" don't have. As far as Spain is concerned, the Communist party survived Franco's dictatorship quite well and, as Menges cites, was able to penetrate and use the Workers' Commissions, "which made the Communists the most important single element in the labor movement during the Franco period."²⁸⁶

Just as the Spanish Civil War complicated the world situation, World War II complicated matters in Spain somewhat, in spite of Spain's limited participation. Since Italy and Germany had supported Franco's coup, Franco was sympathetic to the Axis powers. Benny Pollack notes that "highly emotive speeches were common in this period, in which the existence of an international conspiracy of Masons, liberals, Communists, and Jews was used to justify calls for 'national unity.'" Both Franco and Spain's foreign minister, Serrano Suner, openly defended the Axis powers; nevertheless, when Hitler asked Spain for actual military support, Franco was quick to fall back on Spain's extensive losses during the Civil War as a reason for non-involvement.

As the War progressed and it became apparent that the Axis was losing, Franco's politics took a pragmatic turn. In 1943, Franco attempted to "consolidate a grand alliance of 'Christian' nations against the rising spectre of Bolshevism and the Soviet Union." Politically, this was an important move for Franco, because it meant that, "if the Allies were to accept his rationale, then he could transform a political defeat, which is what the collapse of the Axis would mean to Spain, into a political victory." In 1944, as a continuation of his early version of "Realpolitik," Franco totally abandoned his pro-Axis foreign policy.

²⁸⁶ Ibid.

Even though Spain's support to the Axis had been primarily in the ideological realm, the Allied powers "deeply resented Franco's collaboration, and were prepared to exact some sort of punishment." That Stalin, in particular, maintained animosity toward Spain was evidenced at the conclusion of the war when he suggested at Potsdam that the Allies "break relations with Spain, which had dispatched a 'volunteer' division to fight against Russia." The U.S. and Britain vetoed Stalin's suggestion.

The end of World War II marked the beginning of tensions between Western democratic states and the Soviet Union that deteriorated into the Cold War. In this environment, the Western Alliance "felt it could no longer afford the democratic niceties of opposing and isolating Franco's Spain." Hence, the Western democracies, in particular the U.S., began negotiating with Spain regarding potential bases and membership in NATO. The Soviet Union felt more and more isolated from Spain. As a result, Pollack notes that "overtures were being made towards some form of unofficial link" between Spain and the Soviet Union. He further states that "reliable sources in both the Spanish and the Soviet Foreign services attribute significant importance among Soviet motivations to its desire to limit the potential damage to its security as a result of the American bases which were being discussed at the time between the United States and the Franco government."²⁸⁷

Even before Spain's admittance to the U.N. (which occurred in 1955 in spite of Soviet opposition), Franco agreed to support Western defense by building ten military bases on Spanish soil. Pollack lists several reasons for U.S. interests in Spanish bases, among which are the following: (1) "to provide 'incentives' for the Soviet Union to divert aggression forces and armaments towards areas other than the United States" and (2) "to consolidate Spain's anti-Communist commitment." Thus, it seems clear that, even

²⁸⁷ Ibid., pp. 52-53.

though the Soviet Union and Spain avoided cultivating any direct , legitimate relationships, their indirect contact was significant.

The nature of the underlying antagonism between the two governments is perhaps best illustrated by several secret documents. The first, an "'additional clause' to paragraph two of Article III of the defense agreement of 1953... deals with the utilization of the [Spanish] bases at times when Communist aggression threatens the security of the West, and less specifically, at times 'of emergency.'" As the following statement, summarized from the conclusions of Vinas, indicates, this secret clause gave the United States considerable power in Spain and served as an illustration of Franco's commitment to the West:

Vinas concludes that this was in effect a blank cheque for the United States regarding the bases in Spain, allowing Washington to take the initiative in acts of reprisal, with no obligation to Spain and her head of state than the passing-on of information in their possession regarding the imminent 'aggression' or threat and the intention of counteracting it by means of attack.²⁸⁸

A second document, dated 30 November 1956, essentially reiterates the 1953 document. In this document, classified "top secret," "the National Security Council of the United States declares its intention to use the bases in Spain to attack the Soviet Union, if necessary." Thus, Spain's animosity towards the Soviet Union was manifest in its agreement to allow such bases to be built; on the other hand, the Soviet Union, likewise antagonistic, had an interest in maintaining the Franco regime in order to exploit U.S. support of Franco, a policy that "could and very likely would be construed as a new form of appeasement of a Fascist regime."²⁸⁹

²⁸⁸ Ibid.

²⁸⁹ Ibid., p. 36.

Spanish-Soviet commercial links are another interesting aspect of the Franco period. The two countries maintained their mutual antagonism; verbal attacks were not uncommon and at least superficially, Franco fueled an ongoing anti-Communist crusade. In fact, "Franco was, in July 1954, calling for a boycott of Soviet goods." Simultaneously, however, "the *New York Times* was revealing a secret deal to exchange 300,000 tons of Spanish iron for 179,000 tons of Polish coal and the British House of Commons was being informed... of a number of suspicious trade accords between Spain and several countries of the Eastern bloc."²⁹⁰

Other indicators of warming relations also began to be apparent. From 1960 until the end of the Franco regime seventeen years later, "Spain opened diplomatic representations in all Communist states, with the exception of the Soviet Union and Albania." Given the satellite relationship of the Eastern bloc nations with the Soviet Union, Soviet influence on Spain was indirect but inevitable. It was to the Soviet Union's advantage to postpone establishing formal diplomatic relations for several reasons. First of all, as previously noted, the Soviet Union had approximately \$578 million of Spanish gold that it felt no obligation to return as long as they didn't recognize the Spanish government; second, the Soviet Union, because of Spain's previous ties with Germany and Italy, could exploit U.S. support of Spain as "fascist."

While it appears obvious then, that it was advantageous, at least to some degree, for the Soviet Union to maintain the status quo regarding Spanish relations, several other factors made improved relations difficult. Soviet involvement in the Spanish Civil War and repression against the Communist Party in Spain were among these factors. In addition, the Soviet Union harbored quite a few Spanish exiles. The situation became especially tense when, in May of 1960, the Soviet Union attempted to return 557 of the

²⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 53.

refugees to Spain; Franco deported a number of the exiles back to the Soviet Union, thereby causing "an international furor."²⁹¹

In spite of such potential setbacks, however, relations between Spain and the Soviet Union gradually warmed throughout the 1960s. At approximately the same time as Franco's rejection of the exiles, Spain and the Soviet Union competed in soccer, and Franco allowed those Spanish citizens who wished to attend to do so. As early as 1964, "important sections of the Spanish media were calling for a 'normalization' of relations between the Soviet Union and Spain." Cultural exchanges began to be frequent; then, in 1965, the Soviet Union and five other Communist nations sent missions to Spain, "Soviet tourists began taking their holidays in Spain,"²⁹² and Soviet-Spanish relations were well on their way to normalization.

The 1970s marked even greater cooperation between the Soviet Union and Spain. In 1972, an air link between the two nations' capitals was established. "Commercial interchange increased and the Spanish government came out publicly in support of the old Soviet aspiration for an all European conference on security and cooperation."^{293,294}

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union's primary strategic considerations during this time period were, according to Pollack, first, "to do all it could to stop Spain from becoming a member of the EEC and NATO" and second, "to open up new commercial areas for Soviet products." Further, Moscow looked optimistically towards some sort of Spanish

²⁹¹ Ibid., p. 54.

²⁹² Ibid., p. 56.

²⁹³ It should be noted that the United States and other NATO allies also supported such aspirations in the early 1970s.

²⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 61.

neutrality, basing its hopes on "coincidence in certain areas of foreign policy." (Soviet and Spanish views regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict, Cuba, decolonization in Africa and Asia, and a number of other issues were similar.)

3. The Evolution of Spain's Communist Party: Historical Connections with Moscow

The Partido Comunista Espanol (PCE) has its roots in the Spanish Socialist party. Formed in 1921, its first members²⁹⁵ were in favor of affiliating with the Soviet Comintern; hence, the party's political foundation was based on Stalin's policies. Though banned in the 1920s, it survived to participate in the Civil war and functioned quite effectively during Franco's regime. Originally against both the Spanish Republican government in 1931 and the workers' movement in general, the party shifted under Stalin's leadership to the policy of "'popular front' against Fascism." This policy shift can be traced to the defeat of the Communists and Socialists in Germany in 1933.²⁹⁶

During the Spanish Civil War, leaders of the PCE included emissaries from the Soviet secret police and the GPU. As discussed in the first section of this chapter, the exact role and motives of the PCE during the Civil War are still debated. Suffice it to say that the PCE, and hence the Soviet Union, was an influential entity in Spain during that time period. As recently as 1983, evidence came to light which indicated that the PCE's role, at least in the war's beginnings, may have been substantial. In June, 1983, William Herrick published an article insinuating that the Spanish Communists were responsible for killing Andrea Nin, the leader of the anti-Stalinist *Partido Obrero de Unificacion Marxista* (POUM) and were also responsible for "triggering a police action in Barcelona that provoked both POUMists and Anarchists into taking to the streets to protect

²⁹⁵ Prevost notes that the first members included "the entire Central Committee of Socialist Youth" in addition to "dissident members of the Socialist Party." (Prevost, p. 69).

²⁹⁶ Prevost, p. 70.

themselves." Herrick further indicates that Stalin issued an order to the PCE to drive Caballero (the Prime Minister) from office because of Caballero's refusal to accept any responsibility on the part of the POUM for the events. Caballero was, indeed, replaced by Juan Negrin, a right-wing Socialist. In spite of PCE's support for peace and democracy and its corresponding anti-fascist policies, Herrick attributes Nin's murder to Margarita Nelken's husband; Nelken was "a Communist deputy in the Cortes [cabinet] when the Civil War started" who apparently convinced her husband "to do part of her share of the dirty work required by Stalin."²⁹⁷

Victor Alba and Stephen Schwartz, in a book published in 1988, confirm that "Soviet power was determined to destroy the POUM, the achievement of this goal being one measure of the degree of Spanish hegemony within the wartime republic."²⁹⁸

Following the Spanish Civil War and World War II, from 1946 to 1970, the PCE focused on resisting the Franco government. The group's underlying premise was that the Franco regime would inevitably collapse as a result of its inability to come to terms with the feudal, agrarian nature of the Spanish economy. The PCE banked its resistance on the assumption that Franco's government would not be able to industrialize Spain.²⁹⁹

The beginnings of dissention between the PCE and the Soviet Union can, then, perhaps best be traced to Spain's industrialization under Franco. During the 1960s, Fernando Claudin and George Semprun, PCE members, argued that the party should "not insist upon a complete break from the Francoist State"³⁰⁰ since circumstances had

²⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 12.

²⁹⁸ Payne, Stanley G., review of *Spanish Marxism Versus Soviet Communism: A History of the P.O.U.M.*, by Victor Alba and Stephen Schwartz, in *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, p. 567, August, 1989.

²⁹⁹ Prevost, p. 71.

changed since the aftermath of the Civil War. In 1965, Claudin and Semprun were ousted from the PCE as "'Right deviationists,' but by 1970 Carrillo had adopted their perspective, a strategy that favoured alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie to create a democratic Spain."³⁰¹

4. The Spanish Communist Party and the Soviet Union: Drifting Apart

The roots of the Spanish PCE–Soviet rift are generally traced to a memorandum written by Togliatti, the First Secretary of the Italian Communist Party (PCI). Published in 1964, the document advocated a policy of free debate for solving problems brought about by local conditions. Toward this end, he advocated that communist parties be given more autonomy. While Togliatti's memorandum does mark the first successful break between European communist groups and the Soviet Union, recognition as the first Marxist-Leninist party in Spain to oppose Soviet central control rightly belongs to the POUM. Ultimately unsuccessful because of communist measures, the POUM still stands as a historical landmark in its attempts to promulgate Marxist-Leninist ideologies autonomously. It is ironic, then, that the PCE (which under Stalin had vehemently opposed the POUM) would ultimately follow suit by drifting from the Soviet Union and Stalinism through the late 1960s and early 1970s.

The PCE did not immediately follow the PCI's lead in 1964 — probably because the PCE had been in exile in Eastern bloc nations, including the Soviet Union, since Franco became dictator. Hence, the PCE was dependent on Moscow and other socialist nations for its very existence. In 1968, however, the PCE began criticizing CPSU policies, particularly "the absence of democracy in the USSR and the other Eastern European countries."³⁰²

³⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 72.

³⁰¹ Ibid.

Throughout the early 1970s, the PCE, along with the French and Italian Communist Parties, drifted further and further away from Soviet control. By 1975, the movement had adopted a policy perhaps best expressed by Carrillo's "manifesto program." At a National Conference held in September, Carrillo announced, in addition to various socio-political reforms, his conception of the PCE's future: "... [w]e do not conceive the future socialist systems in Spain being a system of one single party controlling state power, but a democratic multi-party system." These changes in the PCE, in addition to similar evolutions in the Italian and French Communist Parties, were, by 1975, pronounced enough to merit (at least by Franc Barbieri, the Croatian journalist who coined the phrase) special recognition apart from Soviet Communism. The new ideas promulgated by Western European Communist groups independent of the CPSU came to be known, then, as "Eurocommunism." While it is difficult to define Eurocommunism's specific ideology, Szajkowski outlined its basic assumptions as follows: (1) "[D]ifferent circumstances call for a different approach in order to bring about socialist transformation of Western Europe. This can be achieved through ordinary parliamentary procedures and elections contested by several parties." (2) "Eurocommunism accepts plurality of political parties including the right of opposition parties to exist and perform their functions." (3) "Eurocommunism guarantees all the liberties that are the result of the bourgeois democratic revolutions; freedom of thought and expression, of publications, of assembly and association, of demonstration and strikes, of travel home and abroad, the inviolability of private life, religious liberties and complete freedom of expression of philosophical, cultural and artistic tendencies and opinions." (4) "Eurocommunism supports the formation of broad alliances between communists and socialists and between communists and popular forces inspired by Christianity." (5) The Eurocommunist parties explicitly reject the Soviet model of the one-party state and denounce the

³⁰² Ibid., p. 261.

limitations on civil liberties imposed in the USSR... Eurocommunism, asserting its complete autonomy, rejects any centre of the international communist movement, denying the primacy of the Soviet communist party among the communist parties and consequently abandons the basic concept of proletarian internationalism which has traditionally governed the relations between the communist and workers' parties and the CPSU."³⁰³

By 1970-71, the PCE-Soviet split was "all but complete." Officials of the party who maintained pro-Soviet views were given their walking papers; the Soviet Union tried to "influence... the PCE-dominated trade union movement in Spain," thus destabilizing the PCE; and in May 1971, the CPSU attempted to recognize Spanish officials who had been expelled from the PCE due to their pro-Soviet views³⁰⁴.

Prior to the reestablishment of diplomatic relations between Spain and the Soviet Union in 1977, Santiago Carrillo, the PCE leader, published *Eurocommunism and the State*, thus solidifying the break between the PCE and the CPSU. In the book, Carrillo "goes beyond simply criticizing the human rights situation in the Soviet Union... he questions whether the Soviet Union has maintained socialism. He asserts that the October Revolution produced a type of state which 'without being bourgeois cannot be regarded as a state of workers' democracy in which the organized proletariat constitutes the ruling class.'"³⁰⁵

Following legalization of the PCE in the post-Franco era, it only attracted ten percent of the Spanish popular vote,³⁰⁶ a fact that the Soviet Union was quick to exploit.

³⁰³ Ibid., p. 256.

³⁰⁴ Pollack, p. 60.

³⁰⁵ Prevost, p. 75.

³⁰⁶ Urban, Jean Barth, "The West European Communist Challenge to Soviet Foreign Policy," in *Soviet Foreign Policy in the 1980s*, p. 177, Ed. Roger E. Kanet, Praeger Publishers, 1982.

For example, *New Times*, a Moscow periodical, attacked Carrillo's book and accused him of "favoring a strengthened NATO," an illogical accusation "given the PCE's opposition to Spain's entry into NATO." Though fierce and timely (given the PCE's poor performance in the elections), the purpose of the attacks did not appear to be directed at discrediting the PCE in Soviet eyes but, rather, "to bring about a change in Spanish Communist Party policy or at the very least, to threaten the PCF [the Communist Party in France] and PCI [the Communist Party in Italy] with similar polemical retaliation if they perservere[d] in their mounting challenges to Moscow."³⁰⁷

In addition to the issue of autonomy, detente brought new conflicts between the PCE and the CPSU. Initially in favor of relaxed tensions, the PCE diverged from Soviet hopes that detente would weaken the European Economic Community (EEC). Noting the advantages which European economic unity would have for Spain, Carrillo criticized Soviet strategy and accused the Soviet Union of favoring "the West European status quo."³⁰⁸ Carrillo asserted that the CPSU "feared the contagious influence of a West European model of socialism on Eastern Europe;" further, he claimed that "the existence of a Europe-NATO, controlled by the United States, justifies a second Europe on the other side controlled by the Soviet Union."³⁰⁹

In spite of the split between the PCE and the CPSU, however, the Eurocommunists may not be as unmanageable as they might seem. As one PCI ideologist, "when asked what the party would do in a crisis, said, 'We would choose the Soviet Union, of course.'" A similar answer should be expected from the PCE, especially in light of the fact that the CPSU and the PCE rarely differ if a matter is "of major

³⁰⁷ Ibid., p. 112.

³⁰⁸ Urban, "West European Challenge," p. 184.

³⁰⁹ Ibid.

international concern." By 1982, the pro-Soviet and Eurocommunist factions within the PCE, rifts between Carrillo and young leadership,³¹⁰ and its social democratic approach caused the PCE's percentage of the 1982 vote to fall to four percent. In contrast, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE) attracted more votes from the Left. It seems likely that, as Prevost observes, the PCE, "by adopting a basically social democratic approach,... has done very little to differentiate itself from the PSOE."³¹¹

The PCE's problems do not stop there. With the PCE split from the CPSU and the PCE's weakened show at the elections came an internal PCE split. Ignacio Gallego, a Civil War veteran, led the pro-Soviet faction, which called itself Partido Comunista (PC), or "Communist Party," as opposed to the PCE's "Spanish Communist Party." Not surprisingly, this development in Spanish affairs was welcomed by Moscow, and several PC members including Gallego received all-expense paid trips to Moscow. Further, contacts between the PC members and members of the Soviet Embassy are not uncommon. As a result of such developments, Eurocommunists no longer have a place in the Spain-USSR Association and PC headquarters have been opened in nearly all Spanish provinces.

The PCE-CPSU rift has not been a source of problems solely for the PCE. If the PCE has lost strength in Spain because of the new ideology that Paul Heywood suggests is mirrored in the PSOE³¹², the Soviet Union has also lost political advantage the PCE might have offered it. Kanet and Kempton, in a discussion regarding the global correlation of forces, point out that the Soviet Union, once the role-model for the Left,

³¹⁰ Martinez, Robert E., "Spain: Pragmatism and Continuity," p. 373, *Current History*, November 1988.

³¹¹ Prevost, p. 76.

³¹² Heywood, Paul, "Mirror Images: The PCE and PSOE in the Transition to Democracy in Spain," pp. 193-207 *West European Politics* 10, April 1987.

"can no longer consider communist parties in the West as automatic allies or as instruments of its own policy preferences." Indeed, "as Hannes Adomeit has noted, 'the primary challenge of Eurocommunist is that posed to the legitimacy, validity and relevance of Soviet ideology and the Soviet Union.'" If anything, this challenge has only become greater with time.

5. Soviet Strategy Toward Spain

There are several dimensions to Soviet strategy in Spain and Western Europe in general. Among these are the military dimension, the economic dimension, and the political dimension.

The Soviet general strategy within the military realm has included expanding and modernizing conventional and theatre nuclear weapons within the Warsaw Pact, attempts to postpone and/or eliminate modernization of NATO military capabilities, and the attempt to separate U.S. and West European security interests while simultaneously attempting to demonstrate that "Soviet and West European interests overlap and differences between them could be worked out if only West Europe could reduce its dependence on the United States."³¹³

Within the economic realm, the Soviet Union has attempted to expand trade with the West since the early 1970s. Western technology is of particular interest to the Soviet Union, as evidenced by the technology transfer case published in the *New York Times* on 6 Sept 1985³¹⁴. According to the article, a Spanish company exported "almost \$2.5 million in valuable American manufacturing equipment." The purpose of the equipment was reportedly to manufacture "national security and defense equipment." In addition to the economic advantages of increased trade with the West, however, the

³¹³ Ibid., p. 96.

³¹⁴ Shenon, Philip, "Guilty Plea in Exports to Soviet," *New York Times*, p. D1, 6 September 1985 (Local Edition).

Soviet Union stands to gain politically as well. First, Moscow is interested in "strengthen[ing] the West European commitment to detente and if possible,... induce [ing] the Europeans to be more accommodating toward the interests of the USSR — in return for expanding export markets for West Europe in the USSR." Second, the Soviet Union hopes, through commerce agreements with Western Europe, to weaken the Western Alliance, particularly West European ties with the United States. A third objective that seems likely is "the creation of Western economic dependence on the USSR... which the USSR might later be able to use to exert political pressures on West Europe."³¹⁵

Historically, the most important political goals the Soviet Union maintains in its strategy toward West Europe continues to the "to weaken the relationships between West Europe and the United States... [and] to gain acceptance by the governments of West Europe of its dominant position in East Europe."³¹⁶

Implementation of strategies in Spain to achieve these goals takes on diverse forms and can be evidenced, for example, by Soviet citizens charged with espionage. Further, Soviet attempts to cultivate relations with different factions of Spanish society, while possible a strategy in and of itself, can also be seen as a means of implementing larger political military and economic strategies.

The necessity for the Soviet Union to extend its relationships beyond the limitations of the Communist Party is especially noticeable in Spain. Since the PCE and the CPSU have drifted apart, the Soviets have focused energy on other political parties in Spain, such as the PSOE. This strategy has been important to Soviet success for several reasons. First, Socialist, Social Democratic, and Labor parties "are actual or prospective governing parties.... Second, these parties represent that part of the West European public

³¹⁵ Ibid.

³¹⁶ Ibid., p. 99.

that the Soviet analysts regard as 'realistic' in its attitudes toward the USSR and 'progressive' on other issues.... Third, the parties of the non-Communist Left, at least according to Soviet ideology, are potential partners in the revolutionary struggle.'³¹⁷

Soviet cooperation with the non-Communist Left began to be apparent in 1969 when, at the International Conference of Communist Parties, Communists everywhere were encouraged to cooperate with the Socialists and Social Democrats "to establish an advanced democratic regime today and to build a socialist society in the future." In 1972, the Socialist International was pressured internally to allow Socialist parties to form bilateral relations with other parties (namely the CPSU) because some Socialist parties were already cooperating with Communist parties. The Spanish Socialist Party (PSOE) was among the first to establish such bilateral links. Since the beginning, one of the primary topics of discussion between the two parties has been "the dangers of war." This was evidenced at the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) held in Madrid. In a letter presented at the conference, the CPSU concluded the following:

We proffer our hand to the Socialists, Social Democrats and Laborites for a joint struggle aimed at freeing mankind from further wars of extermination and to salvage peace. To achieve these aims of vital importance to mankind, we are willing to cooperate with you in forms mutually acceptable to both sides.³¹⁸

Specific objectives the Soviet Union hopes to achieve through better relations with the non-communist left include, of course, erosion of popular support for NATO in Western Europe, increased influence over Communist parties in Western Europe, increased cooperation between West European Socialist and Communist parties in "the struggle for advanced democracy and ultimately 'Socialism,'" and greater credibility for Soviet peace initiatives within the Soviet Union itself.³¹⁹

³¹⁷ Van Oudenaren, John, "The Soviet Union and the Socialist and Social Democratic Parties of Western Europe." pp. 1-2, RAND Note N-2400-AF, The Rand Corporation, February 1986.

³¹⁸ Ibid., p. 8.

At least in the case of Spain, Soviet strategies seem to have been somewhat successful. For example, the Soviet Union effectively lessened the effects of Eurocommunism, both in Spain and within the Soviet Union, by dealing with the Socialist Party in Spain. When PCE and CPSU relations were particularly strained, the Soviet invited Felipe Gonzales, then PSOE party leader to Moscow, where he was received "with great honors."³²⁰

Well thought-out diplomacy and pragmatic hospitality characterizes the Soviet Union's implementation of its strategies. Not only is this approach evidenced in the case of the newly formed PE, but in the Soviet Union's affinity for finding (and then exploiting) either perceived or real similarities between the two nations. A prime example of this phenomenon can be found in the July 1985 issue of *New Times*. In an article entitled "A Good Beginning," Vadim Zagladin focuses initially on the contributions of such noted Spanish authors as Cervantes, Lorca and Ibanez and such painters as Goya, Velazquez and Picasso toward the "successful development of relations between Spain and the Soviet Union. Following this appeal to Spanish pride, Zagladin attempts to link the two cultures by asserting that, just as the Soviet Union considers the great Spanish masters to be part of its culture, Tolstoy, Chekov, Sholokhov and Pushkin "have become part of the heritage of the people of Spain."³²¹

Having "linked" the two cultures, Zagladin focuses next on other shared attributes: "their industry, their attitude to one another, their hospitality, open-heartedness, and readiness to give an attentive hearing to others, not only to listen to them, but to understand them." As if to remind the Spaniards of their moral obligation to support the

³¹⁹ Ibid., p. 15.

³²⁰ Ibid.

³²¹ Zagladin, Vadim, "A Good Beginning," p. 14, *New Times* 29, July 1985.

Soviet Union, the author next focuses on Soviet sympathies with "the people of Spain [who] became the first victims of fascist aggression in Europe" (in the 1930s). Finally, Zagladin focuses on the necessity for Spain and the Soviet Union to "work to reduce tension, to stop the arms race, and to reduce armaments so as to move on to detente..."³²²

It could seem, at first glance, that Soviet strategy is succeeding in Spain, since Spain, not unlike other West European members of NATO, is concerned with many of the same issues that have motivated Soviet strategic interests since NATO's conception. While Soviet influence on Spain is undeniable, it would be unfair to give total credit to the Soviet Union for the existence and influence of leftist factions on the Spanish political spectrum today. Indeed, Spain has nourished a sizeable leftist following since the Spanish Civil War, even during Franco's dictatorship when leftist parties were illegal. It seems only fair to attribute Spanish democracy and pragmatism with at least partial credit for the decisions that affect Spain and its relationships with other nations.

6. Implications of Soviet Foreign Policy and Actions for Spanish Security

The ongoing changes in the Soviet Union since Gorbachev first initiated glasnost and perestroika have fostered an ongoing debate in the West regarding not only Soviet capabilities, but Soviet intentions as well. Whereas the previous section of this paper discussed general Soviet strategy towards Spain, this section will deal more explicitly with specific Soviet policies and actions that have the potential of affecting Spanish security.

As noted in the following excerpt, Spain carries historical importance for the Soviet Union and is, hence, important to Soviet policy-makers:

Since the days of Peter the Great, the Soviet Union has desired to be a Mediterranean power. As long as the United States maintains its position within Spain, the Soviets cannot achieve that end. Spain, therefore, has become important to the latter, and it will use its diplomatic post in Madrid to wean Spain away from United States influence.³²³

³²² Ibid.

The significance of the Mediterranean for Soviet foreign policy makers has also been aptly explained by Thomas H. Etzold. He asserts that Soviet policy, posture, and activity in the Mediterranean are significant because of the number of potentially dangerous situations that all intersect in the Mediterranean. By way of illustration, he lists "East-West competition in Europe, regional strife in the Balkans, Arab-Israeli conflict, the contest between political Islam and Arabism, and global U.S.-Soviet rivalry as well as the North-South struggle"³²⁴ as "out-of-area" problems that intersect in the Mediterranean.

In spite of the volatile nature of the conflicts enmeshed in the Mediterranean, Etzold asserts that Soviet goals and actions are moderate and "appear to be primarily defensive in their political-strategic character." Along these lines, Soviet foreign policy favors a "dynamic status quo," which would encompass "trends and movements ultimately favorable to the emergence of socialism and people's democracies throughout the world."³²⁵

Towards this end, Soviet policy strives to eliminate U.S. access to bases and facilities in forward areas and to limit U.S. military power. Thus, in 1985 when Gromyko, the Soviet Foreign Minister, met with Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez, talks "centered on 'how to prevent the militarization of space and how to contain the arms race, above all the nuclear race, and to forswear a new war.'" Without doubt, Gromyko's position targeted Spanish PSOE members. In fact, it seems reasonable to suggest that

³²³ Cortada, J.W. ed., *Spain in the Twentieth Century*, p. 177, taken from Pollack, p. 64.

³²⁴ Etzold, Thomas H., "The Soviet Union in the Mediterranean," in *NATO and the Mediterranean*, p. 29, eds. Lawrence S. Kaplan, Robert W. Clawson, and Raimondo Lurashi, Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1985).

³²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

Gorbachev has made "development of ties with the West European Socialists a key element of his foreign policy" in order to influence Western European (and thus, Spanish) perceptions of the arms race, nuclear weapons, and the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative.

That Soviet internal concerns and German reunification take current precedence over foreign policy with Spain can hardly be disputed. Nevertheless, Soviet Union foreign policy is concerned with such issues as limiting the arms race and U.S./NATO military strength, strengthening ties with the PSOE, detente, and strengthening CPSU ties with West European communist parties³²⁶. The implications of this foreign policy for Spanish security depends to a large degree on Spain. Chipman argues that the Soviet Union "has a [naval] capacity to threaten, at a distance, the whole Southern region, so that the NATO Mediterranean states... cannot remain immune to Soviet power." So far, however, Spain and her dynamic Prime Minister, Felipe Gonzalez, have managed to tow a pragmatic, relatively hard line without offending the leftist extremes of the PSOE in Spain or the Soviet Union too much. Whether or not this trend continues remains to be seen.

7. Spanish Separatist Movements and the Soviet Union

As noted in the previous chapter, the most active separatist movement in Spain is by far the Basques, many of whom organized the underground terrorist group ETA following Franco's victory in the Civil War. Since the ETA is still active, the opportunity for Soviet involvement with the ETA in an effort to destabilize the current Spanish government is obvious. Both the Soviet Union and the PCE have, however, systematically dismissed accusations of ETA support. During the early 1980s, when general strikes ran rampant throughout the Basque region and workers in other parts of Spain were sympathetic to Basque demands, the PCE declared that it did not support the

³²⁶ Hamburg, p. 178.

strikes. Its leaders argued that their desire for peaceful free elections prohibited them from establishing solidarity with the ETA.³²⁷

Even so, suspicions of Soviet links with the ETA were reported in the press as early as February 1980. During that time period, two Soviet citizens were expelled from Spain on charges of espionage, but several newspapers with sources close to the Prime Minister suggested possible ties to the ETA as well. Apparently, the suspicions were based on reports that the manager of the Soviet airline Aeroflot "had met with an extreme leftist group in Barcelona,"³²⁸ and that, previously, in July, 1978, Soviet agents and ETA members met in a town in Southern France.

In addition to the alleged meetings, Gromyko (the first Soviet Foreign Minister to visit Madrid³²⁹) was reported as suggesting that terrorism in Spain would diminish "if Spain discontinued its plans to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization³³⁰. Snitten expanded Soviet conditions for an abatement of terrorism in Spain to include allowing Moscow to use it as a springboard to penetrate South America³³¹. In addition, Western sources indicate that a Soviet Canary fishing fleet has been linked to "arms smuggling to the ETA." In spite of all the indirect evidence, however, it is difficult to prove that Soviet-ETA links really exist. For example, while "it is known... that ETA guerrillas

³²⁷ Prevost, p. 73.

³²⁸ *New York Times*, "2 Russians Ousted From Spain as Spies. Newspapers Suggest Soviet Links to Basque Guerrillas of E.T.A.," 17 February 1980.

³²⁹ Markham, James M., "Spain's Terror: Onus on Soviet. Madrid Asserts Moscow is Supporting Terrorists," *New York Times*, 11 May 1981.

³³⁰ Ibid.

³³¹ Snitten, E.M., "The International Politics of Spanish Accession to NATO," p. 2 Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, March 1982.

have been trained in Cuba and Southern Yemen, both Soviet clients,"³³² direct evidence of Soviet training is hard to come by.

8. Potential Effects of Current Changes in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc on Spain

While it is true that Spain does not fear the Soviet Union in the same way other NATO members have been considered to fear it, it is also true that the rapidly changing events in the Soviet Union and the East bloc contribute to a feeling of uneasiness of a different sort in Spain. As a new member of the EEC, Spain "fears new competition for community resources, foreign investment and export opportunities"³³³ from the new market economies in the East. Especially in light of reunification, it seems likely that West Germans in particular will invest more in the East and less in Spain.

The Basque and Catalan separatist groups have not been impervious to changes in the Eastern bloc, either. These groups have been able to capitalize on "events in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to justify calls for regional self-determination in Spain." Preceded by EC calls for "'self-determination' in East Germany,"³³⁴ both Catalan and Basque separatists have called for greater autonomy, "Lithuania's demands for independence from the Soviet Union" only served to give momentum to the cause.

9. Commercial Relations Between Spain and The Soviet Union

Western European trade in general has been important to the Soviet Union since the mid-1970s. It seems evident that these economic relations "will continue to be important"³³⁵ to the Soviets for at least two reasons. First, the Soviet Union faces a

³³² Markham.

³³³ Riding, Alan, "Challenge to Madrid's Success Story," *New York Times*, p. 7, 27 January 1990.

³³⁴ Ibid.

shortage of hard-currency that it hopes to alleviate by exporting energy to the West. Second, the Soviet Union maintains a continued interest in Western equipment and technology "to build up its economic infrastructure."

As previously noted, prior to the restoration of Spanish-Soviet diplomatic relations in 1977, Spain and the Soviet Union began developing commercial interests. In 1976, an agreement signed in Moscow encouraged both nations to participate in trade and industrial exhibitions. Contacts between foreign trade organizations and firms were also encouraged³³⁶. Pollack notes the following regarding Spanish-Soviet economic relations in the early 1980s:

The Soviet market had, by 1983, become the most dynamic of all foreign markets for Spanish products. Exports had increased by 98.3 percent since 1982. Spanish imports from the Soviet Union in 1983 amounted to 492.9 million, an increase of 1.4 percent on the 1982 total of 487.2 million. Spanish exports to the Soviet Union totalled 344.5 billion in 1984.³³⁷

In 1985, economic relations only improved. "A delegation of the Spanish Confederation of Enterprise Organisations... visited the Soviet Union,"³³⁸ and, as Yeugeni Olgin noted, by that time, Spain served as host to several joint-stock companies. In addition, by 1985, Spanish banks and firms had their offices in Moscow," and the two nations had been "making good head way in the cooperation of their fishing industries." (It should be noted here that in 1985, Spain resisted an increased "pressure of the Soviet

³³⁵ Stent, Angela E., "The USSR and Western Europe," in *Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World*, p. 453, eds. Robbin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffman, Aldine Publishing Company, 1986.

³³⁶ Olgin, Yeugeni, "Soviet-Spanish Cooperation and Detente in Europe," p. 86, *International Affairs*, October 1986.

³³⁷ Pollack, p. 65.

³³⁸ Olgin, p. 86.

fishing fleet" for security reasons, which had hoped to base itself either at the Canary Islands or in Algeciras, a mainland Spanish port.³³⁹⁾

Soviet interest in maintaining good economic relations with Spain extends to out-of-area interests as well. In particular, the Soviet Union hopes to extend its influence in Latin America in cooperation with Spain; no doubt the Soviets see a potential to exploit the special relationship shared by Spain and Latin America to gain increased access to Latin American markets. As Yeugeni Olgin was quick to point out in an article published in October 1986, "both partners believe that the realisation of joint projects in third countries, particularly in Latin America, offers good prospects."³⁴⁰

³³⁹ Burns, Tom, "Gromyko, U.S. Envoy Meet With Spanish Leader," p. A10, *Washington Post*, 1 March 1985.

³⁴⁰ Olgin, p. 87.

V. SPAIN'S EVOLUTION AND THE NEW EUROPE: IMPLICATIONS AND POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS

The purpose of previous chapters has been to lay a foundation based on political and, in particular, security realities in Spain. Though Spain is a relatively new democracy, its transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy has been relatively smooth. It has, thus far, managed to balance successfully internal and external pressures that have, at various times in Spain's history, threatened its demise. This chapter then, will explore Spain's position relative to the New Europe. First, it will examine potential states of equilibrium in the new world order. Second, it will discuss Spain's decision to unite with Europe. Third, it will review Spain's possible contributions to a united Europe, and finally, it will discuss implications for the United States. The purpose of this chapter, then, is to assess Spain's role in the new world order, a role which, given Spain's apparent success in effecting a smooth transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy, from a state isolated from Europe to one that has been integrated into European structures to a huge degree, and from a floundering economy to one with optimistic potential, may well be larger than might have been imagined a decade ago.

A. A CHANGING WORLD ORDER

Over thirty years ago, Morton Kaplan identified "six distinct international systems – or, with possibly greater accuracy, six states of equilibrium of one ultrastable international system."³⁴¹ They are, according to him, "(1) the 'balance of power' system, (2) the loose bipolar system, (3) the tight bipolar system, (4) the universal system, (5) the hierarchical system in its directive and non-directive forms, and (6) the unit veto

³⁴¹ Kaplan, Morton, *System and Process in International Politics*, p. 21, Robert E. Krieger Publishing Company, 1975.

system.”³⁴² Kaplan was quick to admit that these six systems do not allow for all of the possible international systems; even so, the systems identified are useful in understanding directions which the current global transition might be expected to take. The following list, based on Kaplan’s book, *System and Process in International Politics*, identifies the characteristics of each of these systems

<i>System</i>	<i>Characteristics</i>
• “Balance of power”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • International social system without a political subsystem. • Actors are international actors who fall within the subclass “national actor.” • At least five essential actors • Example: Pre-WWI period, with England, France, Germany, Austro-Hungarian Empire, Italy, & the United States as essential actors
• Loose bipolar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • In addition to “national actors,” there are two major “bloc actors,” each with a leading national actor, non-member national actors, and “universal actors.” • Example: Cold War period, with NATO and the Warsaw pact as bloc actors, and the U.N. as a universal actor.
• Tight bipolar	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Similar to the loose bipolar system, but there are no non-member national actors, and no universal actors: every nation actor belongs to one of the two blocs. • Example: no historical counterparts
• Universal	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • There is a single “universal actor,” to which all of the national actors belong. • Politics dictate the actions of the national actors within the system. • Only possible when all essential national actors submit to coordination and integration within the system. • Example: no historical counterpart

³⁴² Ibid.

- Hierarchical
 - System operates directly on individuals. There is a single hierarchy rather than a set of "national actors."
 - Can be "directive" (authoritarian) or "non-directive" (functions according to rules generally operative in democracies).
 - Example: no historical counterpart, but a directive hierarchical system might have developed if the Nazis had succeeded in conquering the world.
- Unit veto
 - Each actor has weapons capable of destroying any other actor, even though it cannot prevent its own destruction.
 - Actors may be bloc or national, but no universal actors can exist.
 - Unstable system.
 - Example: no historical counterpart

While it is obvious, based on current events, that the global system is in a period of transition, it is less obvious what the result will be. It is just as obvious, however, that whatever the result is will depend largely on whether or not both Eastern and Western Europe and the Soviet Union are successful in implementing the "new thinking" that currently characterizes both continents. Should the Soviet Union maintain stability as it continues along the apparently irreversible path it has chosen under Gorbachev, the loose bipolar system as we know it will continue to disintegrate. While current events in the Middle East suggest the existence of a type of universal system, as essential national actors rally to control a situation that is perceived as a global threat, the ongoing transitions may not support such a system permanently.

Many, anticipating a more united Europe and noting increasing economic capabilities in the Orient, seem to think the world is evolving into a multi-polar system, with Europe as one of the central poles. For such a system to remain stable, however, Europe would have to unite enough to accept a hierarchical system within the global system. Any other solution would be unstable and would only encourage nationalism and either a return to the balance of power system similar to the one operative prior to World War I or, if each

nation were to acquire its own security system, would create some version of the unit veto system that Kaplan described.

One of the keys to maintaining stability on a global level, then, seems to lie in creating a stable European order, and Europe, it seems, has at least three options if it is to remain stable: (1) the creation of a united Europe under a hierarchical system, (2) the continued presence of an arbitrator such as the United States within NATO, or (3), the acceptance of an entity such as the United Nations as an arbitrator on the global level.

Since Europe has not yet realized full integration, NATO, as an arbitrator has not yet outlived its usefulness. However, since Europe has already embarked on the attempt to become more united, both economically and politically, it may be difficult for NATO to either maintain its position or, should European efforts fail, to regain its position. Thus, whether or not national interests can be subdued to the benefit of Europe becomes of primary importance to the world order.

Both Europe and the United States are all too well aware of the fact that European attempts to unite in the past have failed miserably. As early as 1625, Grotius envisioned an organization like NATO or the United Nations, "some sort of body with its assemblies, where the litigations would be judged by those not involved so as to force the parties to reconcile themselves in reasonable conditions."³⁴³ Lawrence Kaplan also notes that the Duc de Sully of France, William Penn and, later, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi of Switzerland envisioned a united Europe. Such "attempts at least to mitigate the chaos inherent in national statecraft" were, apparently, abundant during the eighteenth century Age of Reason as well.³⁴⁴

³⁴³ Kaplan, Lawrence S., *NATO and the United States*, p. 5, Twayne Publishers, 1988.

³⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

Following the Napoleonic wars, the Quadruple alliance, composed of Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia was able to preserve European peace for 33 years. A "fragmented Europe," however, eventually stifled the alliance. Renewed attempts to establish a European alliance system in the early twentieth century included the establishment of an International Court as part of a very complicated alliance system. This alliance system, competing nationalisms, and competing imperialisms however, contributed to the upset of the balance of power and to the beginning of one of the most destructive wars ever fought. Later, the establishment of the League of Nations failed in the wake of World War II. Following the war, in 1949, "the revived interest in European unification, the 'European Movement' as it was called,... consisted of those who wanted a federated Europe with relatively limited powers as well as those who wanted an integrated European union."³⁴⁵ When, in 1946 and 1947, European leaders turned to the United States for aid, however, "their primary interest was... not the pursuit of any particular form of unification.... They were concerned with the survival of their nations, threatened as they were with social as well as the economic bankruptcy and exposed [as they were] to Communist blandishments and threats."³⁴⁶

Traditionally, international politics in Europe was characterized by the kind of nationalism that Kenneth N. Waltz explains as follows:

In a self help system each of the units spends a portion of its effort, not in forwarding its own good, but in providing the means of protecting itself against others.... When faced with the possibility of cooperating for mutual gain, states that feel insecure must ask how the gain will be divided. They are compelled to ask not "Will both of us gain?" but "Who will gain more?" If an expected gain is to be divided, say in the ratio of two-to-one, one state may use its disproportionate gain to implement a policy intended to damage or destroy the other. Even the prospect of large absolute gain for both parties does not elicit their cooperation so long as each fears how the other will use its increased capabilities. Notice that the impediments to collaboration may not lie in the

³⁴⁵ Ibid., p. 6.

³⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 7.

character and the immediate intention of either party. Instead, the condition of insecurity... works against their cooperation.³⁴⁷

In spite of Europe's inability to harness nationalism in the past, as evidenced by Napoleon's Empire, Hitler's Third Reich, and Britain's imperialism, however, the possibility of its doing so in the future cannot be excluded and, in fact, Europe is banking on its ability to do so. Its challenge will be to unite without the kinds of border wars that characterized the formation of European nation-states. To date, it has met those challenges head on.

B. SPAIN'S DECISION TO UNITE WITH EUROPE

On November 3, 1990, Fernandez Ordonez, Spain's Foreign Minister, announced Spain's plans to unite with Germany, France, Italy, and the three Benelux nations in eliminating border controls amongst themselves prior to the 1991 meeting of the European Community (EC)³⁴⁸. This announcement, and others like it, serves to underscore Spain's commitment to the EC, but where did such commitment come from, especially given Spain's historical ties to the Arab world and Latin America? According to Howard S. Wiarda, "the petition of Spain and Portugal for entry into the European Economic Community (EEC) came at precisely the time the community itself had developed increasing doubts as to whether there were such an entity." Wiarda echoes Stanley Hoffman in explaining Spain's attraction to Europe as a national reaction to the historical isolation that characterized Spain. Both scholars see such isolation as the reason that, to Spain and Portugal "Europe look[s] larger and more singular than is in fact the case; for them, Europe 'remains very much a reality, a model, and a symbol both of economic modernity and of 'civilization.' 'Europe' and the 'European Community' in

³⁴⁷ Joffe, Josef, *The Limited Partnership*, p. 183, Ballinger Publishing Company, 1987.

³⁴⁸ Vilamoura, I. Cembrero, "Fernandez Ordonez Anuncia la Entrada de Espana en el Grupo de Paises Sin Frontera," p. 13, *El Pais*, 4 November 1990.

this understanding obviously mean something more than commodity agreements and lowered tariff barriers; to the Iberians, 'Europe' implies cultural, political, social, and psychological interconnections as well as economic ones."³⁴⁹

Although Spain was not officially admitted into the EEC until June 1985, Wiarda notes that Spain began making attempts to be associated with Europe as early as 1953 when it "signed the Bases Agreements with the United States." Spanish progress towards breaking out of isolationism is marked. "In 1955 it was admitted to the United Nations, in 1958 it became an associate member of the OEEC, in 1959 it was elevated to full membership in the succeeding OECD and also became a member of the World Bank, and in 1962 it approached the EEC." In fact, as Wiarda notes, "by the late 1960s it is fair to say that Spain and Portugal were already *de facto* members of Europe – although that fact could not be admitted publicly³⁵⁰.

During Franco's reign, Europe refused to admit Spain into their organizations because Franco's authoritarian regime was deemed to be incompatible with the democracy that characterized other European nations. Later, when Spain espoused democracy, Europe viewed Spanish membership in the EEC as a potential way of encouraging democracy while discouraging Eastern hostilities.

Nevertheless, by 1980, the European perception of Spain and, indeed, actual conditions had changed sufficiently to merit, at least in French eyes, postponement and review of Spain's application for EEC membership. Wiarda notes that "by 1980 democracy and antifascism in Spain... seemed sufficiently well established that European involvement in the struggle no longer seemed so necessary.... The possibility of a 'red

³⁴⁹ Ibid.

³⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 191.

Mediterranean' no longer loomed large; the political crisis in southern Europe seemed to have stabilized."³⁵¹

If European support for Spain's imminent entry into the EEC had dropped by 1980, however, Spain's hopes for entry had not diminished and "the French pronouncement (actually supported by Germany and some other EEC members, although the French were held chiefly responsible) came as a tremendous shock to Spain and Portugal."³⁵²

As previously indicated, when Spain joined NATO in 1982, it was largely with hopes that NATO membership was a step towards membership in the EEC. The road to EEC membership was not without difficulties, however. As Wiarda notes, "In the summer of 1980 there were instances of French farmers burning Spanish trucks transporting cheaper agricultural products into European markets."³⁵³

Since June, 1985, when Spain was finally admitted to the EEC, its challenges have been manifold. Not only have Spain's "heavily subsidized and protected industries" had to face the challenge of "accommodate[ing] its foreign policy to a common EEC position, especially regarding Latin America, its special relationship with the Arab world, and its earlier nonrecognition of Israel." In addition, Spain's agricultural products, including olive oil, promised to "be a further strain on EEC budgets at a time of tightened finances."³⁵⁴

Not surprisingly, given Felipe Gonzales's propensity for ambiguity, Spain has attempted to maintain its ties with Latin America while pursuing a European policy. This ambiguity is not compatible with the EEC's expectations for Spain to "define the nature

³⁵¹ Ibid., p. 195.

³⁵² Ibid., p. 196.

³⁵³ Ibid., p. 198.

³⁵⁴ Ibid.

of its relations with Latin America" in addition to defining its relations with other nations that are not members of the EEC. In spite of Spain's insistence on apparently ambiguous ties, however, Wiarda states and, indeed, it seems clear that Spain's future lies

...not with Africa or the third world and not even so much in Latin America, but in Europe and with Europe, however uncomfortable that may be at times and despite some sacrifice of the Iberian nation's sense of distinctiveness. Psychologically, culturally, politically, and sociologically Europe is where their strongest ties now are; and if these factors are not sufficient, then those all-important economic relations of interdependence must surely make the European bonds definitive.³⁵⁵

C. SPAIN'S POTENTIAL ROLE IN THE UNITED EUROPE

As might well be imagined, Spain's role in a united Europe will depend entirely on the nature of the united Europe within the developing global system. According to Spain's Foreign Minister, Francisco Fernandez Ordonez, "the European Community has three basic roles to play: to transcend the division of Europe; to support the process of political reforms,... and to facilitate economic liberalization."³⁵⁶ Ordanez notes, however, that "the prerequisite for progress in this direction is the EC's political unity."

Spain's enthusiasm for the concept of a united Europe is unequivocal. In August, 1989, *El Pais* published the results of a survey in which Spaniards were quizzed regarding their opinions of European union. According to *El Pais*, "most Spaniards say that they are in favor of the establishment of a European union with a single common constitution, currency, passport, parliament, government, and even army."³⁵⁷ The same report shows that

...eight of every 10 Spaniards are in favor of holding a referendum in the European Community to establish a European union and of having a single

³⁵⁵ Ibid.

³⁵⁶ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "Foreign Minister on Role in Changing Europe," *Daily Report - West Europe*, p. 15, 20 April 1990.

³⁵⁷ *El Pais*, "Poll Shows Wide Support for European Union," 10 July 1989.

European passport. Three of every four Spaniards (compared to just one in two only a year ago) now want the recently elected European Parliament to prepare a draft constitution for European Union, even though that is not its area of responsibility. A clear absolute majority (between 49 and 67 percent) are in favor of a single European Parliament, or of a single electoral party system, and of a president of Europe.³⁵⁸

Prime Minister Gonzalez, speaking to the Spanish people in late June 1990 following the EC summit in Dublin "underlined the great effort that European unity will [entail] for each and every one of the member countries," but also "explained the Spanish proposals on European citizenship...."³⁵⁹

Given their enthusiasm for European unity, Spain is especially proud of the fact that a Europe made apparent progress towards this end under the leadership of a Spaniard. Ordonez notes that "under Spain's presidency," the EEC accomplished the following:

- Approval for "the negotiation of trade and cooperation agreements with Bulgaria, Poland, and the Soviet Union"
- Grant for "major food and medical aid... to certain countries, such as Poland and Romania"
- Approval for "the establishment of a European Reconstruction and Development Bank (BERD)"
- Approval for "a revision of community financial plans with a view to a 1992 whereby additional credits will be granted to the Eastern countries."³⁶⁰

Ortenez further reports that "in parallel with economic and financial cooperation, there has also been progress in intensifying the political dialogue with the countries of the East, which received a major boost during the Spanish presidency."³⁶¹

³⁵⁸ Ibid.

³⁵⁹ Foreign Broadcast Information Service, "More on European Unity, Stability," *Daily Report - West Europe*, p. 22, 28 June 1990.

³⁶⁰ FBIS, "Foreign Minister on Role....," p. 15.

³⁶¹ Ibid.

While Spain's enthusiasm for its relatively new position in Europe is laudable, it is difficult not to wonder whether the Spanish foreign minister's comments might not, in themselves, be indicative of a latent nationalism in Spain — the kind of nationalism that a united Europe is supposedly trying to overcome.

As noted in the first section of this chapter, the emerging global system is very much dependent on the outcome of Europe's plans for unity in 1992. If Europe is, in fact, able to overcome the nationalism that has proven to be a cause of instability in the past, then it is likely that Europe will be a central pole in a multi-polar system. If, on the other hand, Europe is not able to unite, Spain's position — commonly considered to be peripheral to main events in Europe — may take on renewed significance. To illustrate this point, it may be useful to look at the gross national products (GNP) of the 12 European nations that currently form the EEC. While the GNP of a nation is only one aspect of power, it may be significant enough to serve as an indication of a nation's potential. Hence, the following information regarding each of the 12 EEC member's GNP is provided as the first step towards envisioning a possible scenario in Europe and Spain's role, should Europe 1992 prove unsuccessful.

<i>Country</i>	<i>GNP (in billions of U.S. dollars)</i>	
Germany (East and West)	1083	
France	724	
Italy	368	
France & Italy combined		1092
Britain	504	
Ireland	28.6	
Benelux (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg)	306.6	
Denmark	101.3	
Britain, Ireland, Benelux, & Denmark combined		940.5
Greece	36.6	
Portugal	28.9	
Spain	187.6	
Greece, Portugal, & Spain combined		253.1³⁶²

As may have been noted, the EEC members above have been divided into four groups. These divisions are based on considerations of proximity, historical ties, and major trading partners as indicated in the *1990 World Almanac and Book of Facts*³⁶³. It is interesting to note that the GNP of the first three groups is roughly equivalent, whereas Spain's natural grouping has a GNP that could hardly rival any of the first three groups. On the one hand, this information makes Spain look fairly insignificant in the overall scheme of the new Europe. On the other hand, however, should Europe fail to unite, Spain may prove to be a valuable asset with the potential to shift the balance of power.

Should the 12 EEC nations be able to overcome, or at least deal constructively with Europe's history of conflict, then the united Europe would have a GNP of \$3,368.6 billion, which would put it ahead of both Japan (with a GNP of \$1,900 billion) and the Soviet Union (with a GNP of \$2,300 billion); it would certainly become a major pillar with the United States (which has a GNP of \$4,500 billion) in the global system. As

³⁶² *The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1990*, pp. 685-772, World Almanac, 1990.

³⁶³ *Ibid.*

such, Spain recognizes its future lies with Europe. However, should fragmentation in Europe occur, Spain may well remain a small fish in a big sea – but it may have the potential to swing the balance of power nevertheless. It is no wonder that Spain is interested in a united Europe. For the time being, then, Spain's role in Europe is one of total support and, regarding her Arab and Latin American interests, planned ambiguity.

D. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

It is currently the commonly held belief that NATO has, in essence, ceased to exist. If this were the case, then a section on the implications of *anything* on NATO would seem a bit absurd. However, if it is true that East-West tension and distrust have, for all practical purposes, been dispelled and even if a united Europe looks to an organization such as the CSCE to replace NATO in meeting its security needs, the fact remains that NATO, as an organization, may not have totally outlived its usefulness.

Much has changed since 1987 when Josef Jaffe addressed this topic. Furthermore, his ideas regarding European unity are far from optimistic and, in some instances, are somewhat antagonistic; even so, they are worth noting. He asks:

Which legacy of the past matters more to Europeans: centuries of separate statehood in the shadow of war, or the few decades of partial cooperation under the umbrella of the Pax Americana? In spite of its impressive record of functional integration, Western Europe remains, to recall Stanley Hoffman's verdict, 'a collection of largely self-encased nation-states.... If the hostilities entailed by separate past appear to have evaporated, [Western Europe's] separate pasts have not.³⁶⁴

As Spain and the rest of Europe are in the midst of a transition they hope will bring unity to their conflict, they are all too well aware of the separate pasts that Joffe points out. At the same time, Joffe's principal assertion that NATO "is impervious to real change as long as the world remains dominated *a deux*"³⁶⁵ is somewhat incomplete in

³⁶⁴ Joffe, p. 188.

light of a potential global shift from a bi-polar to a multi-polar system. Even if such a shift becomes reality, however, NATO's outer bounds may be strong enough to withstand the inevitable pressures both from within and from without. Its history is, in fact, replete with both types of pressure. Nevertheless, any substantial shift in pressure, either from without or within the organization, should be carefully analyzed vis a vis its potential impact on NATO and the existing balance of power.

The challenge for present governments, including the Spanish government, is to assess such pressures to determine if the global balance of power is jeopardized to the extent that it outweighs any jeopardy to the European balance of power. In the event that pressures of a multi-polar system were to erode NATO's sturdy outer bounds, NATO has the potential, like an inflated balloon under either too much internal or external pressure, to pop. Given the dangers posed by another world war, maintaining the balance of power to avoid such a pop (either through the current alliance system or some kind of modified system, based on world developments) is, without a doubt, worth the effort.

Currently, NATO has the best-ever record of an alliance system that has proven to be capable of maintaining the balance of power in Europe over an extended period of time. It may continue to be the best available option for assuring the continuance of this balance, at least for the time being. Nevertheless, should mounting pressures threaten to explode the "NATO balloon," and the risk of explosion under these pressures becomes greater than the risk of the pressures of continued alliance, voluntarily deflating the balloon in the face of shifting alliances may be the best available option.

Such an occurrence does not necessarily mean an end to the Atlantic Alliance. As Dr. Edwina S. Campell pointed out in a speech given at the Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California on 20 September 1989, "We [in the U.S.] tend to view the questioning of NATO as questioning of the relationship." Such a view, in the case of

³⁶⁵ Joffe, p. 42.

Spain, is not totally unfounded. Spain *does* in fact maintain an innate distrust of the U.S., largely due to U.S. support of the Franco regime. In addition, several other factors, including Spain's historical propensity for isolationism, a nostalgic desire for neutrality, and the argument that "Spain's foreign policy objectives are not related to Alliance objectives"³⁶⁶ have led some to suggest the possibility of ultimate withdrawal from NATO.

However, it seems likely that Spain will opt to remain in NATO for several reasons. First, in spite of energetic debate prior to the 1986 referendum, its outcome solidified Spain's membership. Second, none of the major political parties in Spain currently advocates withdrawal. Third, many Spaniards still see membership in NATO as connected with membership in the EEC. Fourth, it seems apparent that "Spain has rejected a position of neutralism and intends to pursue an active defense... [and] finally, Spain might find the actual mechanics of withdrawing from the Alliance difficult and disruptive."³⁶⁷ Besides, as Vinas notes, "the PSOE has been able to survive its traumas over defense policy and NATO. It is now united and believes firmly in the need to strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance."³⁶⁸

While it is clear, then, that Spain is more interested in "strengthening the European pillar" than in maintaining cross-Atlantic ties, it is also unlikely that Spain will either withdraw or become fully integrated into NATO. This is particularly true since one of Gonzalez's primary objectives has been "to secure Spain's autonomy — to follow an independent course."³⁶⁹ Thus, Spain's participation in NATO may well come closer and

³⁶⁶ Allin, p. 67.

³⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 68.

³⁶⁸ Vinas, 192.

³⁶⁹ Allin, 70.

closer to a resemblance of "Gaullist policy."³⁷⁰

Essentially, then, Spain's role in the Alliance seems to have changed little since the referendum. It is in Spain's national interest to remain in the Alliance,³⁷¹ just as it is in NATO's interest to support European unity and stability, two terms that have come to be nearly synonymous. Meanwhile Spain has, as Vinas concludes, "ceased to be at the margin of European affairs."³⁷² Holding on to the status quo seems to be the only real alternative for a Spain interested both in preserving its autonomy and in avoiding a policy of isolationism. "Ambivalence" once again seems to describe both Spain's position and its future prospects concerning NATO. Ironically, in light of a world situation in which the status quo is changing on a daily basis, the same ambiguity that has ensured Spain's survival may also serve the Atlantic Alliance as both strive to be like (and in Spain's case, possess) the Rock of Gibraltar in a sea of turmoil.

³⁷⁰ Ibid. Treverton, p. 41, also advocates such a prospect for the future.

³⁷¹ Sanchez-Gijon, 98.

³⁷² Vinas, 193.

VI. CONCLUSIONS

No security system is without flaws, and the Spanish security system is no exception. On the one hand, Spain has successfully managed to handle its transition to democracy and developments such as joining the EEC and NATO that would have seemed highly unlikely if not impossible during Franco's regime. On the other hand, Spain's transitional period is not over. Having chosen to expend its energy on becoming part of the New Europe, Spain no longer has the option of returning to its more isolationist tendencies or of focusing on Latin America or its Arab neighbors.

Europe's progress towards greater unity is uncontrollable; whether Spain can handle the demands of the unity it seeks remains to be seen, especially given the separatist elements, particularly the Basque terrorist organization, in Spain.

Presently, the global transition seems to have paused at least temporarily in a kind of universal system similar to the one Morton Kaplan described over 30 years ago. This situation can probably be at least partially attributed to the crisis in the Persian Gulf, which has served as a sort of catalyst in fostering global unity (minus, of course, Iraq). Whether or not the situation could blossom into a full-fledged universal system, however, is doubtful. Latent nationalism may be temporarily overshadowed by world events, but as the shadows fade, the world will be left to face its true nature, which, it seems, has not yet developed such that it could support a universal system.

If the world's nation-states have not evolved to the point of being able to accept a universal global system, however, they have at least been successful in erasing many of the barriers that have historically symbolized nationalism. The fall of the Berlin wall is but one example. In addition, Spain's espousal of democracy and impressive economic progress have contributed to creating a Europe that does not "stop at the Pyrenees."

As Eastern European nations begin their transition from authoritarian regimes towards democracy, Spain, while far from being a perfect model, serves as an example of hope. Likewise, as far as it is possible to compare nationalistic tendencies to Spain's regionalism, Spain serves as an example for the nations of Europe who are trying to overcome the nationalism that has sparked sporadic conflict amongst them since the time of Napoleon. Likewise, while it would be simplistic to suggest too many parallels between Spain's development and the development of any other nation in Eastern Europe, it nevertheless seems appropriate to suggest that if Spain is able to preserve its democracy, and there is every reason for optimism in this regard, then other nations, like Spain, have the potential to overcome authoritarian governments peacefully as well.


By the same token, the continuing existence of separatist groups in Spain stands as evidence of the continuing potential for exacerbation, just as the continuing presence of nationalities in Europe stands as evidence of the continuing potential for separatism. In short, Spain's future is intrinsically connected with Europe's. If Spain has to deal with separatism, Europe has to deal with nationalism. If Spain is concerned with unemployment and a healthy economy, so is Europe and, in fact, the EEC can be expected to have an equalizing effect on the two economies if tariffs and protectionist measures are ever really lifted in accordance with goals set. If Spain is questioning the necessity for NATO, so is Europe. If the issue of Gibraltar is an exterior security issue for Spain, it is an internal concern for Europe in that both Britain and Spain are members of NATO and lay claim to the area. If Spain is increasing relations to include both economic and political support for the Soviet Union, Europe is doing no less. Further, Spain and Europe share the hope that a new Europe with fewer economic, political, and possibly even social barriers will be able to emerge through a peaceful transition.

As the past few years have shown, no world system is entirely stable. Nuances that affect security trends are ongoing. Nevertheless, some systems are definitely more stable

than others. Given the events that have set current trends in motion, it is in both Spain's and Europe's interests to work toward creating a stable hierarchy within a united Europe. Furthermore, it is in the best interests of the United States to support the European initiative in the interest of global security.

APPENDIX A


MAP OF THE BASQUE REGION



From Clark, Robert P., *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 9, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.

APPENDIX B

THE EVOLUTION OF THE ETA



From Clark, Robert P., *The Basque Insurgents*, p. 36, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1984.

APPENDIX C

SELECTED ETA ACTIONS SINCE 1980

The following is a partial list of the ETA's actions from 1980 through 1990. Where only the month or year is given, it indicates that further information was not available in the sources used. Entries in boldface are actions carried out by the ETA. Entries in *italics* list other events affecting the ETA. The names of Basque provinces are abbreviated: "Guip." for Guipuzcoa, "Viz." for Vizcaya, and "Nav." for Navarra. The column labeled "Source" indicates the source of this information, much of which was taken from FBIS Terrorism reports, in which case the original newspaper, news service, or broadcast service is given. "Profiles" refers to the publication by the U.S. Department of Defense, *Terrorist Group Profiles*. Sources indicating "msg" refer to messages to HQ APOSI from either the Joint Chiefs of Staff ("JCS msg."), the Joint Staff ("JS msg."), or AFOSI District 68 ("AFOSI msg."). No dates are given for the sources; for public media and messages, however, the dates of reporting were within several days after the event except as noted. All of the events listed here were claimed by the ETA, suspected by government authorities to have been committed by the ETA, or were linked to the ETA in news sources.

Date	Target of Action	Type of Action	Location	Source	Results, comments
1980	Eduardo Gomez Frangueria (Memb. Parl.)	Kidnapping Att.		CAMBIO 16	Unsuccessful
1980	Military Command Headquarters	Attack	Berga	CAMBIO 16	
1980 Feb	Spanish Prime Minister's residence	Rocket	Madrid	Profiles	Missed, no injuries
1980 Aug 22	Jose Urzua, Navarra Newspaper Editor	Shot	Navarra	CAMBIO 16	Survived 25 bullets
1980 Oct 13	Officer of the "Pioneer Troops"	Shot	San Sebastian	Nordbayr. Kur	Killed, 100th ETA death of 1980
1981 Jan	"One of Spain's wealthiest men"	Shot		Profiles	Recd. \$3.3 mill. ransom
1981 Mar 19	Col. Ramon Romero Rotache	Shot	Bilbao	NY Times	
1981 Mar 22	Lt. Col. Jose Luis Prieto	Gunned-down	Pamplona	NY Times	Killed, ETA trying to provoke coup
1982 Jan	"Leading industrialist"	Kidnapping		Profiles	Recd. \$1.3 mill. ransom
1982 Sep	Campan cargo terminal	Sinking		CAMBIO 16	Depth charges used
1982 Oct	Various Basque banks	Bombs	Basque Terr.	Profiles	Refused to pay "taxes"
1983 Feb	Bilbao Bank	Bomb	Bilbao	Profiles	Defused by police
1983 Aug	(Various)	Bombs	Barcelona	CAMBIO 16	Unsuccessful
1984	Campan gas pipeline	Bombing Att.	Badalona	CAMBIO 16	2 police killed inspecting bomb
1984 Apr	Retired military officer	Bomb	Pamplona	Profiles	Killed
1984 Oct 17	Vicente Gajate Martin, policeman	Shot in back	Renteria (Guip.)	El Pais	
1984 Dec	Rota-Zaragoza military pipeline	Bomb		Profiles	Killed
1985 Jul	Spanish Dir. of Defense Policy (& chauffeur)	Bomb	Madrid	Profiles	Killed
1985 Aug 22	Radio Ser network antenna	Bomb	Igueldo Mtn., S.S.	Madrid EFE	
1985 Aug 28	ETA offers cease-fire in exchange for promise of negotiations			La Vanguardia	
1985 Sep	GAL kills 4 ETA members in Bayonne tavern			CAMBIO 16	
1985 Sep	Spanish Defense Intel. Agents begin secret negotiations with ETA			CAMBIO 16	
1985 Sep 09	Civil Guard	Bomb	Madrid	CAMBIO 16	19 CG, 1 American killed
1985 Sep 14	Policeman	Bomb	Vitoria	Madrid EFE	Policeman killed, 1 injured
1985 Sep 15	Spanish Prime Minister rejects calls for negotiations with ETA			Paris AFP	
1985 Oct 11	"Yoyes," former ETA leader, returns to Spain from exile in France			CAMBIO 16	
1985 Oct 26	National Police Barracks	Grenade	Basaurl (Viz.)	CAMBIO 16	
1985 Nov 07	Civil Guardman	Bomb	Lagrosao	CAMBIO 16	

Date	Target of Action	Type of Action	Location	Source	Results, comments
1985 Dec 23	Juan Aterea, Civil Guard General, ret.	Shot	Pamplona	CAMBIO 16	Killed
1986	Francisco Sanchez, Policeman	Bomb		CAMBIO 16	13-yr.-old bystander killed
1986	José Vivet, Mayor	Shot	Olabarria (Guip.)	CAMBIO 16	
1986 Jan 16	3 ETA members shot and killed after machine-gunning a French truck			Profites	Killed
1986 Feb	Vice Adm. Cristóbal Caban (& chauffeur)	Shot, grenades	Madrid	SUD-OUEST	
1986 Mar 14	Police, ETA clash in San Sebastian - 1 Policeman, 1 ETA leader killed	Shot	Bilbao	Paris AFP	
1986 Mar 20	José Aguirresabaltza, GAL member	Shot		Madrid EFE	
1986 Mar 26	Police arrest 3 alleged ETA members in Pamplona, arms cache found		Logrono	CAMBIO 16	
1986 Apr 14	Police uncover ETA plans to kill Logrono Army Lt. Gen.		San Sebastian	Madrid EFE	Defused
1986 May 03	72-year old prisoner	Shot	Bilbao	Madrid EFE	Killed (AFOSI msg. dated 19 Jul 89)
1986 May 04	Police Headquarters	Bomb		AFOSI msg.	10 killed, dozens injured
1986 Jun	Military officers & driver	Assassination	Madrid	Profites	10 inj. in related car-bomb
1986 Jul	Civil Guard Cadets	Car-bomb	Madrid	Profites	ETA assisted by Terra Lliure
1986 Jul	Ministry of Defense	Rockets	Probleuou	La Vanguardia	
1986 Sep 13	Civil Guard	Car-bomb		El Pais	
1986 Sep 30	ETA orders increased attacks on French interests			El Pais	
1986 Oct 03	ETA arms cache found in Herri Baiauna Hqs. in Bilibona, 4 arrested			El Pais	
1986 Oct 03	Jesús Jimenez Zubano, alleged ETA-M member, arrested in France			El Pais	
1986 Oct 03	Arcon Peugeot-Talbot auto dealership	Bomb	San Sebastian	El Pais	Failed to explode
1986 Oct 03	Management Technical Consulting (ATESA)	Bombing Att.	San Sebastian	Madrid YA	
1986 Oct 05	Spain organizes "Crisis Cabinet" to deal with terrorism			Paris AFP	
1986 Oct 09	Peugeot garage	Bomb	San Sebastian	La Vanguardia	
1986 Oct 10	ETA arsenal discovered in Tajonar (Nav.)			La Vanguardia	
1986 Oct 10	ETA linked with Terra Lliure (Catalan separatist terrorists)			El Pais	
1986 Oct 10	ETA-M discovered to be "regrouping" in Algeria			Paris AFP	
1986 Oct 10	Bank	Bomb	Barcelona	Paris AFP	
1986 Oct 10-23	2 French-registered cars	Burnt		Paris AFP	
1986 Oct 10-23	Crescent company (French)	Bomb	Barcelona	Paris AFP	
1986 Oct 10-23	French truck	Machine-gunning		Paris AFP	
1986 Oct 10-23	Roadsign company (French)	Bomb	Barcelona	La Vanguardia	
1986 Oct 14	Belchite Barracks, National Police	Car-bomb	Barcelona	El Pais	Susp. links to Terra Lliure
1986 Oct 14	Policeman killed, 11 injured	Car-bomb	Barcelona	El Pais	Refused to pay "protection"
1986 Oct 16	Lacho Aguirregalde, Banque Industrialist	Kidnapping	Vitoria	Paris AFP	
1986 Oct 18	5 Renault, Citroen Dealerships (French)	Bomb	Guip.	Paris AFP	
1986 Oct 20	Renault showroom	Bomb	Las Arenas	JCS msg.	No injuries
1986 Oct 20	Kronenbourg Beer (French)	Bomb	Lasarte	JCS msg.	No injuries, considerable damage
1986 Oct 20	Spain stiffens anti-terrorism legislation			El Pais	
1986 Oct 22	ETA prisoners caught in attempted tunnel escape from prison			Madrid ABC	
1986 Oct 24	4 ETA members sentenced to 66 years for 1984 shooting of policeman.			El Pais	
1986 Oct 25	2 Supermarkets (1 French-owned)	Bombs	Vitoria	Paris AFP	5 injured
1986 Oct 25	French auto showrooms	Bombs	Various cities	JCS msg.	Cities: Ordizia, Bergara, Urretxu, no injuries
1986 Oct 25	Gen. Garrido, wife, & son (Mil. Gov., Guip.)	Bomb	San Sebastian	El Pais	All 3 killed, 9 others injured, 1986 death toll: 43
1986 Oct 26	Herri Baiauna demands negotiations with ETA; 25,000 join protest			El Pais	

Date	Target of Action	Type of Action	Location	Source	Results, comments
1986 Oct 26	Government condemns assassination of General Rafael Garrido by ETA			El Pais	
1986 Oct 30	Jose Larrañaga, alias Peio el Viejo (ETA-Military head) detained by French police			El Pais	(see 16 Oct)
1986 Nov 02	Police free kidnapped industrialist Aquinagalde, Police Chief killed in rescue			Vienna ORF	
1986 Nov 05	Chirac (French P.M.) visits Madrid to discuss Antiterrorism cooperation			Madrid radio	
1986 Nov 05	ETA weapons, explosives cache discovered in Hendaye (France); 11 arrested			El Pais	
1986 Nov 06	Basques riot in Remeria in protest of police raid on weapons cache			Hong Kong AFP	(see 5 Nov)
1986 Nov 07	Renault Dealership	2 Bombs	San Sebastian	Paris AFP	(see 5 Nov)
1986 Dec 16	2 French businessmen	Bombs	Barcelona	JCS msg.	At least 2 seriously injured
1986 Dec	Spanish businessman	Kidnapping		Profiles	Recd. \$1.5 mill. ransom
1987 Jan	Military bus	Car-bomb	Zaragoza	Profiles	2 killed, 40 injured
1987 Jan 24	Six of nine suspects arrested by police admit to ETA ties		Madrid	Reuters	(see Jan car-bomb)
1987 Feb 01	Tens of thousands march through Zaragoza in anti-ETA protest			UPI	
1987 Mar 02	Domingo "Tumbala" Ibarbe, top ETA leader, killed in car crash		Algeria	Reuters	
1987 Mar	Army officer	Ambush	Pamplona	Profiles	Survived
1987 Mar 09	Army officer	Machine gun	Vitoria	Reuters	Survived
1987 Mar 37	Civil Guard Barracks	Car-bomb	Barcelona	AP	1 killed, 15 injured
1987 Apr 05	Two Basque terrorists accidentally killed by their own bomb		Tafalla	UPI	
1987 Apr 08	Two Italians arrested foiling ETA		Madrid	UPI	
1987 Apr	Sports stadium	Bomb	Burlada	Profiles	Defused by police
1987 Apr 10	French Banking Association Offices	Car-bomb	Barcelona	Reuters	3rd attack in Barc. in 2 wks.
1987 Apr 26	100 pro-ETA protesters disrupt commemoration of WWII bombing in Guernica			LA Times	
1987 May	Basque Industrialist	Kidnapping	Madrid	Profiles	Recd. \$1.6 mill. ransom
1987 May 17	Navy, Air Force, Civil Guard Hqs.	3 Car-bombs		LA Times	1 killed 9 injured
1987 May 29	Judge expels Basque MP on trial for ETA connections		Bilbao	Reuters	
1987 Jun	Military Governor's offices	Grenades	San Sebastian	Profiles	6 injured
1987 Jun	Police vans	Car-bomb	San Sebastian	Profiles	6 injured
1987 Jun	State-owned petrochemical plant	2 Bombs		Profiles	\$8-16 million damage
1987 Jun 19	Supermarket garage	Car-bomb	Barcelona	UPI	21 killed, 44 inj. (see 24 Oct 89)
1987 Jun 22	300,000 join silent protest march in Barcelona to protest bloodiest ETA act ever			LA Times	(see Jun 19)
1987 Jul	Civil Guard building	Car-bomb		Profiles	20 injured
1987 Jul	Civil Guard patrol car	Bomb	Onate	Profiles	2 killed, 2 injured
1987 Jul 07	Military headquarters	Grenades	San Sebastian	UPI	5 injured
1987 Jul 08	Police capture 2 ETA terrorists, seize 77 lbs. of explosives		Zaragoza	LA Times	
1987 Jul 12	France agrees to expel all ETA terrorists if can find		Madrid	Reuters	
1987 Jul	Various French property	3 bombs	Durango, Pamplona	Profiles	
1987 Jul 14	Parliamentary Civil Guard van	Bomb	Onate	UPI	
1987 Jul 23	Police kill 1 ETA suspect, arrest many others in raids		San Sebastian	AP	
1987 Jul 24	Parliamentary Civil Guard barracks	Car-bomb	Elber	UPI	
1987 Aug 06	National Police vehicle	Trash can-bomb	Vitoria	UPI	2 killed, 1 injured
1987 Aug 07	Civil Guard barracks	Grenades	Zarauz	UPI	6 injured
1987 Aug 14	Basque police end a strike protesting working conditions		Madrid	Reuters	
1987 Aug 16	Pro-Basque demonstration, 16 arrested, several injured		Goizueta	AP	
1987 Aug 30	ETA leader claims willingness to negotiate peace, end hostilities		Madrid	Reuters	


Date	Target of Action	Type of Action	Location	Source	Results, comments
1987 Sep 05	Police raid 2 ETA hideouts in Barcelona, 3 arrested		Barcelona	JCS msg.	
1987 Sep 17	France deport 2 ETA suspects		San Sebastian	Reuters	
1987 Sep 27	2 National Police vans	Car-bomb	San Sebastian	UPI, Profiles	1 policeman killed, 6 inj.
1987 Sep 30	Court house, during ETA trial	2 Car-bombs	Madrid	UPI	
1987 Oct 01	Police raid suspected ETA safe houses, 12 arrested			UPI	ETA blamed for 600+ deaths
1987 Oct 02	French police arrest ETA leader, nearly 100 others arrested		France	AP	
1987 Oct 10	French police discover master ETA list in farmhouse		France	Wash Post	1 woman killed
1987 Oct 17	Insurance Company	Bomb	Pamplona	LA Times	Killed
1987 Oct 17	Parliamentary Civil Guardmen	Shot	Ordicia	UPI	
1987 Nov 01	Threes jailed for killing Frenchman they mistook for ETA terrorist			Reuters	11 killed, 40 injured
1987 Nov 13	Civil Guard apartment complex	Car-bomb	Zaragoza	AP	
1987 Dec 11	ETA offers truce for talks; Govt. says attacks must end first		Madrid	UPI	
1988 Jan 29	Govt. urges ETA to cease attacks, resume talks		Madrid	Reuters	Effectively ends truce
1988 Feb 10	58-yr-old businessman Emiliano Revilla Sanza	Kidnapped	Madrid	AP	
1988 Feb 25	Civil Guard barracks	Rocket-grenade	Llodio, Alava	JCS msg.	Killed
1988 Mar 15	Civil Guardmen Pedro Balbastro	Killed	Durango	JCS msg.	Killed
1988 Mar 19	Civil Guardmen Emilio Revilla Sanza	Assassinated		JCS msg.	(see 13 Mar 90)
1988 Mar 27	General Luis Azcaraga	Killed	Vitoria	JCS msg.	3 wounded
1988 Apr 15	2 National Policemen	Bomb	Guipuzcoa	JCS msg.	Found & deactivated
1988 Apr	French police wound, arrest ETA suspects carrying \$6M in suspected ransom money		Torremolinos	JCS msg.	Killed, possible drug dealer
1988 May 11	Civil Guard convoy	Car-bomb	Eibar	JCS msg.	Killed, suspected drug dealer
1988 May 19	Resort Hotel	Killed		JCS msg.	Farmer injured, bomb rigged to fake launcher
1988 May 25	Sebastian Alsapiri	Killed		JCS msg.	No fatalities, other bombs defused
1988 Jun 06	Francisco Zabala	Booby-trap		JCS msg.	5 guards injured
1988 Jul 30	Civil Guard barracks	Bombings	Ciutruenigo, Nav.	JCS msg.	2 guards killed, 2 injured
1988 Aug 13	6 French car dealers & 1 French dairy	2 bombs	Northern Spain	AP	
1988 Aug 20	Civil Guard patrol cars	Car-bomb	Eibar	AP	
1988 Aug 27	Interactions		Estella	LA Times	Killed
1988 Sep 08	Catalan terrorist group Terra Llure found to be using weapons & tactics of ETA.	Shot	Izurrea, Viz.	JCS msg.	
1988 Sep 10	2 National Policemen	Shot	Alava	JCS msg.	
1988 Sep 11	2 National Policemen	Shot	Bilbao	JCS msg.	Killed, ETA claimed he was drug dealer
1988 Sep 16	Jose Luis Barrios, working in his father's cafe	Shot	Algorta	JCS msg.	Slightly wounded
1988 Sep 22	Civil Guard Emiliano Tulavan	Shot	Viz. & Guip.	JCS msg.	No injuries
1988 Oct 03	5 French auto dealers	Molotov cocktails	Leon, Spain	Reuters	
1988 Oct 09	Spain, France agree on anti-terrorism measures		Bilbao	JCS msg.	Killed
1988 Oct 29	National Policeman	Killed	Bilbao	JCS msg.	No casualties
1988 Oct 30	Citroen & Peugeot dealerships	Bombs	Llodio, Alava	JCS msg.	(see 25 Feb)
1988 Nov 02	Civil Guard barracks	Launched grenades	Bilbao	JCS msg.	No injuries, significant property damage
1988 Nov	ETA releases Emiliano Revilla after 8 months for \$12 million ransom			Reuters	2 killed, 20 injured
1988 Nov 14	30-40 banks	Molotov cocktails	Basque country	JCS msg.	4 injured
1988 Nov 22	Civil Guard Headquarters	Car-bomb	Madrid	LA Times, JCS	1 killed, 15 injured
1988 Nov 26	Spanish National Police	Car-bomb	Bilbao	JCS msg.	
1988 Dec 18	Police convoy	Car-bomb	Eibar	Daily Telegraph	

Date	Target of Action	Type of Action	Location	Source	Results, comments
1989 Jan 12	Jose Antonio Urrekitioetxea (ETA leader), 10 others arrested		France	AP, Daily Tel.	
1989 Jan 22	Police accused of hiring "hit-squads" to kill Basque separatists			Wash. Post	
1989 Jan 23	Govt. proposes new peace talks, ETA anncs. continued cease-fire			UPI	
1989 Feb 26	Govt., ETA meet in Algiers to discuss terms of peace		Algiers	Wash. Post	
1989 Mar 08	France requests extradition of anti-ETA death squad member		Pau, France	Reuters	
1989 Mar 20	Madrid-Sevilla rail line	Bomb		AFOSI msg.	Located & disarmed
1989 Apr 04	ETA announces intent to end 3-month cease-fire			JS msg.	
1989 Apr 07	National Policeman	Package-bomb	Irua	JS msg.	4 injured, renewed violence ends Algerian talks
1989 Apr 07	Prison director	Package-bomb	Near Madrid	JS msg.	Deactivated, prison held ca. 180 ETA members
1989 Apr 08	Spanish railways & electrical substations	7 Bombs	Guip. & Nav.	JS msg.	No injuries
1989 Apr 11	Transportation Ministry	2 Letter-bombs		JS msg.	Bombs found, no injuries
1989 Apr 12	Civil Guard policemen	Killed	Bilbao	JS msg.	Killed
1989 Apr 14	2 Civil Guards	Car-bomb	Pasajes, Guip.	JS msg.	Injured
1989 Apr 16	Public park	Bomb	Mondragon, Guip.	JS msg.	Discovered accidentally & defused
1989 Apr	Police vehicles	Bombs	Viz. & S.S.	AFOSI msg.	
1989 Apr 25	Military pharmacist	Shot	Bilbao	JS msg.	Killed, police subsequently arrest suspects
1989 Apr 16	ETA makes public threats against Spanish railway lines		Spain	UPI, JS msg.	
1989 Apr 19	Algeria expels ETA terrorists		Algeria	Financ. Times	
1989 Apr 24		Bomb	Rueda de Jabon	AFOSI msg.	No damage, 2 others deactivated
1989 May 05	Natural gas distribution site	Bomb	Basque region	JS msg.	
1989 May 05	3 Renault dealerships	Bombs	Bilbao & Guip.	JS msg.	2 police killed, prison worker wounded
1989 May 06	Police, prison workers	Attack	Madrid	JS msg.	2 police killed, 3 injured
1989 May 09	Police, lured to the scene by gunshots	Bomb	Alcala de Henares	AP	Light damage
1989 May 12	Bilbao-Santander Railway	3 bombs	Basque country	JS msg.	No injuries, significant property damage
1989 May 14	Coop market, Bank, Police station, Disco, & others	6 bombs	Guip. & Nav.	JS msg.	Bomb found & defused
1989 May 14	Soccer stadium, perhaps Navarra President	Bomb	Navarra	JS msg.	3 Police killed, 7 injured
1989 May 24	Police, Peugeot dealership	Bomb, car-bomb	Bilbao	JS msg.	1 injured, largest ETA bomb ever
1989 Jun 26	Civil Guard barracks	Bomb in sewer	Llodio, Alava	JS msg.	Stole truck, used it to launch grenades
1989 Jul 05	Civil Guard truck & barracks	Grenades	Pamplona	JS msg.	Killed, driver injured
1989 Jul 19	Spanish Colonel, Major	Machete gun	Madrid	LA Times	No injuries, minor damage
1989 Jul 24	Civil Guard headquarters	Grenades	Orozko, Viz.	JS msg.	Injured
1989 Aug 01	2 National policemen	Car-bomb	Alicante	JS msg.	5 killed, 30 injured
1989 Aug 19	Supermarket parking lot	Car-bomb	Near French border	AP	Killed
1989 Sep 18	Civil Guards kill 2, arrest 19 suspected ETA terrorists	Car-bomb	Irua	AP	(see 19 Jun 87)
1989 Sep 29	National Policeman	Car-bomb	Madrid	AP	Killed
1989 Oct 23	Court finds 2 guilty in 1987 supermarket bombing		Algorita	AP	Killed
1989 Nov 06	National Policeman	Car-bomb	Bilbao	Daily Telegraph	Killed
1989 Nov 06	Policeman	Car-bomb	Bilbao	JCS msg.	Bomb fell off, injured passer-by, police unhurt
1989 Nov 09	Policeman	Car-bomb	Bilbao	JCS msg.	Killed, 11th drug-related ETA victim
1989 Nov 15	Ignacio Beaucelos Laso (suspected drug trafficker)	Car-bomb	Bilbao	AP	1 Killed, 1 injured
1989 Nov 20	Basque Parliament Members (Herri Batasuna)	Shot	Madrid	CINCEUR msg.	No injuries
1989 Nov 20	Bank	Bomb	Vizcaya		

Date	Target of Action	Type of Action	Location	Source	Results, comments
1989 Nov 24	Adolfo Villalada Martin, industrialist	Kidnapped	Pamplona	Reuters	(see Feb 16 1990)
1989 Dec 08	Spanish ambassador's residence in Holland	Grenade	The Hague	Reuters	No injuries
1989 Dec 26	5 ETA terrorists share Noriega's refuge in Vatican embassy		Panama	Reuters	
1990 Jan 19	5 ETA terrorists arrested in Basque country			JCS msg.	
1990 Jan 30	Policeman	Bomb	Bilbao	Reuters	Killed
1990 Feb 16	Kidnap victim Adolfo Villalada freed after 84 days, \$2.7M ransom paid			JCS msg.	
1990 Feb 27	Fernando de Maden Lago, anti-terror judge	Bomb	Madrid	Reuters	Lost both hands
1990 Mar 13	ETA claims credit for letter-bombs, other violence since Jan., seeks renewed talks			Reuters	
1990 Mar 13	Prison worker	Shot in head	San Sebastian	Reuters	Killed
1990 Mar 13	France extradites 2 ETA members arrested in April 88			JCS msg.	
1990 Mar 27	4 police go on trial for helping the ETA		Madrid	Reuters	
1990 Apr 05	France arrests 16 in roundup of ETA suspect... captures explosives in Bayonne			UPI	
1990 Apr 19	Seville World's Fair-offices	Letter-bomb	Seville	Reuters	Secretary lost 1 hand
1990 Apr 22	ETA declares "war" on Seville World's Fair, claims credit for bombs	Letter-bombs	Seville	Financ. Times	
1990 Apr 23	Prison military offices	Letter-bomb	Madrid	Reuters	Worker lost 2 fingers
1990 Apr	Prison guards	Letter-bomb	Seville	JCS msg.	Detected, no injuries
1990 Apr	EXPO '92 security offices	Letter-bomb	Seville	JCS msg.	Never received
1990 May 09	Spanish national bicycle race	Bombs		JCS msg.	Exploded along route
1990 May 22	Virgilio de Nacimiento (suspected drug dealer)	"Killed"	San Sebastian	NY Times	Killed
1990 Jun 02	French-owned supermarket	Bomb		JCS msg.	
1990 Jun 03	Francisco Almergo (ex-policeman)	"Killed"		JCS msg.	Killed
1990 Jun 08	French-owned supermarket	Bomb		JCS msg.	
1990 Jun 10	Rafael San Sebastian Flechoso	"Killed"		JCS msg.	
1990 Jun 13	Col. Jose Lamata Martinez (ret.)	Gained-down	Algorta	NY Times	Killed, ETA admits this was a mistake
1990 Jun 16	Peugeot dealership	Bomb	San Sebastian	NY Times	Killed
1990 Jun 18	Policeman	Car-bomb	San Sebastian	NY Times	
1990 Jun 20	Policeman	Car-bomb	Basauri, Viz.	NY Times	
1990 Jun 21	Policeman	Car-bomb	Bilbao	NY Times	
1990 Jun 21	Renault dealership	Bomb	Sistao, Viz.	NY Times	
1990 Jun 25	Civil Guard	Shot		JCS msg.	Shot in back of head, killed
1990 Jun 28	Ignacio Urrutia (retired Spanish Army officer)		Paris	Reuters	
1990 Jul 04	French court sentences ETA leaders to prison				
1990 Jul 06	Banco Bilbao de Vizcaya (Spanish bank)	Bomb	Amsterdam	NY Times	4 injured, considerable damage
1990 Jul 12	Jose Mangan Suarez (Civil Guard member)	Bomb	Algorta	NY Times	Seriously injured
1990 Jul 11	Renault Dealerships	Bombs		NY Times	1 exploded, 2 defused

APPENDIX D

MAP OF THE MOSLEM WORLD



From Langer, William L., *An Encyclopedia of World History*, p. 202, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1980.

APPENDIX E
TIMELINE OF THE REIGN OF THE MOORS
A.D. 711 – 1492

- 711 Tariq ibn Ziyad leads Arab-Berber invasion of Spain; southern Spain rapidly overrun.
- 732 Arabs defeated near Poitiers, France, by Charles Martel, stemming Arab advance into Europe.
- 778 Charlemagne tries unsuccessfully to invade Spain.
- 822 Al-Hakam I dies after ruling Spain for 26 years. His reign put down rebellious Arab factions in Toledo and Cordoba.
- 900 Height of Moors in Spain; Christians continue the Reconquest. Cordoba becomes seat of Arab learning.
- 929 Abd-al-Rahman III the first to take title of caliph in Spain.
- 1094 El Cid takes Valencia. Moors recapture it eight years later.
- 1095 Start of the First Crusade
- 1118 Muslim city of Zaragoza taken by Alfonso I of Aragon.
- 1147 Almohad faction of Berbers capture Murcia and unite Moorish Spain and Morocco, with capitals at Seville and Marrakech.
- 1236 Cordoba taken by Christians.
- 1248 Seville taken by Christians as Moors are pushed farther and farther south. Work on Alhambra begins in Granada.
- 1275 The Marinids, Berbers from Fez, invade Spain and defeat Christian Castile.
- 1340 Christians defeat the Marinids in Spain at Salado, and the long history of Moroccan invasions of the peninsula comes to an end.
- 1469 Ferdinand of Aragon weds Isabella of Castille.
- 1492 Ferdinand and Isabella enter the Alhambra in Granada, crushing the last stronghold of the Moors. They finance the voyage of Christopher Columbus to the New World later in the year.

From Abercrombie, Thomas, "When the Moors Ruled Spain," p. 95, *National Geographic*, July 1988.

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